Chapter 2: The new arrangements for
Indigenous affairs – facilitating Indigenous access to government
services

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Chapter 1 << Chapter 2 >> Chapter 3

• Part 1: The challenge of ensuring equal access
  • Background - the new arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs
  • Indigenous disadvantage and human rights
  • The challenge of improving Indigenous access to mainstream services
  • The situation of urban Indigenous peoples - a particular concern
  • A case study: withdrawal of CDEP from urban and certain regional centres and abolition of Indigenous Employment Centres
  • The Council of Australian Government (COAG) Trials
  • Post COAG trials - another 'new' approach
  • Summary: The challenges of achieving equitable access to mainstream services for Indigenous peoples
• Part 2: 'Harnessing the mainstream' through the new arrangements for Indigenous affairs
  • Regionally focussed service delivery: Indigenous Coordination Centres, solution brokers, agreement making processes and 'intensive interventions'
  • Issues concerning engagement with Indigenous communities
  • The changing role of the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination (OIPC)
  • Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms - ensuring accountability for the new arrangements
• Part 3: Conclusions and recommendations

It has now been over two years since the federal government introduced new
arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs. One of the catchcries
of the new arrangements is that they are aimed at ‘harnessing the
mainstream.’ This is to be achieved by removing or reducing the barriers
that prevent Indigenous peoples from accessing existing mainstream services on
an equitable basis. There are two ways of achieving this: first, mainstream
departments can improve their service delivery so that existing mainstream
services are better able to meet the needs of Indigenous peoples; and second,
the whole of government machinery of the new arrangements for Indigenous affairs
can be utilised to create better synergies between mainstream programs and
Indigenous specific services. The focus of this chapter is primarily on this
second aspect of ‘harnessing the mainstream’.

This is the third successive year that the Social Justice Report has
considered the impact of the new arrangements. The two previous reports have
expressed concerns at the lack of progress in ‘harnessing the
mainstream’ and the existence of structural problems within the new
arrangements that work against this objective (such as the absence of processes
for systemic engagement with Indigenous peoples locally, regionally and
nationally; the absence of appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; and
the under-performance of Shared Responsibility Agreements and the new whole of
government machinery in ‘unlocking’ mainstream accessibility).

Sufficient time has now passed to identify whether the new arrangements have
indeed begun to positively impact on the accessibility of mainstream services
for Indigenous peoples, and consequently to demonstrate their potential to
impact on the social and economic disadvantage experienced by Indigenous
peoples. This chapter focuses on the performance of the new arrangements, with a
particular emphasis on this objective of improving access for Indigenous
Australians to mainstream services.

Part 1 of the chapter provides a broad overview of the challenges of
improving accessibility of mainstream services f or Indigenous peoples, as well
as the commitments made to achieve this through the new arrangements. Part 2
then considers the existing potential and current progress in ‘harnessing
the mainstream’ through the new arrangements for the administration of
Indigenous affairs.

As this chapter demonstrates, a degree of instability appears to characterise
the new arrangements in Indigenous affairs with a seemingly endless raft of
complex changes to the government’s administrative processes, policies and
programs. The rhetoric of the arrangements is strong, but the outcomes remain
elusive. The chapter analyses the processes of the new arrangements in some
depth and offers suggestions about how existing commitments and processes could
be turned into action.

Part 1: The challenge of ensuring equal access to
mainstream services for Indigenous peoples

Background – the new arrangements for the
administration of Indigenous affairs

New arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs were introduced
as of 1 July 2004. The arrangements abolished the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission (ATSIC)^[1] and
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS), and transferred
responsibility for ATSIC/ATSIS programs to mainstream agencies. The federal
government held high hopes for the new arrangements. ATSIC was seen as the cause
of the failure to improve Indigenous disadvantage and therefore abolishing ATSIC
would clear the way for effective coordinated programs. The then Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Senator Vanstone, observed that:

No longer will governments persist with the ATSIC experiment that has
achieved so little for Indigenous
people.^[2]

Under the new arrangements, the administration of Indigenous-specific
programs became the responsibility of mainstream government departments. A brief
description and rationale of the new arrangements was provided by Senator
Vanstone on 30 June 2004, which stated, inter alia:

More than $1 billion of former ATSIC-ATSIS programmes have been transferred
to mainstream Australian Government agencies and some 1,300 staff commence work
in the new Departments as of tomorrow.

We want more of the money to hit the ground. We are stripping away layers of
bureaucracy to make sure that local families and communities have a real say
in how money is spent.

Mainstream departments will be required to accept responsibility for
Indigenous services and will be held accountable for outcomes. In future they
will work in a coordinated way so that the old programme silos of the past are
broken down.

Guiding whole-of-government service delivery with Indigenous representatives
will be Partnership Agreements developed at the regional level and shared
responsibility agreements at the local and community level. The new approach
will require communities to offer commitments such as improved school attendance
in return for Government funding
initiatives.^[3]

The new arrangements aimed to remove, or at least reduce, barriers that
prevent Indigenous peoples from accessing existing mainstream services on an
equitable basis.^[4] This objective has
been called ‘harnessing the mainstream’.

‘Harnessing the mainstream’ is an evocative phrase suggesting
that there is considerable potential for Indigenous advancement by improving
access to mainstream programs for Indigenous peoples. This can involve removing
barriers and constraints to accessing services, using mainstream programs
creatively to work in tandem with Indigenous-specific programs, and delivering
mainstream programs in a more flexible and less bureaucratic manner.

The Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Dr Shergold,
explained the objective of improving performance of mainstream services through
the new arrangements as follows:

complex problems, particularly in public policy, are rarely resolved by
structures. Public servants are remarkably good at structures. Put public
servants together for half an hour and they can rearrange the boxes very
easily... The solution that is required here on Indigenous affairs is
necessarily a whole-of-government solution. One of our key failings, I think, in
terms of public policy is the failure to have a whole-of-government approach to
issues... The key is to change the culture of how public servants deliver public
policy. That is my first point.

My second point is that I think mainstreaming has been an enormous failure.
If I thought we were returning to mainstreaming in the old sense I would not
support it at all. But define mainstreaming. All the literature that I have seen
says there are a number of qualities to mainstreaming. The first is that you do
not have Indigenous specific programs. The second is that each department and
agency makes its own decisions in a non-coordinated way. The third is that you
do not have an Indigenous specific agency. The fourth is that you have national
programs that are delivered in the same way no matter where they are delivered.
Those are the four key ingredients of mainstreaming.

The government’s new approach is completely at odds with each of those
four criteria. It is committed to maintaining the funding for Indigenous
specific programs. It has established an Office of Indigenous Policy
Coordination and Indigenous coordination centres across the country. It has made
it clear that the mainstream departments have to work together, and it has said
that there needs to be flexibility in programs so they can respond to local
need. What we have here is a quite new approach. It will not work quickly; this
is in for the long term. It is not mainstreaming in the sense of the articles
that have been written criticising it. It is a new whole of- government
approach, and that is what I am committed
to.^[5]

I have discussed the new arrangements (constituting a ‘quiet
revolution’ according to Senator
Vanstone^[6]) in detail in the past two Social Justice Reports.^[7] The
government’s new approach to Indigenous affairs reflects its strong
commitment to what it terms ‘practical reconciliation’. As my
predecessor, Dr William Jonas AM, observed in the Social Justice Report
2003:

The government has emphasised time and again that the key focus of
reconciliation should be on practical and effective measures that address the
legacy of profound economic and social
disadvantage.^[8]

A number of commentators have noted that in some respects these new
arrangements are not all that new.^[9] ‘Mainstreaming’ as such has been a mainstay of Indigenous policy
discourse for many years.^[10] What
was particularly new was the abolition of ATSIC and thereby the loss of an
Indigenous representative voice in the processes of government at national and
regional levels.

So how have the new arrangements matched with the rhetoric and begun to
demonstrate their potential to impact on the social and economic disadvantage
experienced by Indigenous Australians? This chapter examines the efficacy of the
new arrangements, including in respect of the objective of improving access for
Indigenous Australians to mainstream services.

Indigenous disadvantage and human
rights

There is no dispute that there is a significant problem in respect of
Indigenous disadvantage in Australia. As Gary Banks, Chairman of the
Productivity Commission has noted in the Foreword to the Report Overcoming
Indigenous Disadvantage – Key Indicators 2003:

Notwithstanding many years of policy attention, this Report confirms that
Indigenous Australians continue to experience marked and widespread
disadvantage. This is shown most fundamentally by the 20 year gap in average
life expectancy between Indigenous and other Australians. ^[11]

More recently Dr Ken Henry, Secretary of Treasury, commenting on the extent
and persistence of Indigenous disadvantage in Australia, observed that
‘Indigenous disadvantage diminishes all of Australia’ and stated
that ‘it has to be admitted that decades of policy action have
failed’.^[12]

The situation in respect of Indigenous disadvantage has been noted at the
international level. In 2000 the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) expressed its:

... concern that, despite the efforts and achievements of the State party
[Australia], the indigenous populations of Australia continued to be at a
comparative disadvantage in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights, particularly in the field of employment, housing, health and
education.^[13]

In important respects things are not improving for Indigenous Australians.
Gary Banks, on the release of the Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage: Key
Indicators 2005,^[14] commented
on the mixed results in the report and identified ‘areas of
regression’. These included: increases in Indigenous peoples as victims of
violence, as subject to child protection notifications, and in regard to
imprisonment rates, especially for
women.^[15]

Recent reports suggest that increases in diabetes amongst Indigenous peoples
will have a devastating impact over time. For example, up to 30% of Torres
Strait Islanders are affected by type 2
diabetes.^[16] Statistics on the
large Aboriginal community of Wadeye in the Northern Territory reflect a parlous
situation, with a death rate four times higher than the rate for the Northern
Territory, an average life expectancy of 46 years, a range of serious and
endemic health problems, and a high percentage of children in the 0-5 age group
who are stunted (20%), wasted (10%) and/ or underweight
(21%).^[17]



Whilst there is
widespread agreement and concern about the state of Indigenous disadvantage
measured against a range of economic and social indicators, there is less
recognition that this situation reflects a profound failure to afford Indigenous
Australians their full range of human rights. Australia’s ongoing
inability to secure decent living standards for its Indigenous citizens is not
only a failure of domestic policy, it is also a failure to meet basic legal
obligations arising from Australia’s role as a responsible member of the
international community.

There is a clear obligation on Australia, in terms of the requirements under
international law and in particular under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR – ratified by Australia),
to:

... take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the
present Covenant by all appropriate
means.^[18]

These rights are precisely the sorts of rights in which Indigenous
Australians fare so poorly. They include the right to an adequate standard of
living (which includes adequate housing) and the right to the highest attainable
standards of physical and mental health. Further, the steps required to be taken
under the Covenant must be deliberate, concrete and targeted towards
ensuring the full realisation of rights and governments must demonstrate that
they are progressively realising the enjoyment of
rights.^[19] This requires that
service delivery occur within an overall strategy that includes specific,
time-bound and verifiable benchmarks and
indicators^[20] to ensure that
the enjoyment of rights improves over
time.^[21]

In Australia, this requires an integrated and purposeful approach to
improving Indigenous living standards which will necessarily include improved
access to mainstream services and a range of Indigenous specific programs to
respond to particular circumstances. It also requires flexibility and
sensibility to the cultural and social norms and aspirations of Indigenous
peoples. This principle is well established in international
law,^[22] and it should be the very
bedrock on which Australia’s reconciliation process is built.

When considering Indigenous peoples’ ability to exercise and enjoy
their economic, social and cultural rights, the United Nations Committee on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights has also provided guidance to governments
about how to fulfil their legal obligations. The Committee has encouraged
governments to:

• Prepare aggregate national statistics or estimates so that they have an
  accurate diagnosis and knowledge of the existing situation;
• Give special attention to ‘any worse-off regions or areas and to any
  specific groups or subgroups which appear to be particularly vulnerable or
  disadvantaged’;
• Engage in the elaboration of clearly stated and carefully targeted policies
  and develop and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive
  implementation of each of the rights contained in the Covenant;
• Facilitate public scrutiny of government policies with respect to economic,
  social and cultural rights, and encourage the involvement of the relevant
  sectors of civil society in the formulation, implementation and review of these
  policies;
• Identify specific benchmarks or goals against which their performance in a
  given area can be assessed; and
• Report in detail on the factors and difficulties that inhibit progressive
  realisation of the full range of economic, social and cultural rights so that
  more appropriate policies can be put in
  place.^[23]
  

There have also been a number of developments at the international
level in recent years which have seen a clearer understanding emerge of the
relationship between human rights and development and poverty eradication. Past
Social Justice and Native Title Reports have highlighted these
developments.^[24]

One of the most significant outcomes of this focus on integrating human
rights and development and poverty eradication activities has been the agreement
among the agencies of the United Nations of the Common Understanding of a
Human-Rights Based Approach to Development
Cooperation.^[25]

This document outlines the human rights principles that are common to the
policy and practice of the UN bodies. The Common Understanding states
that these principles are intended to guide programming across a range of
service delivery areas.^[26] They are
of importance in addressing the accessibility of mainstream services.

The Common Understanding has three principles. Namely, that:

• All programmes, policies and technical assistance should further the
  realisation of human rights;
• Human rights standards guide all development cooperation and all phases of
  programming; and
• Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacity of
  ‘duty-bearers’ to meet their obligations and of
  ‘rights-holders’ to claim their
  rights.^[27]
  

The Common Understanding also identifies the following
elements that are ‘necessary, specific, and unique to a human rights-based
approach’ to
development.^[28]

These principles provide useful guidance for incorporating participatory
development principles into domestic policies and programs relating to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander policy, including, to improve
accessibility of mainstream services.

The challenge of improving Indigenous
access to mainstream services

Most expenditure by Australian governments on the provision of services to
Indigenous peoples is made through mainstream services generally available to
all citizens. However, the Commonwealth Grants Commission’s Report on
Indigenous Funding 2001 found that Indigenous peoples do not access these
mainstream services on an equitable basis:

It is clear from all available evidence that mainstream services do not meet
the needs of Indigenous people to the same extent as they meet the needs of
non-Indigenous people. In general, Indigenous people experience greater
disadvantage and have greater needs than non-Indigenous people and, for
geographic, economic and cultural reasons, mainstream services are less
accessible to them.^[29]

The report noted that despite the physical accessibility of services in urban
areas, there was a range of factors constraining access (see below). Although
Indigenous peoples in rural and remote areas face similar barriers to urban
Indigenous peoples, they also face major physical access difficulties because
mainstream services are often either not provided, or physical access to them is
restricted by distance.^[30] There
can also be problems in attracting and retaining experienced and trained staff
to work in rural and remote areas or specifically with Indigenous peoples,
regardless of location.

In response to this situation, the report identified as a principle that
should underlie service delivery:

Recognition of the critical importance of effective access to
mainstream programs and services, and clear actions to identify and address
barriers to access.^[31] [emphasis added]

The ramifications of problems of accessibility to services were examined in
the Social Justice Report
2002.^[32] By way of example,
that report noted that Indigenous peoples’ access to health services needs
to be viewed widely to include not only an evaluation of the specific health
service in question, but the broader health context and underlying determinants
of people’s overall wellbeing. The work of the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is particularly relevant here as
this body broadly interprets the right to health as contained in the Covenant
as:

an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health care
but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access
to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe
food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions,
and access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and
reproductive health. A further important aspect is the participation of the
population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national and
international levels.^[33] [emphasis
added]

The right to health has been elaborated in international law to give it real
potency to improve health. This broad perspective and considered and elaborated
approach to improving access to mainstream programs needs to be brought to bear
in respect of the objective of ‘harnessing the mainstream’ under the
new arrangements for Indigenous affairs in Australia.

There is a further dimension to consider when the health service in question
is to be accessed by Indigenous peoples. The Social Justice Report 2002 also observed that:

Of particular note is the inclusion of a paragraph [in CESCR General Comment
14] specifically relating this right to Indigenous
peoples.^[34] The paragraph
emphasises the need for health services to be culturally
appropriate and for full and effective participation by Indigenous
peoples. The Committee notes that in Indigenous communities the health of the
individual is often linked to the health of the society as a whole and has a
collective dimension. As with other rights protected by the Covenant
(including the right to education), there is an emphasis on the need to develop
health strategies that should identify appropriate right to health indicators
and benchmarks. ...... Having identified appropriate right to health indicators,
states should set appropriate benchmarks to each indicator, for use in
monitoring and reporting.^[35] [emphasis added]

The relevance of accessing mainstream services has been highlighted under the
new arrangements for service delivery at the federal government level. The new
arrangements emphasise whole of government service delivery and improved
coordination and integration. Whole of government (or ‘joined up’ or
‘connected’ government) is a policy imperative that increasingly
underpins the provision of government services across the board, including
Indigenous services. Dr Shergold, Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister
and Cabinet, has made clear that a whole of government approach is a high
priority for the Australian Public
Service.^[36] ‘Harnessing the
mainstream’ is a central plank in the ‘whole of government’
approach to service delivery.

The Australian government has also worked with state and territory
governments to achieve better whole of government coordination between levels of
government. The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has made significant
commitments to overcoming Indigenous disadvantage, including through the National Framework of Principles for Delivering Services to Indigenous
Australians as agreed in June 2004. These principles include:

address sharing responsibility, harnessing the mainstream, streamlining
service delivery, establishing transparency and accountability, developing a
learning framework and focussing on priority
areas.^[37]

COAG has identified the parameters of the objective of ‘harnessing the
mainstream’ as follows.

Increased access to mainstream programs is closely linked with improved
integration and coordination of service delivery to Indigenous peoples and
communities. In fact, these objectives are complementary, as one of the reasons
for poor access is often perceived to be uncoordinated and complex service
delivery arrangements. As I noted in my Social Justice Report 2004, the
new arrangements for Indigenous affairs mean that, to a significant extent, at
the federal level the administration of mainstream programs now sits alongside
Indigenous-specific programs in the Indigenous Coordination Centres established
to deliver Indigenous programs on a whole of government basis. As I
emphasised:

This is a significant opportunity to improve the accessibility of mainstream
programs for Indigenous people and communities so as to better meet their
needs.^[39]

The new relationship between Indigenous-specific and general programs within portfolios rather than with external agencies, such as
ATSIC, can lead to greater sensitivity in respect of actual mainstream program delivery. For example, delivery of mainstream services by an agency
should now benefit from association with the Indigenous-specific services also
being delivered. In this setting mainstream administrators will have a greater
opportunity to learn about appropriate and effective Indigenous service delivery
and be sensitised to particular difficulties confronting Indigenous peoples in
their relations with government service providers.

As well, mainstreaming of ATSIC services under the new arrangements has given
these issues greater cogency given that virtually all Indigenous funding now
comes through mainstream agencies, whether as Indigenous-specific or as
mainstream programs.

This can, however, be problematic. As Gray and Sanders have noted, ‘The
relationship between Indigenous-specific programs and general programs within a
portfolio area is
complex’.^[40] The problem is
that the tendency to substitute rather than to complement and
supplement programs can arise, even within portfolios – so that
the burden may yet again be left to the Indigenous-specific programs, and the
mainstream programs step back from the task. This substitution effect is
explained in Text Box 3 below.

I appreciate that various high-level arrangements have been put in place to
try to avoid such back-sliding.^[41] Nevertheless, over time, there is a risk. As Gray and Sanders comment:

Here then is the conundrum of Indigenous-specific mechanisms within
government administration. They run the danger of letting general mechanisms
avoid responsibility for Indigenous people, while simultaneously holding out the
hope of sensitising those general mechanisms to Indigenous
difference.^[42]

The Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs has delineated some of the
challenges:

The many challenges in this area include ensuring that Indigenous-specific
and mainstream programs are complementary, reducing the red tape associated with
these services, and making mainstream services attractive to Indigenous
people.^[43]

These are important and difficult challenges for successful implementation of
the new arrangements. The difficulties in the past in achieving objectives such
as improving access to mainstream service provision provide a salutary lesson.
Such difficulties were neither the making of ATSIC nor its predecessors, but
instead reflect entrenched problems in responding to Indigenous disadvantage.
One lesson is that, whilst ever Indigenous Australians retain distinctive
cultural and societal values and practices, governments need to understand,
respect and respond to such difference. They also need to value Indigenous
participation in designing and implementing service delivery. Otherwise the
difficulties between the ‘mainstream’ service providers and their
Indigenous clients will worsen and inevitably, Indigenous people will bear the
brunt of the failure.

I commented in my previous Social Justice Report that removing the
barriers to accessing services is particularly challenging, and progress has
been slow.^[44] I believe this
remains the case, and if anything this objective of the new arrangements has
tended to slip from view. I also noted the absence of mainstream data, the lack
of linkages between the Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage reporting
framework and mainstream programs, the absence of appropriate monitoring and
evaluation processes, and the lack of mechanisms for Indigenous engagement and
participation in designing and delivering
services.^[45] There remains a need
for effective and credible evaluation of progress towards achieving the
objective of ‘harnessing the mainstream’.

The situation of urban Indigenous
peoples– a particular concern

The federal government has made remote communities its priority for
Indigenous-specific funding under the new arrangements. This is on the basis
that need is greatest in remote communities, and on the understanding that
mainstream services are generally available to urban-based Indigenous peoples.

This emphasis on remote communities is reflected in discussions at the
November 2006 Senate Estimates hearings of the Senate Standing Committee on
Community Affairs in the context of the ‘strategic interventions’
approach now being implemented in Indigenous affairs (see further below). In
response to a question, the Associate Secretary of the Department of Families,
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaCSIA) advised that the great
majority of these interventions are focused on remote locations that have been
neglected, or where the needs are greatest. This reflects the Government’s
general approach:

Mr Gibbons—There is an Indigenous specific cluster [within
FaCSIA] and the resources of that program cluster are focused more on remote
Australia than anywhere else—not exclusively, but the burden of our
investment is going to be on the backlog in housing and infrastructure in remote
Australia. That is a clear priority of the
government.^[46] [emphasis
added]

The implicit assumption is that to a considerable extent the needs of urban
Indigenous peoples (including people living in regional centres) can be met by
mainstream programs because:

• services are already in place to serve the wider community, unlike more
  remote areas where services may have to be provided specifically to meet the
  needs of Indigenous communities; and
• many Indigenous peoples in urban areas follow a lifestyle quite similar to
  the wider society, and so it may appear that these people are better placed to
  utilise mainstream services.
  

But the diversity of situations of Indigenous peoples in urban and
regional areas makes it unrealistic to over-generalise. The needs of Indigenous
peoples living on Special Purpose Leases on the outskirts of Alice Springs,
Darwin or Katherine in the Northern Territory will be quite different to those
of people living in the suburbs of Sydney or Melbourne or housing estates in
regional centres such as Dubbo or Geraldton.

The Commonwealth Grants Commission has pointed out that:

Despite the physical accessibility of services in urban areas, a range of
factors clearly constrains access of Indigenous people to them. The result is
that mainstream services are not meeting the needs of Indigenous people
equitably.^[47]

There are a number of reasons for this relative under-utilisation of
mainstream services, which can be generally considered under the term of
‘barriers to access’. This under-utilisation of services undoubtedly
is a contributing factor to the relative disadvantage of the Indigenous
population, including the disadvantage experienced by Indigenous peoples living
in urban areas. The Commonwealth Grants Commission listed the following barriers
to access in urban areas.

Cultural practices and social arrangements are also important determinants of
the lower uptake, relative to the wider population, of mainstream services by
Indigenous peoples in urban areas.

The persistence of Indigenous difference, and evolving Indigenous norms and
customs, including in urban areas, results in mainstream services often being
unsuitable or unworkable. For example, in urban and regional areas the
mainstream criminal justice system, with relatively high rates of Indigenous
offending and incarceration, is often less effective than it might be in
deterring criminal behaviour and in providing effective rehabilitation.
Consequently a number of initiatives, including elder participation in judicial
processes and circle sentencing have been developed. This has been a positive
development in aligning mainstream services with Indigenous needs and values. As
my predecessor, Dr Jonas, pointed out:

The fact that Indigenous involvement in sentencing processes is taking place
in urban areas in the most settled eastern sea-board states, such as through the
Koori, Ngunga and Murri Courts and circle sentencing, demonstrates the vitality
and evolving nature of [Indigenous] customary
law.^[49]

As well, past bad experiences with mainstream service providers, and the
confidence-sapping effects of a lifetime led in the shadow of racism, can all be
real barriers to accessing
services.^[50]

Thus, as I pointed out in the Social Justice Report 2004, the emphasis
in the new arrangements on remote discrete Indigenous communities poses
difficulties for Indigenous peoples in urban
areas.^[51] Urban Indigenous peoples
may in effect be abandoned to mainstream services, without adequately addressing
issues of access, flexibility and relevance.

The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA) considered some of these problems in an
inquiry into the needs of urban dwelling Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples in 2001. In respect of accessing mainstream services, it noted that:

The evidence suggests that Indigenous people in urban areas tend not to use
mainstream services and choose instead to use Indigenous community organisations
as either intermediaries with mainstream agencies or as replacement service
providers, or not to use any services at all [emphasis added]. ^[52]

Or, as Shelley Reys, an Indigenous consultant and a Board member of
Reconciliation Australia, has observed:

... Indigenous people in Sydney are expected to access mainstream services
that often don’t meet their needs. ^[53]

Indeed, HORSCATSIA’s Report set out the challenges and parameters of
service delivery to urban-based Indigenous peoples as follows:

In urban areas at least, the urgent priority should be on meeting the needs
of Indigenous people through better access to existing mainstream services. This
means that mainstream services need to be appropriately designed and delivered
in culturally sensitive ways that reflect regional differences and cultural
diversity. It also means that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples need
to be involved in program design and service delivery. It may be necessary to
invest in parallel Indigenous specific structures or services where mainstream
services are inadequate or non existent.

The Committee acknowledges that there are many mainstream government services
that Indigenous people find currently neither easy to use nor appropriate to
their circumstances. However, this is not a reason for doing nothing.
Appropriate plans need to be developed to overcome these obstacles. They should
not be perpetuated.^[54]

This is the nub of the situation. These comments by the HORSCATSIA provide a
template for the provision of services to Indigenous peoples in urban areas and
regional centres. The question that needs to be considered is whether the new
arrangements for Indigenous affairs are responsive to the needs of Indigenous
peoples in urban areas. Does the current emphasis on SRAs and strategic
interventions in discrete and remote communities mean that for urban Indigenous
peoples the unsatisfactory state of affairs regarding access to mainstream
services will be perpetuated?

The Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination has identified improving
mainstream access as a critical component of the new arrangements if the
government is to improve service delivery to Indigenous peoples in urban
locations:

the Government recognises that Indigenous disadvantage will not be addressed
through Indigenous-specific programs and services alone. It is important,
particularly in an urban context where the majority of mainstream infrastructure
is already present, to 'harness the mainstream'... In urban and regional
environments, where the majority of the Indigenous population lives, physical
access to mainstream services is less likely to be the key issue. However,
mainstream services have not performed as well as they should in meeting the
needs of Indigenous people in urban areas. Therefore, the Australian Government
is also working to harness mainstream services, to improve access to, take-up of
and outcomes from these services for Indigenous Australians. This is also an
issue being raised in various bilateral negotiations with the
States.^[55]

In correspondence provided for this year’s report, as well as
discussions with senior officials in OIPC, the government has indicated that it
continues to struggle with the challenge of ‘harnessing the
mainstream’ among Indigenous peoples in urban communities:

Our analysis shows that harnessing the mainstream is closely connected to the
effective provision of services to urban Indigenous people. Feedback from those
working on the ground as well as nationally... reveals that there are many
success factors and challenges common to both urban and mainstreaming issues.
These include:

• Improved mechanisms/incentives are needed in mainstream services to break
  down barriers to access and to ensure that use by Indigenous people is in line
  with need and that outcomes achieved are comparable to other Australians in like
  circumstances;
• Further information is needed on Indigenous mobility and service usage in
  urban areas;
• The Indigenous population in urban areas can be diffuse and is not always
  readily identified as cohesive or ‘community’ groupings for the
  purpose of targeting services and collaboration;
• Cooperative action by governments can be hampered by inflexibility resulting
  from the funding, structure and operation of agencies and programs; and
• The necessary changes and improvements need a long term approach.
  

These success factors and challenges will be further examined
during ongoing policy developments on improving urban and mainstream
services.^[56]

A case study: withdrawal of CDEP from
urban and certain regional centres and abolition of Indigenous Employment
Centres

There are two aspects to improving accessibility of mainstream services for
Indigenous peoples. The first is improving such access through whole of
government coordination and the machinery of the new arrangements (as discussed
throughout this chapter). The second is the efforts of individual mainstream
departments to build better connections between the mainstream and Indigenous
specific services they deliver on a day-to-day basis.

The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) is one such
mainstream agency that has taken on a significant role in Indigenous affairs as
a result of the new arrangements. This owes much to the fact that tackling
Indigenous unemployment and underemployment are at the core of the federal
government’s Indigenous Economic Development Strategy (IEDS), which
was launched in November 2005.^[57]

The goal of the IEDS is to support Indigenous Australians achieve economic
independence by reducing their dependence on passive welfare. The strategy takes
a whole-of-government approach to removing barriers to Indigenous economic
independence, drawing together the range of mainstream and Indigenous-specific
programs and services, and linking them into support offered through the
corporate, community and philanthropic sectors.

Under this strategy, the ‘key ingredients for economic
independence’ are Indigenous employment, home ownership and business
development.^[58] The twelve
initiatives in the IEDS focus on two main areas: work and asset/ wealth
management. The work initiatives include CDEP reform; local jobs for local
people; improved employment service performance; and targeted industry
strategies. The asset/ wealth management initiatives include increased
Indigenous home ownership and economic development on Indigenous
land.^[59]

DEWR’s prominence in Indigenous affairs is also related to the fact it
is responsible for the largest Indigenous specific program, the Community
Development Employment Project (CDEP). The CDEP scheme was transferred from
ATSIC to DEWR in July 2004, and underwent significant changes to align
Indigenous specific services with mainstream services which I commented on in
the Social Justice Report
2005.^[60] Now one year on, we
are faced with even more sweeping changes.

The CDEP scheme plays a central role in the economic and community life of
many discrete Indigenous communities and rural towns with a significant
Indigenous population.^[61] As I
reported in the Social Justice Report 2005:

At 30 June 2004, there were over 36,000 CDEP participants and 220 CDEP
organisations. In 2002 the CDEP scheme accounted for over one-quarter of the
total employment of Indigenous Australians, with 13 percent of the working-age
population being employed in the CDEP scheme. ... The majority of CDEP
participants (62%) were in very remote areas, 11 percent were in remote areas,
11 percent in outer regional areas, 9 percent in major cities and 7 percent in
the inner regional areas.^[62]

CDEP has been a contentious program since its inception in the late 1970s.
Interestingly, it was an attempt to address the perceived negative effects that
could flow from providing remote communities with social service benefits. There
was a concern even then, that this ‘passive welfare’ would have
harmful personal and social consequences.

Over its lifespan, the CDEP scheme has been criticised by Indigenous peoples
and governments for a range of reasons, including that it:

• Is an alternative form of employment for Indigenous peoples, even where
  there are other jobs available in the local labour market;
• Is a destination or dead-end, rather than a pathway to ‘real’
  and sustainable employment;
• It lets governments at all levels get away with not providing essential
  services to Indigenous communities;
• It devalues the work done by CDEP participants because a ‘real
  job’ would earn a ‘real wage;’ and
• CDEP participants do not have access to superannuation, long-service leave
  and union membership.
  

For all its criticisms, it is important to acknowledge that the
CDEP scheme has enabled many Indigenous communities to develop valuable
community services which address key community needs. Many of these services are
now regarded as ‘essential services’ in Indigenous communities and
it is questionable that commercial enterprises could either afford to provide
them, or deliver them in a culturally appropriate manner. Examples include:
night patrol services; childcare centres; cultural and natural heritage
programs; and garbage services.

The CDEP scheme has also contributed to the development of Indigenous
businesses, entrepreneurship and leadership in some communities. CDEPs have been
able to increase the employment prospects of many participants through the
delivery of accredited vocational training courses, paid work experience,
personal support and literacy/numeracy
skills.^[63]

Initially CDEP was based on community development with projects typically
ranging from housing and road maintenance, to artefact production and
horticultural enterprises. There was a strong emphasis on projects that
positively contributed to community coherence and cultural integrity. There was
also an emphasis on boosting the number of CDEP participants and completed
projects.

However, reforms in recent years have shifted the focus towards long-term
employment outside the CDEP scheme. Increasingly CDEP organisations are required
to make links with a range of government programs aimed at getting Indigenous
peoples into mainstream employment or developing Indigenous business
opportunities.

The government’s introduction of Indigenous Employment Centres
(IECs) in recent years is indicative of the re-orientation of the CDEP
scheme towards mainstream employment outcomes. From 2002, the government
encouraged the establishment of IECs by CDEPs located in areas with good
employment opportunities. The purpose of these centres was to assist more CDEP
participants to move off CDEP into long-term employment outside the CDEP scheme.
IECs would tailor help for individual CDEP participants to get them job ready,
support them while they are in their chosen job, and provide a pathway to
employment that has strong connections with the local community. IECs continued
to be established in a total of 43 locations across Australia until
2006.^[64]

On 6 November 2006 the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations
released an Indigenous employment discussion paper: Indigenous Potential
meets Economic
Opportunity.^[65] It
proposes ‘a new model of employment services’ for Indigenous
Australians in urban and major regional centres.

The discussion paper notes major achievements of the CDEP reform process,
which it credits to the introduction of the IECS, including:

• 3,704 Indigenous people moved out of CDEP and into employment in the 2005-06
  financial year, an increase of 135 per cent on the 2004-05 financial year;
• In the three months to end September 2006, 1,482 CDEP participants were
  placed into jobs outside of CDEP – more than double the number in the same
  period last year;
• Over 20 businesses were progressed through CDEP during 2005-06. An
  additional 52 were identified and are progressing;
• The CDEP “No work No pay” rule is being more strictly enforced
  with participants now required to sign an acknowledgement form to ensure they
  are aware of the rule; and
• A more competitive funding process ensuring better value for money from
  CDEP.^[66]
  

At the same time, the discussion paper acknowledges that only 5
percent of the people moving through CDEP in 2005-06 were recorded as
‘achieving employment off
CDEP’.^[67] In contrast, Job
Network (‘Australia’s largest and most effective program in finding
jobs for Indigenous
people’^[68]) placed over
45,200 Indigenous job seekers into jobs in a similar twelve month
timeframe.^[69] It is this apparent
success of a mainstream service provider in placing Indigenous job seekers in
employment that appears to be driving the government’s latest round of
CDEP changes.

Another reason for the changes is that ‘outcomes from CDEP appear to be
growing faster in remote areas than in urban areas’, and ‘a new
approach is required to improve performance, particularly in urban and major
regional centres with strong labour
markets’.^[70] This ‘new
approach’ will include the abolition of CDEPs and IECs in urban and major
regional centres, as well as a greater focus on placement directly into jobs
through ‘employer-focused job brokerage’. As the government’s
discussion paper elaborates:

To make the most of strong labour markets in urban and major regional
centres, the Australian Government proposes to further increase the focus on
employer demand and placement directly into jobs. This would mean that in
these locations, CDEP and IEC activities would cease and funding would be
redirected to an enhanced STEP brokerage service from 1 July 2007. [emphasis
added]

The IEC model, which was designed to bridge the gap between CDEP and Job
Network, is no longer necessary given the improved performance of CDEP service
providers and Job Network members. Funding for IECs across Australia would cease
on 30 June 2007. CDEP would continue to operate for eligible people in remote
locations and regional location with weaker labour markets. ^[71] ... This would affect about 40 of
the 210 current CDEP service providers and about 7,000 CDEP places out of
around 35,000. All IECs across Australia would cease on 30 June
2007.^[72] [emphasis added]

The new ‘brokerage services’ would be provided by enhanced Structured Training and Employment Projects (STEP) brokers (see text box
below). They would work with local employers to identify employment
opportunities and place people directly into jobs or organise training,
mentoring and other activities that would prepare job seekers for identified
jobs. CDEPs and IECs would be able to compete for new business as STEP
brokers.^[73]

It is important to note that these proposed changes
are intended to commence implementation in mid 2007. The lifespan of these
proposed new arrangements is only identified as being the next 2 years, i.e.
2007-08 and 2008-09. It seems the way is being left open for the full
mainstreaming of Indigenous employment services in urban and regional centres
following that.

The latest round of proposed changes to the CDEP scheme comes not long after
a significant round of reforms last year. There has not been sufficient time to
assess whether those changes were having a positive effective before Indigenous
communities and organisations are now expected to absorb another, arguably more
complex round of changes. This apparent ‘restlessness’ in
arrangements, with constant changing of organisations, policy-settings, and even
names, creates its own stresses and
problems.^[79]

It is important that there is clear direction and informed policy development
in the critical area of Indigenous employment. This is not to suggest that all
new policies should be free of modification and adjustment, but there needs to
be recognition that communities and organisations can only absorb so much change
before it becomes destabilising and detrimental.

It remains to be seen whether the government’s proposal to increase
Indigenous employment through job placement and job-relevant training in areas
with an apparent strong labour market will result in increased sustainable job
placements. However, there are a number of factors that bring into question
whether this will be the case.

Principal among these is the assumption that a market with strong local
demand will take up an Indigenous job seeker as readily as it would a
non-Indigenous job seeker. As Job Futures pointed out in its response to the
government’s discussion paper:

Aboriginal job seekers, on the whole, are further from the world of work,
more likely to live in jobless households, have lower basic skills (including
literacy/numeracy) and are less likely to be prepared for sustainable
work.^[80]

Similarly, a downturn in current buoyant labour conditions may also weaken
the position of Indigenous job seekers in the employment market.

Although the government is confident that the CDEPs that have been targeted
for replacement by enhanced STEP brokers all have strong labour markets, the
socio-economic status of Indigenous peoples in those locations does not compare
well to the non-Indigenous population. As Job Futures explains, in each
location:

• The unemployment rate of Indigenous peoples is higher and the labour force
  participation rate lower than for non-Indigenous people – even when the
  CDEP labour force is included in the employment figures;
• The level of long-term unemployment is higher amongst Indigenous people than
  non-Indigenous people; and
• The level of schooling of Indigenous people is substantially lower than
  non-Indigenous people.^[81]
  

Given the profile of Indigenous job seekers in the locations where
the CDEP reforms will occur, Job Futures has recommended the government maintain
the CDEP scheme as an ‘intermediate labour market program’ –
which was the broad intention of the 2005-06 changes to CDEP guidelines. Job
Futures recommends that in urban areas, rather than abolishing them, CDEPs
be:

... repositioned as an Intermediate Labour Market program which provides an
experience of real work, for wages, which reconnects people to the world of work
and facilitates the transition to mainstream employment. ... While many
employers are willing to provide vocational skills, employers are not geared to
assisting employees to gain basic skills. Employers want employees who will turn
up each day appropriately dressed, able to work effectively with co-workers and
with a basic understanding of work safety rules. Intermediate labour market
programs give people the chance to develop these
skills’.^[82]

I am not alone in my concerns about the haste with which the changes to the
CDEP scheme will be introduced, and the extent to which Indigenous communities
and organisations will be prepared for their
introduction.^[83] The
government’s discussion paper acknowledges that on 1 July 2007
approximately 7,000 people will lose their CDEP wage. What it does not
contemplate are the possible adverse social and economic consequences for the
Indigenous individuals, families and communities that will be affected. As Job
Futures warns:

CDEP is currently the largest employer of Aboriginal people in the country
and is considered a real job by participants, community members and recipients
of CDEP services. ... Unless these individuals have a job to go to, they will be
made redundant and are likely to experience the range of personal, social and
financial problems that go with this. Shame, withdrawal from social activity,
ill health and poor financial status are some of the consequences. ...

We highlight these issues not because we believe that the status quo should
remain, but because we believe that change should be measured and should be
calculated to improve the situation of Aboriginal people – not drive
communities and individuals to
despair.^[84] [emphasis added]

Although the government’s discussion paper provides assurances that
DEWR will develop comprehensive transition arrangements for all CDEP
participants and service providers affected by the new model, there is
surprisingly little detail about what such arrangements might entail. Beyond
assurances that DEWR will ‘ensure affected participants understand how the
changes affect them and what their options are’, and will ‘work with
CDEP service providers, Centrelink, and other service providers’ to assist
participants – there is no further
information.^[85]

The government’s proposal to abolish all IECs without first evaluating
their effectiveness is also a matter of concern. The discussion paper makes no
comment about whether they achieved any of their objectives, or how the enhanced
STEP brokerage system will improve on them. Rather it appears that the IEC model
is being mainstreamed and re-badged as something new and improved, namely enhanced STEP. However there is surprisingly little detail about how the
‘enhanced STEP’ will be different from the old ‘STEP’.
For example, there is no information about:

• The number of people that will be able to access the service over time;
• The nature or level of the community activities stream;
• How activities under STEP will be differentiated from Job Network services;
  and
• The key performance indicators or the guidelines that DEWR will use to
  distribute business amongst the employment brokers.
  

I am not confident that the month-long public consultation process
shed any further light on these matters or enhanced general understanding in the
Indigenous community about how the reforms will operate. Such understanding is
critical to the smooth implementation at the community level. As Job Futures
observes:

After one consultation session at which DEWR presented, a number of
organisational representatives discussed their impression of the extent to which
community engagement activities would continue to be part of the enhanced STEP
model. The organisations had impressions ranging from that these activities
would be unchanged under the new arrangements, to that they would be practically
eliminated. This difference highlights the fact that the discussion paper simply
does not have the level of information required by communities, recipients of
CDEP services (eg childcare centres, Day Patrol) and CDEP participants to enable
them to consult about the impact of the
changes.^[86]

I expressed significant concerns about the consultation process held for the
previous round of CDEP reforms.^[87] Similar concerns exist about the latest round of consultations on the discussion
paper. A total of 30 face-to-face consultations were held in urban and regional
centres over a two week period in November 2006, and each consultation ran for
three hours. Interested parties had at most, one month to submit written
comments.^[88] Although the
government has provided assurances that the feedback from these consultations
will ‘be used to shape the future direction of
CDEP,’^[89] I question the
extent to which the government will take on board any Indigenous or employment
industry feedback. The government has already identified which CDEPs it will
abolish, it has set a deadline of 1 July 2007 for the commencement of the STEP
brokerages, and there simply is not the time to rethink the model in any
substantive way.

Concerns have also been expressed regarding the capacity of some CDEPs and
IECs to compete for STEP brokerage contracts against organisations that have
years of experience bidding for contracts with
DEWR.^[90] Although DEWR intends to
‘work closely with CDEP organisations to maximise the opportunities for
emerging businesses to
continue’,^[91] there is
considerable risk that some of these organisations will not make the transition.
The loss of organisations that deliver valuable if not essential services in
Indigenous communities will have broader social and economic consequences that
will need to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

Finally, I question the extent to which enhanced STEP will really provide a
new service to Indigenous job seekers. The government acknowledges that some
Indigenous job seekers will not be ready for training or job placement; hence
community work activities will have to continue to be provided through the
enhanced STEP. It appears that, to this extent at least, STEP will continue to
operate like a CDEP in relation to these Indigenous clients. Similarly, the
services described as falling within enhanced STEP are already currently
available through the Job Network or Wage
Assistance.^[92]

My Office will continue to monitor developments in relation to the operation
of the CDEP scheme and the enhanced STEP model. The effects of the changed
arrangements will need to be carefully monitored before further changes are
introduced. This will especially be the case if the proposed changes prove to be
a trojan horse for further mainstreaming of Indigenous employment services in
urban areas. It would be highly undesirable if a class of Indigenous peoples
become permanently isolated from the labour market in urban and regional areas,
without the support of CDEP or some similar arrangement that meets the
particular needs of Indigenous unemployed people and allows them activity,
training and purpose. It is difficult at this stage to see this being
satisfactorily provided by the mainstream employment services.

The Council of Australian Governments
(COAG) Trials

The genesis of the new arrangements are to be found in the agreement in April
2002 of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) to trial a new whole of
government approach to the delivery of services to Indigenous communities at
eight selected trial sites:

The aim of these trials will be to improve the way governments interact with
each other and with communities to deliver more effective responses to the needs
of indigenous Australians. The lessons learnt from these cooperative approaches
will be able to be applied more
broadly.^[93]

The key objectives in the COAG trial sites were to:

• tailor government action to identified community needs and aspirations;
• coordinate government programs and services where this will improve service
  delivery outcomes;
• encourage innovative approaches;
• cut through blockages and red tape to resolve issues quickly;
• negotiate agreed project outcomes, benchmarks and responsibilities with the
  relevant people in Indigenous communities;
• work with Indigenous communities to build the capacity of people in those
  communities to negotiate as genuine partners with government; and
• build the capacity of government employees to work in new ways with
  Indigenous communities.^[94]
  

As it turns out, on the information available to date, it would
appear that none of these objectives have been achieved to any significant
degree (see below).^[95]

The trials got underway in some sites in 2002 and in others in 2003. A
federal government department was identified for each trial site to lead the
government’s involvement in the trial. The Secretary of the Department was
to act as a ‘champion’ for the relevant community, in the sense of
promoting the coordinated delivery of services by the federal departments
involved. The sites were to be individually monitored and evaluated, as well as
evaluating the overall whole of government approach embodied in the trials:

The whole-of-government initiative will be evaluated by an independent expert
within two years of commencement and again after five years. Data collected and
analysed through the performance monitoring process and feedback received from
trial regions will be included in the
evaluation.^[96]

Unfortunately, these early commitments concerning evaluation of the COAG
trials were slow in coming to realisation. An evaluation framework for the
trials was released in October 2003, but this set out evaluation priorities
rather than an evaluation process. In April 2004 it was stated that
‘evaluation of the trials would be premature at this
stage’.^[97] Even though the
trials had neither been completed nor evaluated at the time, in July 2004 the
Government chose to replicate this whole of government service delivery model on
a nation-wide basis through implementing the new arrangements for the
administration of Indigenous affairs.

Thus, as I noted in 2004:

The structures of the new arrangements and the philosophy that underpins them
can be seen to have been directly derived from the COAG
trials.^[98]

Indeed, despite the absence of any formal evaluation, the federal government
continually stated that the new arrangements were based on ‘the early
learnings’ from the COAG trials, as well as findings of the ATSIC
Review.^[99] This places the COAG
trials at the centre of the new arrangements. Concerns about the trials have
to be viewed in this context.

The key problem that presents itself is whether there was premature adoption
of the COAG trials in terms of implementing the new arrangements. This danger
was noted by the Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous
Affairs in its 2005 report After ATSIC – Life in the
Mainstream?^[100] While
the Senate Committee was supportive of the COAG trials, it had concerns,
especially if the model was to be applied widely too early. As the Committee
noted:

The Committee is concerned that the COAG trials are being used as a model for
wider service delivery arrangements before there is any clear idea of whether
these trial sites have succeeded or not. In point of fact, the COAG trials are
yet to be assessed in any authoritative manner; until such time as that occurs,
the likelihood of success of the new arrangements is difficult to gauge, and as
such, represents a risk in terms of public policy. ^[101] [emphasis
added]

In what now appears to be a prophetic observation, the Committee noted that
the extent of dedicated support that the COAG trials were then receiving to
ensure their success was
unsustainable.^[102]

My Office became increasingly concerned about arrangements for evaluation of
these trials and public accountability for their outcomes. The Social Justice
Report 2003 noted that:

... it is not clear at this stage that the performance monitoring framework
of the trials will be sufficiently
rigorous.^[103] ... The lack of a
clear evaluation strategy is of great
concern.^[104]

Consequently I recommended that an independent monitoring and evaluation
process for the whole of government community trials initiative be
initiated.^[105] However, by the
time of the Social Justice Report 2005, my concerns about the evaluation
had not diminished, and I reported that:

To date, progress has been slow in ensuring that the new arrangements are
subject to rigorous and transparent monitoring processes. The absence of
sufficient processes amounts to a failure of government
accountability.^[106]

HORSCATSIA, in its 2004 report on its inquiry into capacity building and
service delivery in Indigenous communities, whilst being generally supportive of
the trials, also noted its’ ‘serious concerns regarding the
Trials.’^[107] They
stated:

The Committee notes that there has been limited, if any coordinated reporting
on their implementation and, to date, no tangible evidence has emerged on their
progress. The Committee has concerns regarding accountability matters, and
believes that an effective audit process needs to be put in place and a regular
report made on their progress in achieving
outcomes.^[108]

The Committee went on to recommend that:

The Commonwealth Government report to Parliament on an annual basis on the
progress of the COAG Trial of the whole of government approach to service
delivery in Indigenous communities and regions, and that procedures be
implemented to ensure that the report presented in the House of Representatives
stands referred to this Committee for its considerations and
report.^[109]

In its response to the Committee’s Report (August 2006), the government
rejected this recommendation, arguing that it:

... is committed to ensuring that reporting on the progress of the COAG
trials is carried out and made widely available, and therefore [the government]
does not consider that a report to the Parliament is
necessary.^[110]

Information about the progress of COAG trials has clearly not been made
‘widely available’ to date. The past three Social Justice
Reports have expressed concerns about the lack of transparency and the
absence of monitoring and evaluative processes, and the consequent lack of
government accountability, for the COAG trials in some
depth.^[111]

This year the advice from the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination (OIPC)
concerning the status of the evaluation of the COAG sites has been as
follows:

In late 2003 the Australian and State and Territory Governments agreed on a
monitoring and evaluation framework for the eight COAG Indigenous coordination
trials ... OIPC is coordinating evaluations of the eight COAG trial sites on
behalf of the Australian Government, in consultation with the relevant
Commonwealth and State/Territory lead agencies in each site.

Formative evaluations of each site commenced in 2005-06. The evaluations are
looking at what’s working well and what can be improved. They are being
undertaken by independent evaluators using a common evaluation framework. They
are focusing on how governments can improve their engagement with each other and
with Indigenous people and communities. The evaluation reports will cover the
history of the trial, the coordination processes used in the trial, interim
outcomes and options for further consideration by the trial partners. The
evaluations should be largely completed by July 2006.

An overarching report (or meta-evaluation) in the second half of 2006 will
draw together the common themes and lessons from the individual COAG Trial site
evaluations.

The need for and nature of further evaluation of the COAG Trials will be
considered after the meta-evaluation and will be flagged in future evaluation
plans as appropriate.^[112]

This timetable has run behind schedule. Further, the federal government has
not made the findings of the reviews of the COAG trial sites publicly available
as they have been completed, preferring instead to release all of the individual
trial reports and the synopsis report when they are all complete and the
government has had the opportunity to consider
them.^[113]

In the absence of information from the federal government on the evaluation
of the trials, I sought to gauge the effectiveness of the trials using what
information was available from various state and territory governments and other
sources.^[114] I presented and
analysed this information in the Social Justice Report 2005, noting the
shortcomings and problems evident in at least some of the trials at that stage.
For example, independent evaluations of the Shepparton COAG trial, commissioned
by the community partners, concluded that the trial was
failing.^[115]

Such apparent failures put a question mark over the entire COAG trial
process. As the authors of the Shepparton evaluation rightly asked:

If the COAG pilot is unable to function successfully in an innovative and
tested Aboriginal community such as Shepparton, the question must be asked:
Where can it succeed?^[116]

We now have part of the answer to that question: not, apparently, at Wadeye
in the Northern Territory.

The evaluation of the Wadeye COAG trial (also referred to as the ‘Gray
Report’) entered the public arena in late 2006 before the government
intended and was widely reported in the
press.^[117] It was also discussed
at the November 2006 Senate Estimates hearings. The Gray Report described
significant problems with the Wadeye trial (see box below).

Wadeye was selected as the Northern Territory site for a COAG trial. The
Secretary of the then Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS) was
responsible for the implementation of the trial. Its high profile nature
prompted the Prime Minister, the Chief Minister of the NT, and other senior
Ministers to visit Wadeye during the period of the trial, which in turn
heightened expectations of the trial’s success. The Secretaries' Group on
Indigenous Affairs Annual Report 2004-05 commented:

The trial site at Wadeye is showing how governments can work together with
Indigenous communities to improve outcomes for Indigenous
people.^[118]

In a similar vein, the then Minister, Senator Vanstone, had commented:

In the COAG trial we dealt directly with the 'Thamarrurr' [traditional
governance arrangement] so each of the clans has been able to have its say. As a
result of us listening to the Thamarrurr and responding, life is now improving
for the people of Wadeye.

The Thamarrurr, Territory and Australian governments agreed education was a
priority and just last week there was a massive increase in the number of
children attending school. So much so that more desks had to be put on the barge
from Darwin.

What works in Wadeye of course will not work everywhere
else.^[119]

Unfortunately the optimism shown about the trial proved to be misplaced. The
evaluation report by Bill Gray AM, a highly regarded former senior government
official, indicates an almost total failure of the Wadeye trial to achieve its
objectives.

The Wadeye COAG trial showed that the whole of government approach to service
delivery is difficult to implement, requires a major investment of time and
resources, and has yet to demonstrate that it provides a reliable and realistic
platform for the administration of Indigenous affairs. Whilst coordination of
service delivery is important and should be pursued, it is not a substitute for
developing and implementing strong policies and effective programs to respond to
the difficult circumstances facing communities like Wadeye.

A sense of urgency, commitment and partnership is required. However, as of
November 2006 at Wadeye the government is instead locked in a wrangle over
leasing arrangements for the township which seem more to do with ideology and
less to do with service
delivery.^[121] Australian National
University researcher John Taylor has observed:

... the Thamarrurr region is rapidly expanding in population size. Unless a
major upgrading occurs, this trajectory means that Wadeye (along with many
predominantly Aboriginal towns across the Top End) will be increasingly
anomalous in the Australian settlement hierarchy for being a vibrant and growing
medium-sized country town yet with almost none of the basic infrastructure and
services normally associated with such
places.^[122]

The Wadeye trial indicated unresolved tensions or contradictions in policy
settings. For example, genuine engagement at family level, a key objective of
the new arrangements, will almost certainly take government down the path of
support for smaller family and clan-based satellite and outstation communities.
However, present federal government policy towards outstations is uncertain at
best, and has included a moratorium on housing for outstation and similar
communities, as described in Text Box 7 below.

The greatest danger arising from the disappointing outcomes of the COAG
Wadeye trial, and from similar problems with other COAG trials, is that the
wrong lessons will be learned.

When asked about the government’s response to the Gray Report at Senate
Estimates hearings in early 2007, the Associate Secretary of FaCSIA explained
that ‘ ... our [the government’s] response to the evaluation
predated our receipt of the
report’.^[124] The Associate
Secretary went on to explain that shortly after taking office, the Minister for
Indigenous Affairs travelled to Wadeye and undertook immediate action to try to
alleviate the situation and quell local riots. Not only is this an indication of
the extent to which the trial had failed to achieve a coordinated, whole of
government outcome, it is also a very clear indication of the fact that we may
not be given the opportunity to learn the lessons from the Wadeye trial. The
message from Wadeye may well be as much about policy failure as about failure of
processes and procedures. We have to look this possibility squarely in the face
– simply moving on to another ‘model’ of intervention will not
do.

Whilst the trial evaluations remain important in their own right, the COAG
trial evaluations are something of a proxy for evaluation of the new
arrangements in their entirety. Significant problems in respect of the trial
sites would suggest that the system as a whole may be in difficulty. This
consideration adds a dimension of urgency and significance to the evaluations of
the COAG trials.

It is becoming evident that serious discussion needs to takes place with
Indigenous peoples and other stakeholders at national, regional and local levels
about the new arrangements in Indigenous affairs. As we move into post-COAG
trial arrangements for Indigenous affairs, there is a pressing need for
transparent and rigorous evaluation processes if egregious errors of policy and
judgement are to be avoided.

Such regular reviews of progress on the new arrangements should involve
Parliamentary scrutiny. The appropriate body for ongoing review would be either
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs; the Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs (which was established as a one off committee for inquiry into
the bill to abolish ATSIC); or a newly established standing Joint Parliamentary
Committee.

The ‘democratic spotlight’ that this would provide is especially
important in an area as complex and sensitive as Indigenous affairs, and it is
unrealistic to think that all wisdom can rest in the necessarily somewhat
circumscribed world of Ministers and senior bureaucrats who have limited
knowledge or experience in Indigenous affairs. The imposition of unresearched
and unproven policies on Indigenous Australians will continue to enable
governments to blame the victims for the failures of such policies.

At present, the Senate Estimates process is the only avenue for information
about the new arrangements and their implementation. These hearings are,
however, limited in scope (relating to matters of appropriation and not policy
development). They do not provide an adequate process for Parliamentary scrutiny
of Indigenous affairs, particularly given that there is no avenue for the direct
input and participation of Indigenous communities and people into the process.

Post
COAG trials – another ‘new’ approach

Regardless of whether individual COAG trials have been more or less
successful, it is now clear that the federal government is moving to abandon
them. There is an evident lack of enthusiasm for continuing with the COAG model
for service delivery to communities. As has been pointed out by senior
officials: ‘[t]he trials were trials; it was never intended that they
would go on forever’.^[125]

It appears likely that once all the COAG site evaluations are completed
(anticipated for late 2006) and the results of the ‘meta-evaluation’
of all the evaluations considered, governments will move on from the COAG trial
approach. Comments made at the November Senate Estimates hearings indicate when
and how the trials could be brought to an end:

Mr Gibbons - It [ending the trials] is under consideration with a
number of jurisdictions now. If I take the Wadeye one which we have been talking
about, I believe both governments are comfortable with the idea of transitioning from a trial into a regional partnership agreement. The
negotiations we are having at the invitation of the Chief Minister will probably
lead to a longer term commitment to replace the COAG trial. [emphasis added]

... As a result of the evaluations that are about to be considered by
government, I think consideration will be given to bringing the trials to an end
and moving on, but that will have to be resolved in partnership with the
appropriate state or territory jurisdiction. ^[126]

The new approach now being implemented is two-pronged. On the one hand it devolves the authority for agreement-making for service delivery down, by
giving ICC managers authority to commit in a single SRA up to $100,000, and
state managers up to
$500,000.^[127] On the other hand,
agreements relating to regions or communities deemed to be ‘in
crisis’ are being elevated to the status of high-level agreements
between the federal and state/territory governments. These agreements are being
referred to as ‘strategic’ or ‘intensive interventions’
in respect of designated priority communities.

Turning first to the increased authority for the ICC and state managers, this
appears to be an attempt to find a way around the red tape that has tied up the
new arrangements and hindered the delivery of substantive outcomes in
communities. The types of projects that the government intends to fund under
this initiative include early childhood centres, sports facilities and new
housing. To enable managers to respond to the immediate needs of Indigenous
communities, they will ask them to ‘sign on-the-spot shared responsibility
agreements in exchange for the
cash’.^[128] As the Minister
has explained:

The managers of the 29 Indigenous Co-ordination Centres that have been
created across the country will no longer have to wait for official sign-off to
take action. We are giving ICC managers the capacity to actually see what needs
to be done on the ground to make those decisions and fund them on the ground,
bang.^[129]

This ‘bottom up’ model contrasts with the more ‘top
down’ approach that is implicit in ‘strategic interventions’.
The Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs is credited
with having developed the framework for strategic interventions in an attempt to
address the failures of the COAG trials and the continuing serious problems in a
number of Indigenous communities:

Since Minister Brough has come in he has very quickly decided that you have
got to define an area, put someone in to do an assessment and really coordinate
between the Commonwealth and the state an intensive response which is
coordinated and planned, et cetera. That is basically the route we are going in
Wadeye [post COAG trial], as well as a range of other locations across the north
of Australia.^[130][emphasis
added]

This is spelt out a little more in the following description:

A significant change since Minister Brough has been in the portfolio,
recognising some of the experience that has come out of the trials and
elsewhere, has been the reconstruction of our approach to Commonwealth-State
cooperation in this area to lock the bulk of our investment into joint
agreements around strategic issues.

In the case of Alice Springs, for example, we were invited to assist the
Northern Territory deal with the growing issue of demographic movement into
Alice Springs and the shortage of accommodation, both long and short term, et
cetera. We are making a significant investment there in partnership with the
Northern Territory. We have been asked to do the same in Wadeye. So, instead of
committing first and then working out what we are doing, we are negotiating up
front what the objective is, what each jurisdiction is going to do and what
conditions are going to prevail et
cetera.^[131]

The Secretary of FaCSIA, put the same point another way:

... we are in the process of changing our approach entirely and it is
an approach based on a very clear bilateral arrangement with the state or
territory government - in this case, the Northern Territory. While we are still
talking with them, we have not got a document that spells it out but it is very
much a focus on ensuring that the state or territory government live up to their
responsibilities around schooling and policing and those sorts of things. In
return for that, we live up to our responsibilities in the provision of our
services. That is basically what it is
about.^[132][emphasis added]

I have quoted from the Senate Estimates hearings at some length because there
has been little public consideration of the newly proposed changes to the
administration of Indigenous affairs. It is important to understand what is
involved, and to appreciate that these changes have been triggered by the
problems associated with the COAG trials.

In September 2006, the Australian Government confirmed this new intensive
intervention approach as applying more broadly to urban communities when the Australian Government Blueprint for Action in Indigenous Affairs was
endorsed by the Ministerial Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs. As noted by OIPC,
this Framework:

introduces a more structured, geographically based approach that recognises
that locational factors have a significant bearing on Indigenous peoples’
wellbeing and on how governments can best work to overcome Indigenous
disadvantage. ^[133]

The government notes that the Blueprint is based on three geographic
categories from the ARIA classification system: urban (where over 30% of the
Indigenous population live), regional (with approximately 43% of the Indigenous
population) and remote (where about 27% of Indigenous Australians live). OIPC
have noted that this definition of ‘urban’ differs from the
definition used by OIPC to date, which was less
specific.^[134]

The Blueprint repeats the government’s intention to focus on harnessing
the mainstream in urban areas:

In addressing Indigenous disadvantage the Australian Government aims to leverage existing infrastructure. In urban areas the majority of
existing infrastructure revolves around mainstream programs and services, and
consequently the work to address disadvantage in urban areas focuses on
harnessing the mainstream.^[135]

The government goes on to state that ‘leveraging existing
infrastructure’ in order to ‘harness the mainstream’ entails
the following:

The Blueprint outlines the role of Australian Government agencies in urban
areas as ‘improving the functioning of mainstream services for Indigenous
people’, including through intensive place-based intervention if
necessary. The Australian Government applies the principles of flexibility,
shared responsibility and local solutions across all its work on urban and
mainstreaming issues. Strategies for the Australian Government to achieve this
are identified in the Blueprint, including:

• develop and implement an Indigenous urban strategy that identifies and
  removes barriers to access and modifies mainstream services to improve
  participation by and outcomes for Indigenous people;
• share responsibility, make agreements, and be flexible and consultative in
  order to improve outcomes and build better relationships;
• respond to the needs identified locally and use intensive intervention when
  needed (coordinated centrally by FaCSIA and ICCs where relevant);
• improve the quality, design, and delivery of Indigenous-specific and
  mainstream services; and
• improve its own and support its partners’ cultural understanding,
  governance, operations, policies, accountability and evaluation.
  

Cooperation and coordination across all governments is needed to
improve the integration of, and outcomes from, services. The role of States and
Territories is critical, given their significant responsibility for service
delivery and relevant regulation. FACSIA’s role is to facilitate policy
development where there are issues in common across the Australian Government or
with States and Territories through overarching bilateral agreements.

FACSIA has initiated cross-departmental work on policy issues relating to
improving mainstream service provision and cultural inclusiveness, provided
opportunities for Australian Government departments to learn from each other,
and has sought the advice of the National Indigenous Council (NIC) on those
issues. The NIC has underlined the need to adapt mainstream services and improve
their cultural inclusiveness to ensure that Indigenous people get better access
to and outcomes from those services.

Program and service delivery is the responsibility of the specific Australian
Government department or agency managing the program or service. The OID
reporting framework is being used to guide the construction of performance
indicators in Shared Responsibility Agreements and the development of Baseline
Community Profiles.^[136]

There are two features of concern in this Blueprint. The first is the clear
lack of progress in improving mainstream access that has occurred in the first
two years of the new arrangements. The Blueprint provides a further bureaucratic
re-organisation of what the government intends to do rather than reporting on
what the government is actually doing or has already done. It also proposes the
development of an urban strategy – surely there are useful lessons from
the past two years of the new arrangements and the operation of ICCs in urban
localities, in particular, to advance this?

The second is that the federal government is moving towards a bilateral
interventionist model. The government appears to require some certainty from
its state and territory counterparts on the level and detail of their commitment before an intervention can commence, rather than developing this as the
program unrolls in the chosen community. It is clear that the interventionist
model puts the strategic decision-making clearly in the hands of government
– with the Indigenous community only becomes involved after the
basic decision to intervene has been made and respective levels of commitment
agreed.

Elcho Island (Galiwin’ku) in the Northern Territory has been given as
an example of a strategic intervention that is
underway.^[137] In this instance
the Australian and Northern Territory Governments selected the community, but
the federal government is now ‘engaged with the traditional owners on
Elcho Island and the historical people of Galiwinku’ in an attempt to
‘secure the agreement of all the parties’ before the detailed
planning of the implementation stage of the intervention is
finalised.^[138]

This example suggests that ‘strategic intervention’ in fact means
‘restricted Indigenous participation’ at a governmental and
priority-setting level. Priorities are determined by outsiders (governments),
then the insiders (the community) are invited to participate in the detailed
planning and implementation.

This does not appear to provide a sound basis for ‘ownership’ by
Indigenous communities of initiatives undertaken as part of such strategic
interventions. It is inconsistent with the various commitments made by
government through COAG relating to Indigenous
participation.^[139]

Nor would it be consistent with the Guidelines for engagement with
Indigenous peoples that were contained in the Social Justice Report
2005. Of particular importance in the context of
‘strategic interventions’ are the following principles, contained in
the Guidelines:

• Indigenous peoples have the right to full and effective participation in
  decisions which directly or indirectly affect their lives;
• Such participation shall be based on the principle of free, prior and
  informed consent, which includes governments and the private sector providing
  information that is accurate, accessible, and in a language the indigenous
  peoples can understand;
• Governments and the private sector should establish transparent and
  accountable frameworks for engagement, consultation and negotiation with
  indigenous peoples and communities;
• Indigenous peoples and communities have the right to choose their
  representatives and the right to specify the decision making structures through
  which they engage with other sectors of society;
• Frameworks for engagement should allow for the full and effective
  participation of indigenous peoples in the design, negotiation, implementation,
  monitoring, evaluation and assessment of outcomes;
• Indigenous peoples and communities should be invited to participate in
  identifying and prioritizing objectives, as well as in establishing targets and
  benchmarks;
• There is a need for governments, the private sector, civil society and
  international organizations and aid agencies to support efforts to build the
  capacity of indigenous communities, including in the area of human rights so
  that they may participate equally and meaningfully in the planning, design,
  negotiation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, programs and
  projects that affect them. ^[140]
  

To ensure a sound basis to government programs, full Indigenous
participation must be guaranteed from the start in determining the
priorities and basic parameters of government support. Perhaps the term
‘intervention’ itself is a bit awkward, and a term without a
connotation of unilateralism might be preferable.

Concurrent with the strategic intervention approach, a new division has been
established in FaCSIA to administer the interventions, known as the Strategic
Interventions Task Force. The Task Force is to initially focus on
communities on Mornington Island, in Queensland; Galiwinku, Alice Springs and
Wadeye in the Northern Territory; and Kalumburu in Western
Australia.^[141]

Another associated change has been referred to by the Minister as
‘cutting the fat from the
bureaucracy’.^[142] It will
result in just one State Manager being responsible for Families, Community
Services and Indigenous Affairs in each state and territory, rather than having
a separate Indigenous Affairs Manager (within OIPC) and State Manager (within
FaCSIA).

The federal government will move staff from southern Australia to remote
areas in northern Australia to give isolated communities more intensive support.
This will be done through a phased approach. Such a move is consistent with the
government’s view that urban and regional based Indigenous peoples can be
served by mainstream agencies and services. This reinforces concerns that the
government continues to focus insufficient attention on the specific
difficulties of urban and regional Aboriginal communities in accessing
mainstream services.

A further component of the changed arrangements now being introduced concerns
community profiles or baseline data. The Office of Indigenous Policy
Coordination (OIPC) has advised that as a result of the COAG trials, better
baseline data is required. Thus:

OIPC is developing an approach for evaluating intensive whole-of-government
initiatives in Indigenous communities and regions. This evaluation approach
would be used for priority region interventions. Elements of this
approach would be applied as appropriate to
comprehensive SRAs, other SRAs with a substantial investment, and a sample of
communities being assisted under the Petrol Sniffing 8 Point
Plan.^[143] [emphasis added]

OIPC has developed a prospective timetable for community profiles as part of
the Performance Management Framework for Intensive Whole-of-Government
Interventions, as follows:

As anyone with experience in Indigenous affairs can attest, community
profiling exercises have something of a cyclical nature. Over the years there
have been a number of such exercises, of varying detail and quality. As well,
there is already a considerable amount of data available from a range of sources
including state and territory profiles of
communities,^[145] the Australian
Bureau of Statistics, the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research
(CAEPR), the Australian Institute for Health and Welfare (AIHW), a range of
government agencies that collect data to inform their own programs, and academic
institutions.

As profiled in last year’s Social Justice Report, there has also
been the regional identification of priorities by Indigenous peoples through
ATSIC Regional Council Plans, extensive data collection through the Western
Australian Aboriginal Child Health Survey, and information collated
nationally through regional health planning forums under the National Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Health Strategy. Each of these is a significant
source from which community profiling exercises could draw.

Such community profiling should only be undertaken with the full
participation and cooperation of Indigenous communities. A profiling exercise
conducted with such participation can provide a valuable tool for empowering
communities to identify the priority issues and actions necessary to improve
their circumstances.

I do, however, have some concerns about this approach. The investment of the
high level of resources and time to develop such community profiles should not
be an end in itself. The identification of high levels of needs in communities,
for example, necessitates action to address the findings of this research. This
was a fundamental failing of the extensive community profiling done as part of
the COAG trial in Wadeye, where government expenditure and program activity has
clearly not responded to the urgent and high levels of need identified in the
community profiling work undertaken by John
Taylor.^[146]

The findings of such community profiling should also be treated with
flexibility. The population dynamics of remote area communities mean that
today’s demographic profile might be quite inaccurate in a year or two.
The difficulties of making valid comparisons over time in Indigenous
communities, because of population instability and other reasons, on almost any
social indicator, have been extensively
documented.^[147]

Taylor, Bern and Senior have affirmed the importance of establishing baseline
data, but with the qualification that careful attention must be paid to the
impact that future population dynamics may have on community needs and
priorities:

In Indigenous affairs generally, social indicator analysis is increasingly
used to quantify the degree of relative disadvantage and to monitor the effects
of government policy and economic development in general. In a fundamental
sense, planning for social and economic change is determined by the size,
growth, and socioeconomic composition of populations. Accordingly, an
understanding of these factors is essential for a proper assessment of the need
for, access to, and distribution of resources. There is also a growing awareness
of a need to better understand the dynamics of change in the size and
composition of the Indigenous population, so as to formulate policies that are
based not solely on current or historic assessment of government obligations,
but also on some estimation of anticipated
requirements.^[148]

Another important caution that needs to be applied when compiling and
analysing baseline data for Indigenous communities is the variance that can
emerge between what the data indicates and what Indigenous communities
themselves perceive or aspire to. As Taylor, Bern and Senior explain:

... while social indicators report on observable population characteristics,
they reveal nothing about more behavioural population attributes such as
individual and community priorities and aspirations for enhancing quality of
life— indeed the whole question of what this might mean and how it might
be measured in an Aboriginal domain is only just beginning to be
addressed.^[149]

Reliable data is essential. However, the gathering of facts and statistics,
important as they are, must not be a substitute for action. Nor should this
become a substitute for meaningful Indigenous participation and consultation.
Although the task of establishing community baseline data will assist in
evaluating interventions, it should not be relied upon as the primary the
basis for the development and modification of Indigenous policy.

The frequency with which some Indigenous communities are
‘measured’ is also of concern. This can be very frustrating and
exhausting for the communities involved, as well as the wider community, all of
whom want to see significant on-the-ground progress as quickly as is reasonably
possible. This sort of frustration became evident at the November 2006 Senate
Estimates hearings.^[150] I
certainly hope that the community profiles are not an excuse for lack of action,
nor that they draw resources away from initiatives that might directly address
Indigenous disadvantage.

It is unfortunate that many of the senior bureaucrats involved in Indigenous
affairs at this juncture do not have the corporate or historic knowledge to
inform policy development. It is also unfortunate that the huge cost of this
exercise and other ‘new innovations’ will be attributed to
Indigenous affairs spending reinforcing the government’s claims of
significant input with minimal outcomes.

I am also concerned by the thinking behind the selection of communities for
special attention, and whether there is a tendency for the focus to move from
one community to another before the first community has seen real improvements.
Indeed, the Chief Minister of the Northern Territory, while welcoming the
federal government’s proposals in respect of Galiwin’ku, has
expressed such a concern:

We have received a proposal from the Australian Government for what is called
an ‘intensive intervention’ in Galiwinku. I have given a commitment
to the federal government we will work with them on that, that is fine. However,
while I endorse that initiative, I believe that the priority for such intensive
intervention is the community of Wadeye. It is our largest Aboriginal community
and, for the last three years, it has been the subject of the COAG trial.

While we welcome Galiwinku – that is terrific - we do not want the
federal government’s attention taken away from Wadeye. It has been a COAG
trial. We cannot say, because the outcomes we wanted in three years had not been
achieved: ‘Okay, Wadeye, let us look somewhere else’. What I am
saying to the Indigenous Affairs Minister is: welcome, Galiwinku, welcome the
work we are doing together on Alice Springs, particularly on the town camps, but
important to this Territory and our future is
Wadeye.^[151]

The federal government’s tendency to deliver important policy decisions
in Indigenous affairs as a fait accompli – even to territory and
state governments – raises serious concerns about the ability of
Indigenous communities to negotiate as equal partners in the many agreement
making processes that have been introduced with the new arrangements.

Constructive engagement with Indigenous communities and good faith
negotiations are critical to the successful operation of the principle of mutual
obligation.

However, there are perceptions that in some instances, the government’s
application of the principle of mutual obligation has slipped into a coercive
mode with Indigenous communities and territory administrations alike. ^[152]

For example, in Galiwin’ku, the reward offered to the community for
agreeing to lease land in the Indigenous township on a 99 year basis will be a
significant investment in housing. The Minister, Mr Brough, explained the
proposed deal in the following terms:

Around fifty houses will be built and real jobs provided, if the community is
safe and signs up to full school attendance, a no-drugs no-violence policy and agree to a 99 year lease to support home ownership and business
development opportunities.^[153] [emphasis added]

Similar concerns about coercion have been expressed in respect of the Tiwi
Islands where there is a concern that the federal government will not deliver on
a $10 million funding commitment for a new boarding school if the community
rejects a proposed 99 year
lease.^[154]

If such deals are being proposed they may well put Australia in breach of its
international obligations in respect of human rights. Given the parlous housing
conditions at townships such as Galiwin’ku, this arguably could be seen as
a form of inducement and contrary to the principle of free and informed consent.
To sign away valuable rights in land for 99 years is a matter which should
require careful consideration and independent expert legal
advice.^[155]

Although the underlying title stays with the traditional owners, in the
circumstances such arrangements potentially can be the de facto equivalent of a transfer of freehold title. I am concerned that if agreements
are made as a result of inducements, and where there is a clear power imbalance,
we may be getting towards a situation that could be characterised as
expropriation of Indigenous
land.^[156]

Summary: The challenges of achieving equitable access to
mainstream services for Indigenous peoples

This first section of the chapter has provided an overview of the challenges
facing the government in achieving equitable access to mainstream services for
Indigenous peoples. There are two key elements to the government’s
approach to achieving this.

Firstly, individual mainstream departments are endeavouring to adapt existing
services so they better meet the needs of Indigenous peoples. A good example
here is the government’s proposal to abolish IECs and CDEPs in urban and
major regional centres and to steer Indigenous job seekers into mainstream jobs
using employment brokers. This raises the fundamental question of whether
mainstream services can be sufficiently adapted to both address the needs
of Indigenous Australians, and respect and accommodate their cultural
differences. It also raises the question of why this has not happened in the
past and what strategies are going to be put in place to ensure that it will
happen into the future.

The second and larger element of the government’s approach to improving
Indigenous peoples’ access to mainstream services is achieving a more
coordinated and effective ‘whole of government’ response. This
involves a major reorganisation of the way the federal bureaucracy deals with
Indigenous affairs so that there are better linkages between mainstream programs
and Indigenous specific services. It also involves reaching agreement with the
states/territories on respective roles and responsibilities in addressing
Indigenous disadvantage and service delivery. This has been the
Government’s policy focus since the new arrangements were introduced in
2004, and hence is the major focus of this chapter.

Absent from the Government’s approach to harnessing the mainstream is
the participation of Indigenous peoples. I continue to have serious concerns
that Indigenous Australians have largely been left out of the government’s
equation. Where they are consulted on legal and policy developments, it is
rushed, ad hoc and often tokenistic. But all too frequently major policy
decisions, such as the abandonment of the COAG trials, are made and implemented
without Indigenous input, knowledge or consent.

Two years on from the introduction of the new arrangements, we are yet to see
significant improvements in Indigenous levels of disadvantage – whether it
be in relation better access to mainstream services, or economic independence. I
am the first to acknowledge that improvement on these fronts will take time and
we need more and better data to make these evaluations with any confidence.

However, what does concern me is that the government has not bedded down its
policy direction for Indigenous affairs. This is not only destabilising and
confusing for Indigenous peoples, it is diverting valuable resources from
producing changes on the ground that will improve the daily lives of Indigenous
Australians. Indigenous peoples, governments and other key stakeholders have to
get the policy foundations right before new directions are taken.

Part 2: ‘Harnessing the mainstream’ through the
new arrangements for Indigenous affairs

The new arrangements for Indigenous affairs have a number of key elements
that can contribute to harnessing the mainstream. In this part of the report I
will examine the role of each of these building blocks in terms of how they
currently operate and how they could potentially contribute (or contribute more
effectively) to this objective.

These key elements are as follows:

• Regionally focussed service delivery through Indigenous Coordination
  Centres, solution brokers, agreement making processes and ‘intensive
  interventions’;
• Engagement processes with Indigenous peoples;
• The role of the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination; and
• Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
  

Regionally focussed service delivery:
Indigenous Coordination Centres, solution brokers, agreement making processes
and ‘intensive interventions’

A central component of the new arrangements is the development of a whole of
government machinery for service delivery that is regionally based and which
prioritises agreement making processes with Indigenous communities. Information
about these processes indicates that the government clearly intends them to play
a critical role in ‘harnessing the mainstream’.

• Indigenous Coordination Centres and solution brokers
  

Indigenous Coordination Centres (ICCs) are designed to be the focal
point of the new relationship being forged with Indigenous communities. They
replace ATSIC Regional Offices. According to the Minister, Mr Brough:

Our Indigenous Coordination Centres (ICCs) are the frontline of the
Government’s efforts. All Australian Government agencies with major
responsibilities for Indigenous programs are required to work together. This is the new single face of
government.^[157]

OIPC has defined the specifics of the ICC role as
follows:

Each of these ICCs coordinates Australian Government program funding and
services to local Indigenous people. ICCs will coordinate Indigenous-specific
programs in their regions. They will work with local Indigenous communities and
negotiate regional and local agreements for effective partnerships based on
shared responsibility.^[158]

The role of ICCs in
respect of Indigenous-specific programs is clear enough, although there
are significant issues with the workability of this model of service delivery
and coordination. Gray and Sanders note, for example, the view held
by heads of government departments that ICCs present ‘some very
significant governance and skill
challenges’.^[159]

However,
the role of ICCs in respect of the objective of removing barriers to mainstream
services is less clear. Do ICCs have a mandate to involve themselves in issues
of mainstream service delivery, especially where those services are provided by
state and territory authorities?

ICCs are the federal
government’s primary point of contact with Indigenous communities for the
development of local and regional agreements. These include: Shared
Responsibility Agreements (SRAs), Regional Partnership Agreements (RPAs) and
Regional Indigenous Engagement Arrangements. ICCs are also responsible for
regional coordination with state and territory government
activities.

Accordingly,
the ICC structure is well placed to develop complementarity between
Indigenous-specific and mainstream programs. For example, ICCs could negotiate
with communities to mix and match mainstream and specific programs to better
meet their needs. If a particular agency is attempting to develop
complementarity in its programming between its mainstream programs and its
Indigenous-specific programs, the culture and resources of an ICC are
potentially helpful.

The Social Justice Report 2005 discussed the potential for the ICC structure
to be utilised to improve regionally focused service delivery for Indigenous
health. It noted the potential for the whole of government structure at the
regional level to provide an improved focus on the social determinants of
health, which could complement health specific
interventions.^[160]

Last
year’s report noted that in the first twelve months of the new
arrangements, the Department of Health and Ageing had not played a significant
role in the roll out of the new arrangements, did not have a significant
presence in ICCs and had ‘limited capacity to influence the strategic
directions underpinning engagement at the regional level and through agreement
making processes such as
SRAs.’^[161]

I
noted the failure of the new arrangements to build on significant progress and
experience in the health sector, or to develop effective relationships with the
extensive local Aboriginal Community Controlled health
sector.^[162] In particular, I
expressed concern at the failure
to:

• Apply the
methodologies and lessons learned from the health
sector;

• Build upon the significant community
resources and capacity that exists through the Aboriginal Community Controlled
health sector; and

• Build upon the findings
and recommendations of the regional planning processes conducted under the
state-wide Aboriginal Health
Forums.^[163]

And
as a consequence, I noted that there is a ‘disconnect between existing
programs relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health and the whole
of government approach adopted through the new arrangements.’ This was
despite the ‘clear inter-connections between the issues’ and the
recognition by governments of the need to adopt a holistic response to achieve
lasting improvements in Indigenous
health.^[164]

In
meetings with senior executives of the OIPC, the potential to utilise the
existing processes within the health sector to improve the performance of the
new whole of government machinery was discussed. A senior executive stated that
they would be ‘mugs’ if they did not pay attention to this and begin
to utilise the existing resources, such as regional health planning forums.
There is, however, no evidence that any such links have been developed in the
year that has passed since this discussion and since the findings of last
year’s Social Justice Report. This remains a major failing of the
ICC process, and accordingly an ongoing failure to meet the objectives of the
new arrangements.

Taking a
whole of government approach to service delivery through ICCs is a major
challenge. It can cut across well established systems of budget and program
control, delivery and accountability arrangements and, simply, differing
departmental cultures. There is, predictably, a degree of inertia in the system.
At least some experience from the COAG trials suggests that it is very difficult
to change established organisational patterns of service delivery planning and
activity.^[165] Experience in the
Wadeye COAG trial indicates that communities and departments can quickly lapse
back into direct negotiations and funding arrangements. ^[166] In other words, the old
silo-mentality can quickly re-assert itself.

OIPC has indicated that each regional ICC has now
commenced developing regional priority plans which will ‘identify
the key issues (with measures and timeframes) that the ICC will focus on in a 12
month period.’^[167] These
plans:

cover work done through a variety of mechanisms, including RPAs and SRAs
(both single issue and more comprehensive), strategic intervention arrangements
and community in crisis interventations (sic.).

The regional priority documents are endorsed by Australian Government agency
state manager groups that meet regularly with ICC managers in each state and
territory. These in turn link back to national priorities. This ensures the
commitment of all necessary Australian Government agencies to a particular
regional priority. The ICC Managers then report regularly to the state manager
group on progress with the priority initiatives.

The priority plans are a guide only and do not attempt to cover all the
activities in which an ICC may be involved within the year, rather they
highlight the most significant community and government work in which the ICC is
likely to be involved.^[168]

The regional priority plans process is a new development. There is no
public information about this process. Given the prominence attached to
harnessing the mainstream, it can be expected that the regional priority plans
for many regions will provide greater detail about how the government intends to
progress the objective of improving mainstream accessibility. This would
particularly be expected for those regional priority plans for ICCs that are
based in urban centres.

The regional priority plans are internally focused on how the ICC organises
its business. It is not intended to establish the priorities for Indigenous
communities, but instead form the basis for how different government departments
will collaborate through the ICC structure. Clearly, the priorities for
government coordination cannot be divorced from the priorities of Indigenous
communities. It is artificial and unrealistic to suggest otherwise.

I am concerned that there is a disconnect between the creation of such
regional priority plans and Indigenous engagement and participation in
determining what the priorities for a region are. The experiences and views of
Indigenous peoples and communities appear to have been given little
consideration to date, which is a critical oversight. This absence has the
potential to impact on the effectiveness of program delivery (such as through an
ICC) and on the effectiveness of whole of government coordination.

One of the government’s responses to the
challenge of making a whole-of-government approach work has been the appointment
of solution brokers. Solution brokers are staff from different government
departments, usually located in ICCs or state offices/departments, which
progress the whole of government and whole of agency approach of the new
arrangements. The OIPC has described their role as follows:

Solution brokers should have a detailed understanding of the full range of programmes and services in their agency, particularly those
impacting on Indigenous Australians, and understand how to link these various
programmes – or to suggest how they might need to be adapted so they
respond to community circumstances and deliver better
outcomes.^[169]

Solution brokers should have the skills to link programs of their own and
other agencies to generate innovative, flexible solutions to issues identified
by communities. They are meant to support ICC managers in implementing a whole
of government response to communities’ needs including assisting to
negotiate SRAs. As I have noted elsewhere, this:

... new brand of bureaucrat, a ‘solution broker’, navigates
through all the levels and sectors of government to negotiate, as their name
suggests, a solution. .... it is intended that as many of these solutions as
possible are to be delivered according to the principle of mutual
obligation.^[170]

Solution brokers have, for example, been appointed by the Department of
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) to every
ICC.^[171] The role of DEWR
solution brokers is to:

• Represent DEWR in the implementation of the Australian Government’s
  collaborative approach to Indigenous program management and service
  delivery;
• Contribute to the development and implementation of Regional Partnership
  Agreements (RPAs) and Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) through ICCs;
• Identify gaps/duplication in service delivery, areas for improvement and
  opportunities for innovation, coordination and collaboration;
• Negotiate and liaise within DEWR and with other government agencies,
  external organisations and local Indigenous communities to promote employment
  and enterprise development opportunities for Indigenous Australians; and
• Prepare briefings, submissions, reports, reviews, contractual documentation,
  risk management plans, business plans and general correspondence as
  required. ^[172]
  

Clearly it is the intention that the solution broker looks for
complementarity between Indigenous specific and mainstream programs, and that
they then prioritise those programs that are best suited to meeting the
particular needs of each community.

Other departments and agencies have also placed solution brokers in ICCs,
although as last year’s Social Justice Report noted, they have not
been placed in every ICC. This is for a combination of reasons, including
difficulties experienced by some departments in identifying and placing
sufficiently senior and experienced staff as ICC solution brokers. Instead, they
have been placed in other offices such as a primary regional office or a state
office on a ‘hub and spoke’
model.^[173]

To what extent this reflects a retreat from the model of a solution broker in
every ICC remains to be seen. Indeed, ICC staffing seems to have been a problem
wider than the placement of solution brokers, and there may have been a
reduction in staffing levels in ICCs, particularly at the more junior levels, by
some agencies.^[174]

The role of solution broker is potentially valuable. However, it takes a
special kind of person, with both the motivation and the skill set to carry out
this role successfully. Not only does the solution broker need to know what is
available from the government side, he or she needs to be able to interact with
the Indigenous community on a constructive basis and also be able to deal with
the non-government sector as appropriate. In this regard, I have consistently
expressed concerns at the recruitment practices adopted through the new
arrangements to date because they do not sufficiently recognise that the ability
to communicate effectively with Indigenous communities is an important and
essential skill and an integral component of all merit based selection
processes.^[175]

The potential role of solution brokers is discussed further below in relation
to the Shared Responsibility Agreement making process.

• Reducing ‘red tape’ through funding processes
  

Another of the government’s responses to the challenge of
making a whole-of-government approach work better has been to explore ways of
reducing the ‘red tape’ that acts as a barrier to Indigenous
peoples’ access to mainstream services. A particular focus has been on
reducing the red tape associated with accessing funding for Indigenous programs.
Complex, multiple forms; difficult bureaucratic processes; inflexible service
arrangements; lengthy submissions and reports and persistant changes to policy
and program guidelines have all contributed to Indigenous peoples being unsure
of what services are available, and how they can be accessed.

The Secretary of the Treasury recently acknowledged the bureaucratic burden
associated with the new arrangements in Indigenous affairs:

I was struck, during a visit to one of the Cape York communities last year,
that the principal concern of its leaders was the red tape burden of reporting
and compliance arrangements arising from a multiplicity of government
intervention programmes and delivery agencies. Compliance with red tape was
absorbing all of the administrative capacity of the community. Reducing the red
tape burden on indigenous communities must be a national reform
priority.^[176]

Devising strategies to reduce red tape has been a particular focus of ICCs.
This has led to the introduction of the electronic Submission (eSub) process for
organisations applying for Indigenous program funding. ICCs also provide
information on available programs and funding priorities to applicants.

eSub enables Indigenous community organisations to download one funding
application even when requesting funding for multiple projects or from more than
one agency. The completed form or an eSub disk is mailed or electronically
submitted to the closest ICC for
assessment.^[177]

Whilst this has undoubtedly streamlined and simplified the process for
Indigenous organisations to access funding, the government is aware that the
problems created by red tape are more extensive. Addressing these problems
requires more than providing web-based solutions – as the government found
out in May 2006 when Morgan Disney & Associates presented OIPC with their
report entitled A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous Communities (hereafter the Morgan Disney
report).^[178]

The overall conclusion of the Morgan Disney report was that:

... actual red tape is less than perceived red tape, and that
many of the issues raised as examples of red tape, are in fact about
relationships, program management practices, and capacity of government
agencies, ICCs and funded organisations. [However,] the expressed frustration,
of both Indigenous organisations and ICC staff ... around having to take time
away from urgent, daily service delivery, or operational matters, to comply with
conditions of grants in reporting was considerable.

... [Indigenous organisations dispute] whether much of what is currently
required [in terms of reporting] actually assists governments or their governing
bodies to manage risk, to assess what outcomes are being achieved, and therefore
to account well for the use of
funds.^[179]

Funding procedures and conditions that the report identified as contributing
to levels of frustration and perceptions red tape included:

• The reporting burden of small grants is virtually equal to that of much
  larger grants. Even though there is a smaller risk, small grants still have the
  same reporting frequency and the same number of performance indicators for which
  data has to be collected.
• 66% of grants from programs that continue year after year have to be
  re-applied for annually, even though there is little variation in risk or
  circumstances.
• Funding departments appear to make little use of the information in the
  reports they receive from grant recipients, including information about the
  financial well-being of recipient organisations.
• Performance indicators are frequently not related to the activity being
  funded.^[180]
  

The report also identified adverse ‘organisational
cultures’ as another source of frustration and perceived red tape. For
example, some departments suffer from a ‘rigid compliance’ culture.
Rather than striving to help communities achieve their goals and build up their
organisational capacity, these departments insist on compliance with ‘less
than sensible reporting requirements’ or ‘standard performance
indicators which do not match the
project’.^[181]

To address both the actual and perceived burden of red tape on Indigenous
communities, the Morgan Disney report recommends a ‘paradigm shift’
at the federal level to bring about organisational and cultural
change.^[182] The alternative
paradigm proposed is based on the concept of mutual responsibility, a concept
that already underpins the government’s approach to Indigenous affairs.
The major objective of this paradigm shift would be move the focus of funding
Indigenous programs from one of achieving compliance, to one that is measured by
beneficial outcomes in Indigenous communities.

The Morgan Disney report characterises the concept of mutual responsibility
in a manner that emphasises mutual trust, respect and accountability between
funding agencies and funded organisations. In order to ensure that the funding
of Indigenous organisations results in beneficial outcomes for communities, the
report suggests that there needs to be a general acceptance of the following
premises by both parties:

• Organisations, on the whole, want and do what they believe is best for their
  communities, and similarly governments want to assist communities to achieve
  their potential;
• Risks are best managed when these are assessed together by the funding
  agency and the funded organisation, and jointly managed;
• Working together is more likely to achieve agreed and better outcomes for
  communities;
• Accountability for outcomes requires a mutual accountability between funding
  agencies and funded organisations based on respect and capacity building of
  Indigenous organisations; and
• Governments have a responsibility to monitor the use of public` funds and
  this can be done well, in partnership with Indigenous organisations and
  communities.^[183]
  

According to the Morgan Disney report, this paradigm shift would be
a relatively low cost option and would not require ‘massive change’.
Rather there would be a need for ‘change management, organisational and
cultural change and
training.’^[184] In fact,
many of the government’s current overarching policy strategies would be
consistent with, and quite critical to the success of this paradigm shift. For
example, it would be critical to maintain:

• An ongoing commitment to finding whole of government solutions to funding
  and supporting Indigenous organisations and communities, and to ways of working
  in partnership;
• A commitment to negotiating and focussing on accountability at the outset to
  ensure outcomes are achieved;
• A commitment to capacity building in Indigenous communities and
  organisations; and
• The development of the role of ICCs and OIPC at the regional and national
  levels, to improve and coordinate whole of government and cross government
  efforts to support and fund organisations, and reduce the administrative burden
  on Indigenous organisations. ^[185]
  

The Morgan Disney report is clear in the need for this paradigm
shift to be led by senior elements of the Indigenous affairs bureaucracy. For
example, it recommends that:

• The Secretaries Group on Indigenous Affairs establish a service charter and
  issue a leadership statement;
• OIPC examine practices within the ICCs and work with other departments to
  improve funding mechanisms and processes; and
• State/territory Managers of Australian Government departments provide
  ‘a solid foundation’ for the paradigm shift to take
  root.^[186]

• Shared Responsibility Agreements
  

Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) have been a prominent
feature of the work of ICCs and solution brokers at the regional level over the
first two years of the new arrangements. SRAs are defined as:

... agreements between the government and Indigenous communities or groups,
to provide a discretionary benefit in return for community obligations. These
discretionary benefits may take the form of extra services, capital or
infrastructure over and above essential services or basic entitlements.
They can involve all or some of the people in a residential
community.^[187]

The Annual Report 2004-05 of the Secretaries’ Group on
Indigenous Affairs observed that:

A central element of the Australian Government’s new approach is the
voluntary development with Indigenous families and communities of Shared
Responsibility Agreements
(SRAs).^[188]

Through SRAs, the government seeks to establish a mutual obligation basis for
assistance to Indigenous communities. SRAs are intended to respond to the
identified priorities of particular communities or family groups. In return for
discretionary benefits from government, communities make specific commitments in
order to achieve their identified goals. The obligation on the community or
family is often in the form of behavioural change (for example ensuring children
attend school). ^[189] SRAs also
meet the objective of the new arrangements of direct engagement with Indigenous
peoples.

As reported in last year’s Social Justice Report, OIPC had
identified a key role for SRAs in achieving improved access to government
services, including in urban locations:

There are a number of mechanisms under the new arrangements that will
facilitate improved service delivery to Indigenous people living in non-remote
communities, including SRAs...

As part of the new arrangements ICCs have been working with Indigenous people
and communities in both rural and urban areas to identify their needs and
priorities as well as develop Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs). SRAs can
be used in both rural and urban contexts, either as a mechanism through which
disadvantage can be tackled directly, or to complement and inform the delivery
of an existing service. They are also a useful mechanism through which
Government can respond to community identified needs by linking programs and
closing gaps in current service delivery. There are already a number of examples
or SRAs in urban areas.^[190]

The ‘directness’ of the SRA process is seen as worthwhile in
itself as a form of engagement and because it potentially lessens the influence
of ‘gatekeepers’, including Indigenous organisations.

Although
accounting for a relatively small share of total Indigenous program funding,
SRAs have been given considerable prominence by the government. In the national
media, they have come to embody the government’s commitment to
partnership, local agreements and flexible ‘joined-up’ government
service delivery. There are now over 190 of these agreements in
place.^[191] The responses of
Indigenous communities that have entered into SRAs are considered in detail in
the next chapter of this report.

However, the question remains: are SRAs an effective tool to ‘harness
the mainstream’? Do they achieve synergies between Indigenous-specific and
mainstream programs that improve the outcomes for communities. Or, are SRAs
really just a tool for tailoring Indigenous-specific programs to the needs of
the community concerned?

In last year’s Social Justice Report I wrote that the SRA
process had not, on the evidence to date, been a significant tool in harnessing
the mainstream.^[192] With a truly
flexible approach one might expect mainstream funds to be deployed through
SRAs to meet the expressed needs of the community. I commented that
ultimately, if funding for SRAs remains basically Indigenous specific
expenditure ‘then SRAs will remain a supplementary funding source and will
play a similar role to that of ATSIC program
funding.’^[193]

There are some examples of SRAs which seek to use Indigenous-specific funding
to reduce barriers to mainstream services. For example:

• The Areyonga community in Central Australia developed the Areyonga Bus and Oval SRA to reduce barriers to mainstream services that
  were caused by the community’s remote
  location.^[194] The Areyonga
  community identified their priority need as being ‘improved access to
  educational, specialist medical, cultural, sporting and recreational
  opportunities in Alice Springs and the
  region.’^[195] Among other
  things, the SRA provided the community with a bus.
  
• The Bagot community in Darwin entered into the Bagot SRA to reduce barriers to mainstream services that were caused by the community’s
  lack of knowledge of how to access services. The Bagot community, although right
  in Darwin and having access to a strong labour market, operates like a discrete
  Indigenous community. It identified its priorities including the development of
  a community plan. It did not have the skills or expertise to develop a community
  plan so wanted a Community Development Officer position with two locals trained
  to do the work. Among other things, the SRA provided the community with a
  Community Development Officer and a package of training opportunities.
  
• The Sarina Aboriginal and Torres Strait Community in Queensland through the
  Mudth-Niyleta Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporation developed the Sarina Economic Participation Strategy SRA to reduce barriers to
  mainstream employment opportunities that were caused by the community’s
  reliance upon CDEP. The Sarina community identified their priority need as being
  ‘wanting to stay in the community and be a part of the mainstream labour
  market.’ Among other things, the SRA provided the community with an
  Indigenous Community Volunteer (ICV) who helped to prepare the Economic
  Participation Strategy. This is seen to be the first of a number of SRA's that
  will be entered into by the community.
  
• The Palmerston Indigenous Village developed the Palmerston Community Plan
  SRA to reduce anti-social behaviour in the community and create
  greater engagement with mainstream activities. Among other things, the SRA
  provided the community with a Community Development Officer who will work with
  the local council to develop and implement a community plan.
  

These SRAs provide the potential to achieve improved access
to mainstream services over time.

A year further into the new arrangements, though, and it appears that the
majority of SRA funding continues to come from Indigenous specific expenditure
and not mainstream programs. The potential remains, however, for SRAs to build
the necessary linkages between Indigenous specific services and mainstream
services.

Solution brokers are ideally placed to create these linkages.

Chapter 3 of this report contains the results of a survey of Indigenous
communities and organisations which have entered into SRAs. The survey results
show that solution brokers are indeed critical to Indigenous community
satisfaction with SRAs. The survey found that:

• The biggest single reason that an SRA was initiated was at the suggestion of
  the government, usually through an ICC or solution broker;
• In 57% of cases, the ICC or solution broker were integrally involved in the
  development of the SRA (although survey respondents generally identified this
  participation as by ‘ICC staff’ rather than by ‘solution
  brokers’); and
• Communities that stated they had received no assistance from the ICC in
  developing the SRA had much lower rates of satisfaction with the SRA
  process.^[196]
  

However, the survey also confirmed the potential for SRAs to be a
tool to further the holistic, longer term priorities of communities. The survey
found that a majority of respondents defined their SRA as being about multiple
issues, and not being restricted to a single issue. This suggests a willingness
to look to more comprehensive arrangements that tackle the priorities identified
by communities.

The survey also identified disappointment from communities that SRAs did not
provide this broader, more comprehensive focus. Concern was expressed that the
one off nature of the funding was not capable of producing sustainable
improvements in communities, and could lead to disillusionment from communities
about engaging with government – the very opposite of the intended
impact.

• Comprehensive SRAs, Regional Partnership Agreements and
  ‘intensive interventions’
  

Regional agreement making processes were intended from the start to
be an integral component of the new arrangements. The principal tool that has
been identified for this purpose is the Regional Partnership Agreement (RPA).
OIPC has described the nature and purpose of RPAs as follows:

Regional Partnership Agreements provide a mechanism for setting out a
coherent government investment strategy across a region, eliminating overlaps or
gaps, and promoting coordination to meet identified priorities for the region.
Where States and Territories have agreed, RPAs may also incorporate State and
Territory investment. RPAs will accord with the Framework Principles for
Government Service Delivery agreed by the Council of Australian Governments in
June 2004.^[197]

SRAs were originally intended to be ‘more detailed documents operating
at a family or community
level’^[198] and accordingly
were not intended to provide a mechanism for developing regional plans and
strategies.

However, there has been an evolution in thinking about SRAs towards their
expanding in focus and duration. The Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous
Affairs has commented that this evolution towards a ‘comprehensive
SRA’ approach:

... describes the more intensive work that we will do with Indigenous
communities that goes beyond addressing single issues. It will require strong
partnerships between communities and government at all levels, with business and
our provider networks.^[199]

According to the Secretaries’ Group, this approach will be
implemented:

... in locations where communities are ready and willing to build on what
they have already achieved – to work with us towards their longer term
goals, covering more community priorities overtime (we are calling this a more
comprehensive approach to SRAs, but it can also be done through RPAs). ^[200]

This evolutionary approach appears to deal with the potential for SRAs to be ad hoc, limited in focus, of short duration and uncoordinated with the
needs of the wider community or region. The rationale of moving towards a more
comprehensive approach has been set out as follows:

While it is important not to underestimate the impact of single-issue SRAs -
particularly in smaller and remote communities as the first step –
progress will always be limited in any single area unless factors in related
areas are addressed. For example, only limited success can be expected in the
area of employment (even if real job opportunities exist), if education and
health issues are not also
addressed.^[201]

A distinction continues to be made between comprehensive SRAs (as relating to
one community) and RPAs. Thus, for communities which are able to take advantage
of a wider approach to agreement-making:

This might mean they want to take a whole of community or even a cross
community approach – here they might start with a comprehensive (multi
issue) SRA if it’s just for one community, or with an RPA if they want to
work across several communities in a region.

RPAs tend to set out higher level community goals and the outcomes to be
delivered. However, as they progress, they should include SRAs with clear shared
responsibilities for local communities or groups which support the objectives of
the RPA.^[202]

It is clear that there may be some overlap. Gray and Sanders suggest
‘perhaps the distinction between SRAs and RPAs are becoming rather blurred
anyway’.^[203]

There is also the question of where the comprehensive SRAs or RPAs will fit
in the new ‘intensive intervention’ model (as discussed in Part 1 of
this chapter). The intervention model is based on identifying priority
communities (which seems to mean in general, communities that are in crisis).
Presumably, such communities, if in crisis, are not in the position to negotiate
and enter into comprehensive SRAs. A term which has been used to describe the
sort of agreements that might be developed in such situations is a
‘holistic’ SRA, which:

... would relate more to those locations where we are planning or have
already commenced a joint intervention with a state or a territory where we are
attempting at a particular place to deal with a broad range of issues
concurrently.^[204]

Accordingly, it appears there are now three agreement mechanisms being used
which are similar in approach and purpose, and which may overlap. These are
RPAs, ‘comprehensive SRAs’, and ‘holistic SRAs’. This
proliferation of approaches is not necessarily a problem, but these terms and
concepts do need to be thought through carefully to avoid confusion.
Nevertheless, the priority in agreement-making lies with avoiding an excess of ad hoc and isolated agreements that do not take into account local and
regional needs, resources, options for efficient and effective service delivery
and meaningful participation of Indigenous partners.

The move towards ‘comprehensive’ or ‘holistic’ SRAs
seems sensible and timely. Such devices, along with RPAs, could be used to
contribute to a regional needs analysis approach in order to map mainstream and
Indigenous-specific services together.

The challenge, and it is not easy, is to balance the directness and immediacy
of a bottom-up family or community-based approach, through small one or
two-issue SRAs, with the efficiencies and effectiveness of coordinated planning
and service delivery on a wider community or regional basis.

The potential for ‘comprehensive’ SRAs has been discussed by the
government for some time. It was anticipated that there would be several such
SRAs in place during the past financial year, however, these agreements have yet
to eventuate.

Accompanying this slow progress in finalising comprehensive SRAs has been the
slow pace of finalising RPAs. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3
and remains a matter of significant concern. When writing the Social Justice
Report 2005 there was only one concluded RPA to report, the Ngaanyatjarra
Regional Partnership
Agreement,^[205] and OIPC had
advised that a number of RPAs were under
discussion.^[206]

There are now apparently several RPAs that have been negotiated to agreement
stage and are awaiting signature by ministers at both the federal and
state/territory levels. As well, there appears to be a continuing commitment to
RPAs in the context of arrangements to follow on from the COAG trials. As the
Associate Secretary of FaCSIA has explained:

If you look at the bilateral agreements we have with several states, you will
see a clear intention to move on to replace the trial arrangements with regional
partnership agreements that lock in both the Commonwealth and the state or
territory jurisdiction to an ongoing
commitment.^[207]

For example, the intention at Wadeye seems to be to ‘transition’
the COAG trial into an RPA.^[208] These agreements appear to be focussed on the bilateral
level.^[209] As noted elsewhere in
this report, it is not clear what role is anticipated for Indigenous
representative organisations in the new regional partnerships to succeed the
COAG trials. The Ngaanyatjarra RPA provides a model for appropriate Indigenous
participation.

Two further RPAs have recently been signed in November 2006. These are the
East Kimberley RPA and the Port Hedland RPA. The Port Hedland RPA has an
employment focus to take advantage of opportunities in the minerals sector in
the region. The RPA has been developed under a Memorandum of Understanding
between the Australian Government and the Minerals Council of Australia. The
Minister, Mr Brough, has indicated that:

Over the next five years the partners to the Agreement will aim to prepare
Indigenous people for the workforce and support the development of Indigenous
businesses.^[210]

Indigenous partners to the RPA include Bloodwood Tree, Pilbara Meta Maya,
Pilbara Logistics and Indigenous Mining Services, and it is to be signed by 14
key players including industry partners such as BHP Billiton Iron Ore,
Fortescue Metals, Newcrest Mining as well as Ngarda Civil and Mining. This RPA
is profiled as a case study in chapter four of the Native Title Report
2006.

Although there has been a considerable delay, it is pleasing to see these
RPAs finalised and agreed. It is to be hoped that further RPAs will be agreed to
progressively around the country. My Office will monitor developments with new
RPAs and similar agreements, including their:

• Arrangements for Indigenous participation in decision-making at all
  levels;
• Their performance in addressing Indigenous disadvantage; and
• Their progress in realising the goals of the Indigenous peoples of the
  regions concerned.
  

Issues concerning engagement with
Indigenous communities

• The absence of regional representative structures – a flaw in
  the new arrangements
  

As already noted on several occasions in this chapter, the need for
Indigenous regional representative structures to partner governments in
region-based planning and in determining appropriate service delivery
arrangements is paramount. Their absence constitutes a significant flaw in the
administration of the new arrangements to date.

A somewhat passive approach appears to have emerged on the part of the
federal government in facilitating and supporting the emergence of regional
representative structures to enable Indigenous peoples to participate in
decision-making. This is discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this report.

In announcing the abolition of ATSIC, the government stated its intention to
support the creation of a network of regional representative Indigenous bodies
to interact with governments.^[211] In June 2005, the then Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs had confirmed that the government remained committed to establishing
representative bodies at the regional level:

We have always stated that, following the dissolution of ATSIC Regional
Councils from July 1 this year, there will be room for genuine Indigenous
representative bodies to emerge in their
place.^[212]

In the Social Justice Report 2005, I reported on the considerable
progress that had been made in negotiating regional representative arrangements
and structures.^[213] I was also
able to report that consultations had been conducted across many regions to
identify replacement representative structures during the past year, and OIPC
had provided funds through the ICCs for Indigenous peoples to convene local and
regional meetings to discuss options for new regional representative
arrangements.^[214]

An overview of progress on a state-by-state basis showed that there were
promising developments in determining culturally appropriate regional
representative models,^[215] although there were gaps and problems with some of the models. I noted that the
federal government had not yet outlined in concrete terms how it proposed to
support such bodies. I emphasised the need to finalise and operationalise
representative organisations where negotiations were largely complete, and to
make greater progress in other areas where models had not yet been finalised.

Given the advanced state of discussions a year ago in a number of regions, it
is quite remarkable that progress towards recognising regional representative
structures has stalled. It appears that the government now sees the principal
route to regional engagement structures as being developed around participation
in RPAs, rather than separately established representative organisations.

There is an important change in approach from an emphasis on regional structures, to regional processes and agreements, particularly
RPAs. The federal government’s preferred new approach is to work in
partnership with Indigenous groups, as well as state and territory governments,
to establish Regional Indigenous Engagement Arrangements (RIEAs). The
government has stated that:

The new engagement arrangements are important mechanisms for Governments to
engage with Indigenous communities about agreed priority areas for joint effort
and promote the principles of partnership, shared responsibility, and
self-reliance. ^[216]

OIPC has set out the parameters for RIEAs as follows:

Clearer parameters have recently been agreed by Minister Brough. These are
allowing us to progress RIEA proposals that are consistent with the Australian
Government’s principles of partnership, shared responsibility and
self-reliance, and to provide feedback to communities on proposals that are not
consistent with the Australian Government’s objectives. Parameters for
Australian Government funding and support include:

• Initial Australian Government funding be capped and limited to one year
  after which further support be negotiated through RPAs;
• Funds support meeting costs such as travel, but not sitting fees or
  remuneration;
• State and Territory Governments participate through RPAs or bilateral
  agreements;
• The Government retains the right to engage directly with communities or
  other bodies;
• The Government be assured of the legitimacy of RIEAs among their
  constituents; and
• RIEAs not be ‘gatekeepers’ or have decision-making
  responsibilities concerning Indigenous program
  funding.^[217]
  

However these parameters do not necessarily have to be met in
total. They are intended as a guide, and other proposals that merit
consideration but do not meet these criteria will be considered.

The parameters are themselves of some concern, as they indicate that the
shift away from regional representative bodies is definite. RIEAs will only get
funding support for a year, after which time any further support must be
negotiated through an RPA. Whilst this does not necessarily preclude
organisations with a degree of permanency, it shows that engagement arrangements
are to be contingent on RPAs.

While it is desirable not to foist a standard model on different regions, and
this is one of the reasons given for the slowness in getting regional engagement
arrangements in place or supported, I remain concerned that the vacuum in
Indigenous regional participation is creating problems. It is difficult for
Indigenous communities to deal with the volume of changes, agencies and
requirements under the new arrangements and the increasing entanglements of red
tape.^[218] There is a need to
support authentic and credible structures and processes for Indigenous
communities that allow them to: engage with governments; be consulted; and where
appropriate, provide informed consent.

Chapter 3 considers this issue I some depth. It notes that:

In my view the government has adopted a cynical and disingenuous approach in
which the apparatus of the new arrangements play no active role in engaging with
Indigenous peoples on a systemic basis to ensure that mechanisms for Indigenous
participation can become a reality.

The Government has clearly stated that one of the priority areas for their
Expert Panels and ‘Multiuse list of community
facilitators/coordinators’ is to assist in the development of regional
engagement arrangements. This demonstrates that they are fully aware that such
arrangements will only become a reality if intensive support is provided to
Indigenous communities to develop models that are suitable to their local
needs.

It is fanciful to expect that RIEAs will emerge solely through the efforts of
Indigenous communities that are under-resourced and that in most instances do
not have the necessary infrastructure to conduct the wide-ranging consultation
and negotiation required to bring a regional engagement structure into
existence.

It is also convenient for Government to leave this issue solely up to
Indigenous peoples to progress. I would suggest that this is done in full
knowledge that the outcome of this approach will be an absence of regional
engagement arrangements.

There is a clear need for special assistance to ensure that Indigenous
peoples are able to, in the words of the object of the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Act 2005, ensure the ‘maximum participation of
Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders in the formulation and
implementation of government policies that affect
them’.^[219]

I hope that RIEAS will develop in a manner that can represent Indigenous
interests in their area, but whether they will have sufficient autonomy to
freely represent their members’ interests remains to be seen.

• The importance of direct engagement with
  Indigenous communities
  

It is also important to consider the modalities of
engagement with Indigenous communities. A major thrust of the new arrangements
has been direct engagement with communities and families. This approach
has been taken, despite the government’s oft repeated conviction that
there were serious failings in the modalities of engagement with Indigenous
communities in the era of ‘self-determination’ or
‘self-management’ (essentially from the 1970’s through to the
new arrangements in July 2004).

Indigenous organisations and various other intermediaries had, according to
the government, become ‘gatekeepers’ - in effect preventing
Indigenous peoples from dealing directly with governments, expressing their real
priorities, or operating on a basis of mutual responsibility. The then Minister,
Senator Vanstone, expressed these concerns with the old ways of doing things and
the government’s intention to let Indigenous families and communities
speak for themselves:

When no one listens to your view, when no one sees that you could contribute
anything of value, it's the equivalent of being told that you are of no value,
either within or outside that community. That debilitating and degrading
message has been reinforced day-after-day, year-after-year, decade-after-decade,
in hundreds, if not thousands, of communities around Australia. We're changing
that. We are listening directly to communities. We are asking them not only what
they want, but also, what they can
contribute.^[220]

This remains a key plank of the new arrangements, as shown by the following
comment of the current Minister, Mr Brough:

We aim to make it simpler for Indigenous people to deal with government. We
want to show respect by encouraging them to be active participants in solving
their own
problems.^[221]

This is an entirely worthy objective. There can be no doubt that
intermediaries - including Indigenous organisations – can unintentionally
disempower Indigenous peoples. This has clearly occurred at times in Australia,
particularly where key interests, such as rights in lands and waters, have been
concerned. However, this paradox of Indigenous representation reflects an
inherent problem in the interface of two quite distinct systems – the
European system of laws, governance and
administration^[222] and
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander systems of laws and customs. These two
systems are based on quite different premises and values, but the two have to
find a way to interact as they coexist over the same land and in the case of
land and native title rights, Indigenous laws have legal effect in the European
system.

No matter what rhetoric is current, Indigenous peoples undoubtedly retain
some rights of self-government, and in practical terms have to be, and will be,
consulted and negotiated with over programs and services. In any society with
Indigenous minorities, whether Australia, New Zealand, Canada or others, the
forms or modalities of engagement present significant challenges and require
considerable thought and, indeed, sensitivity.

Programs to address Indigenous disadvantage have to be provided in genuine
partnership with Indigenous peoples, and in terms that give those peoples room
for input and initiative. These programs and services need to be provided in
ways that Indigenous peoples can identify with and ‘own’.

Indigenous peoples must be able to incorporate programs into their
ideological and value systems. If such programs remain outside their systems,
they will be seen simply as ‘foreign’, or as just the latest concern
of government officials. If this is the perception in Indigenous communities,
those programs will continue to be ineffective in dealing with Indigenous
disadvantage.

Leading Indigenous spokespeoples have made this point repeatedly. Noel
Pearson, writing in the context of alcohol and drug problems, affirms that while
law enforcement is important, coercive measures alone will not succeed. Rather,
Pearson believes a combination of both the enforcement powers of the police, and
‘the moral resolve of elders’ is
required.^[223] Similarly Pat
Dodson has observed:

All the assistance in the world will be of no consequence if our governments
are not prepared to enter into genuine conversations with our people at every
level to come to agreement about how Aboriginal people can take their place in
the Australian society, while still being able to be Aboriginal people with
unique roles and responsibilities in their own
land.^[224]

It is my concern that the basic problem remains when it comes to government
engagement with Indigenous peoples in Australia: there is still an unwillingness
or inability to fully comprehend and respect the distinctive nature of
Indigenous societies and cultures. Until this situation changes, even with the
best will in the world, policies of ‘direct engagement’ with
Indigenous peoples are unlikely to succeed.

• Defining Indigenous ‘communities’
  

The engagement process under the new arrangements is based largely
on the concept of a ‘community’. While it is possible to strike
agreements with ‘families’, the focus of most SRAs are at the
‘community’ level. This focus on ‘community’ is despite
the extensive literature about the artificiality and problematic nature of major
Indigenous settlements in Australia.

The term ‘community’ is misleading in the Australian context
because many Indigenous settlements are artificial constructs that bring
together disparate clan and language groups. Many of these settlements only took
root because non-Indigenous people established a mission or ration depot, and
over time Indigenous peoples settled in and around these locations. Not
surprisingly, this mix of clan and language groups created and continues to
create tensions and stresses in what we now loosely refer to as
‘Indigenous communities’.

The transformation of a ‘settlement’ into a
‘community’ in the sense of a cohesive functioning
‘town’ like other Australian rural towns, has been a policy
objective going back to the
1960s.^[225] The objective of
‘normalising’ Indigenous communities clearly underlies current
government initiatives, rather than the stated aim of direct engagement with
Indigenous communities.

A good case in point is provided by the recent amendment of the Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 to enable the creation of
99 year leases over Indigenous owned land. The objective of this proposal
appears to have been to turn Indigenous settlements into ‘normal
townships’, in part by overriding traditional land ownership laws and the
responsibilities of traditional custodians through the device of a
‘headlease’.

Such attempts (and the 99 year leases are just the latest incarnation of this
objective) will almost certainly have the opposite effect to that which is
desired. The changes are likely to reinforce the artificiality and alienating
nature of these communities, and to add to their social dysfunction. The rights
of the traditional owners will be nullified. Regardless of compensation
arrangements or ‘rents’, this is unlikely to work towards the
development of harmonious communities. Similarly, Indigenous initiatives to
relocate away from the social dysfunctional characteristics of large Indigenous
settlements by establishing homelands communities have met with a degree of
negativity (see discussion of Wadeye COAG trial above).

Such policy developments lead me to suspect that the direct engagement
objective, whilst well intentioned, is not yet sufficiently based on a full
understanding and acceptance of the values, aspirations and social organisation
of Indigenous Australians. As well as mutual obligation, we must strive for
mutual understanding and genuine partnership.

• Capacity
  building

Indigenous peoples are not always in a position of equal power, nor do they
necessarily have the capacity to engage in direct negotiations without some risk
to their legitimate interests. Safeguards must be in place to ensure that
interests and rights are protected. Where necessary, assistance should be
provided in strengthening capacity to engage in negotiations.

Over many years there has been considerable effort put into capacity building
in Indigenous communities. Many of these programs have been successful, and
there is now significant Indigenous capability in a wide range of areas. But the
need to build and strengthen capacity remains a massive task, and when the
emphasis is placed on direct negotiation, consultation and agreement making as
under the current arrangements, this potentially brings the capacity building
requirement right down to the grass roots.

The more that this capacity building can come from Indigenous organisations
the more effective it will be. I note the continuing work of the Office of the
Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations in providing on-the-ground accredited
training in corporate governance for Indigenous Governing Committees and
Boards.^[226] There is, however, an
ongoing need for a strategic approach to creating succession in communities for
Indigenous peoples to take over many of the jobs currently undertaken by non
Indigenous people in communities. There are also many organisations, both
government and non-government working at the local, regional and national levels
to strength and enhance Indigenous capacity.

There is a particular concern in relation to small SRAs and capacity
building, which I highlighted in the Social Justice Report 2005:

With the initial focus on single issue SRAs, it is also difficult to see that
a capacity building approach tied to long term change is being prioritised in
the SRA approach – although the government has clearly indicated that this
is an intention of the process and will be built upon through the negotiation of
more comprehensive SRAs.^[227]

Since then, the Government has responded (in August 2006) to my report by way
of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Affairs, Many Ways Forward – Capacity Building in
Indigenous communities.^[228] One of the Committee’s recommendations was that all three levels of
government work cooperatively and in consultation with Indigenous peoples in
relation to the provision of services. This whole of government approach to
service delivery should include:

the incorporation of capacity building into the design and implementation of
programs delivering services to Indigenous communities, including funds to
enable mentoring of community members and
organisations.^[229] [Recommendation 7(d)]

In its response to the Committee, the government observed generally in
respect of SRAs and capacity building, that:

The close engagement with communities in the development of SRAs has allowed
the Government to obtain a better idea of the capacity building requirements of
communities and to tailor program and service delivery to help build capacity
where it is needed. Approximately half of all SRAs signed to date feature
community capacity building, governance and leadership initiatives supported by
the Government.^[230]

The government in specifically responding to Recommendation 7 (d) did not
accept this particular recommendation in full, however, it noted that:

Capacity building, within both Indigenous communities and government
agencies, is a key focus for the Government. Rather than it being an automatic
requirement that a capacity building component be built into the design and
implementation of programs, capacity building needs should be considered in the
light of the circumstances of individual communities and service delivery
organisations.^[231]

Undoubtedly this is so. Communities have variable levels of capabilities.
Some only need some initial facilitation support, such as assistance with
marketing, seed funding for enterprises, or linkages to relevant agencies in
fields such as tourism, the arts and environmental management. Other
communities, perhaps without experience or training in the past, might need
substantial and longer-term assistance in capacity building.

What matters is that direct engagement can only be meaningful if the capacity
exists in communities to so engage. In designing program delivery, capacity
building always needs to be considered and resources made available appropriate
to the circumstances.

The changing role of the Office of Indigenous Policy
Coordination (OIPC)

Organisational
stability during the implementation of new administrative arrangements
would normally help such arrangements to ‘filter down’ and become
understood and accepted by clients as being the way that business is now done.
However, such stability has been lacking in respect of the new arrangements in
Indigenous affairs, with a number of significant shifts in both arrangements and
policy settings in the relatively short period since the new arrangements came
into effect. Changes to the location of OIPC within the Indigenous affairs
bureaucracy are suggestive of the instability that lies at the very foundation
of the new arrangements.

As the successor to
ATSIC and ATSIS, OIPC was to be the focus of the implementation of the new
arrangements. Its role
included:

• Coordinating
  Indigenous policy and programs at the national level;
• Managing the Indigenous Coordination
  Centres (ICCs);
• Brokering relationships
  with other levels of government, including with the states and territories;
  and
• Reporting on the performance of
  government programs and service delivery for Indigenous people, in the context
  of policy review and development.

At the time of the
implementation of the new arrangements OIPC also retained some responsibility
for delivering major programs, particularly in relation to land rights and
native title.

OIPC faced
significant difficulties from the start. The new arrangements involved a number
of innovative changes, including ICCs, Regional Partnership Agreements (RPAs)
and Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs). These changes brought new
challenges for policy and program development, such as the need to reduce
barriers to access mainstream services for Indigenous peoples, which were often
provided by state and territory governments.

As a result of
mainstreaming ATSIC programs, OIPC lost a significant number of skilled and
experienced staff, including Indigenous
staff.^[232] The reduced
organisational expertise available to the new agency, given the considerable
challenges facing it, created its own difficulties. As well, an undue confidence
based on an assumption that ATSIC had been the major cause of failure in
Indigenous affairs, may have exacerbated the difficulties which have accompanied
implementation of the new
arrangements.

Early
reservations on the part of Secretaries of some departments about the role of
OIPC were noted by Gray and
Sanders.^[233] In their view, the
role of OIPC
was:

• Too
  prominent in the new arrangements, and potentially OIPC could grow into the
  government’s major Indigenous agency, thereby undermining the objective of
  mainstreaming; and
• That OIPC sat awkwardly
  in the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
  (DIMIA).

One
Secretary’s view (at the time OIPC was located in DIMIA) was
that:

... it might be
more productive if OIPC were in the future ‘broken up’ and for
relevant parts of it to come across into that department [the department of the
person making this observation], rather than being left as an ‘awkward
pimple’ on a department dominated by its immigration
function.^[234]

It seems that this has now largely transpired. First OIPC was transferred to
the Department of Family and Community Services that was later renamed FaCSIA.
Then, a reorganisation of FaCSIA in the latter part of 2006 resulted in OIPC
programs and some of its key functions being taken from OIPC and subsumed within
the overall departmental structure of FaCSIA. Program losses included native
title and land rights, which are now handled by a Branch (Land) within the
Indigenous Land and Housing Division of FaCSIA. The other major change is the
loss of the responsibility for managing ICCs. ICC managers now report to FaCSIA
state and territory managers, whose responsibilities are wider than Indigenous
programs.

As the OIPC website states:

Certain functions that had been with OIPC are now undertaken from within the
wider FaCSIA, including management of ICCs and program
management.^[235]

As at November 2006, the role of OIPC was as follows:

• Provide advice to the Minister for Families, Community Services and
  Indigenous Affairs;
• Coordinate and drive whole-of-government innovative policy development and
  service delivery across the Australian Government;
• Coordinate the Single Indigenous Budget;
• Broker relations with State and Territory Governments on Indigenous
  issues;
• Evaluate and report on the performance of government programs and services
  for Indigenous people to inform policy review and development; and
• Support the work of the Ministerial Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs,
  Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs and National Indigenous
  Council.
  

It seems that under the new administrative arrangements OIPC
becomes one division or group among others in the FaCSIA structure, rather than
an autonomous agency as suggested by its
name.^[236] The Secretary of
FaCSIA, Dr Farmer, described the change in the following discussion at the
Senate Estimates hearing in November 2006:

Dr Harmer - OIPC in the new structure has been redefined to a
coordinating group.

Senator CHRIS EVANS - Coordinating group. So what does that mean in
terms of its resources? Policy coordination is a small section?

Dr Harmer - No, it is not small. It is a significant coordination
function which manages the single Indigenous budgets submission and manages the
secretariat for the secretary’s [sic] group. It manages the secretariat
for the National Indigenous Council and a whole range of other coordination
tasks—

Senator CHRIS EVANS - All of the line functions have been placed
elsewhere?

Dr Harmer - They are now part of FaCSIA proper, yes.

Senator CHRIS EVANS - They have all been brought under one roof inside
FaCSIA?

Dr Harmer - Yes, they
have.^[237]

Although OIPC undoubtedly retains important coordination functions,
nevertheless, the loss of responsibility for management of the ICCs is highly
significant. This role provided leverage in policy development and relationship
brokering roles; ICCs were a key OIPC responsibility. In October 2005 the
Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs released a Bulletin on
ICCs^[238] which emphasised the
pivotal role of OIPC in relation to the management and functioning of the ICCs.
As recently as August 2006 the government’s response to a report of the
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs stated that ‘OIPC leads the
ICCs’.^[239] Given the
pre-eminence of ICCs in the new arrangements, this change appears to represent a
major downgrading of OIPC’s role.

These changes to OIPC’s role only increase present uncertainty about
where overall responsibility for Indigenous policy lies. Despite assurances from
FaCSIA that the reorganisation will lead to a greater focus within that
Department on Indigenous policies and programs by bringing together all
Indigenous-specific programs,^[240] I am concerned that we are in fact seeing an increase in
‘disconnected’ government. One wonders where within the system, the
objective of boosting Indigenous peoples’ ability to ‘harness the
mainstream’ now lies.

The fact that OIPC sits within FaCSIA and that its various Indigenous
programs have been grouped under one Deputy
Secretary^[241] appears to give
FaCSIA a de facto lead agency role in Indigenous affairs. Another way of
putting this is that the Secretary of FaCSIA is now the senior official in
Indigenous affairs. To what extent this is a rational outcome, or whether it
reflects the vagaries and shifting sands of bureaucratic arrangements is
unclear. Confusion over who is responsible for leading change has been
identified in respect of the failures of the COAG trial in whole of government
administration at Wadeye (see above). I am concerned that this may be an
emerging system-wide problem.

FaCSIA is a mainstream agency that has responsibilities to a broad range of
clients. It is difficult to see how it can be expected to consistently provide
the essential advocacy and support that is needed to adequately protect
Indigenous rights and interests.

It is equally concerning that the portfolio of Indigenous affairs does not
have a Minister with sole responsibility. Instead the Minister responsible is
also the Minister for Families and Community
Services.^[242] Not only does this
mean the Minister’s attention is not focussed on Indigenous affairs and
the task of directing the whole of government approach to address Indigenous
disadvantage, it also means that this Minister has multiple responsibilities at
the Cabinet table. It is therefore not to be expected that he will always have
the needs and aspirations of Indigenous Australians at the forefront of his
mind; they will inevitably and frequently come second.

This situation is disturbing. If Indigenous affairs are going to be
effectively subsumed within broader departmental structures and Ministerial
portfolios, this will reduce visibility, accountability and perhaps
responsibility. It raises the issue of just how far the mainstreaming of
Indigenous affairs is to go. It appears to be consistent with the dogma that
Indigenous Australians have no special place, and no special rights.

The changes in role of OIPC are part of a kaleidoscope of shifting
arrangements that have confused and bedevilled the ‘new arrangements in
Indigenous affairs’ since their inception and implementation. The
confusion and instability appears to be worsening. Whilst I hope this does not
continue to be the case, these are matters of concern and my Office will follow
them closely over the next 12 months.

Monitoring
and evaluation mechanisms – ensuring accountability for the new
arrangements

There is a danger in the new arrangements of an ‘accountability
gap’. Such a gap could develop between the rhetoric of improved
outcomes through mainstreaming on a ‘whole-of-government’ basis, and
the reality of actual outcomes for Indigenous peoples and communities on
the ground.

The need to evaluate the new arrangements has been recognised from early in
their implementation. In 2002 COAG noted that:

failures in the past have emphasised the importance of policy that is
evidence based and incorporates ongoing mechanisms for evaluation and
review.^[244]

In 2004 COAG agreed to a National Framework of Principles for Delivering
Services to Indigenous
Australians.^[245] This
Framework clearly linked the need for greater transparency and accountability to
the goal of better service delivery to Indigenous peoples. By adopting the
Framework, Australian governments committed themselves to:

• Strengthen the accountability of governments for the effectiveness of their
  programs and services through regular performance review, evaluation and
  reporting;
• Ensure the accountability of organisations for the government funds that
  they administer on behalf of Indigenous people; and
• Task the Productivity Commission to continue to measure the effect of the
  COAG commitment through the jointly-agreed set of indicators.
  

In the Social Justice Report 2004 I noted that there was a
need for ‘rigorous monitoring of the implementation of the new
arrangements’.^[246] In 2005
the Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs, noting
that ‘the Committee has not been presented with any actual evidence to
show that mainstreaming will bring about improvements in service
delivery’,^[247] recommended:

that the Government immediately establishes a mechanism to thoroughly and
impartially assess the new mainstreaming arrangements as they are implemented,
including those already in place. The Committee also recommends that the
resultant report is made public. (Recommendation
5.1)^[248]

The Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs commented in its Annual
Report 2004-05 on the implementation of the new arrangements: ‘We
consider that, given the magnitude of the task, the progress made to date is
significant.’^[249]

It would be reassuring to think that this is the case, but can we be sure?

In implementing the reconciliation framework to address Indigenous social and
economic disadvantage, COAG in 2002 commissioned a regular report against key
indicators of Indigenous disadvantage. The Prime Minister, Mr Howard,
subsequently stated that the principal task of this report would be:

to identify indicators that are of relevance to all government departments
and Indigenous stakeholders and that can demonstrate the impact of programme and
policy interventions’. ^[250]

Subsequently, the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service
Provision (SCRGSP), with secretariat assistance from the Productivity
Commission, produced Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage – Key
Indicators 2003,^[251] and a
second report in 2005. As the Chairman of the Productivity Commission, Gary
Banks, has observed, by linking progress with reducing Indigenous disadvantage
to government programs, the accountability of governments in dealing with
Indigenous disadvantage has been
elevated.^[252]

The laudable, indeed essential, objective of monitoring the impact of program
and policy interventions through charting changes in key indicators has proved
in actuality somewhat difficult to achieve. Despite the best efforts of the
Productivity Commission, the Key Indicators reports have not been able,
to date, to yield data that can, in the Prime Minister’s words,
‘demonstrate the impact of programme and policy interventions’.

It is simply too early for changes flowing from the new arrangements to show
up in a way that cause and effect can be reasonably identified. The Key
Indicators 2005 report is based to a considerable degree on data that
predates the policy initiatives arising from COAG and implemented by the new
arrangements in Indigenous
affairs.^[253] As well, there are a
range of significant gaps, inconsistencies and definitional problems in the
data.^[254]

The Key Indicators 2005 report showed at best a mixed picture in
respect of addressing Indigenous disadvantage in Australia, with some key
indicators showing improvement, but others showing deterioration. Overall the
Productivity Commission concluded that:

... in the areas identified as crucial to reducing disadvantage, outcomes
fall well short of what is
needed.^[255]

Although there are significant problems associated with using the Key
Indicators reports to assess the outcomes of the new arrangements, at least
in the short to intermediate term, the Productivity Commission has advised that in time they will enable government to gauge the extent to which the new
arrangements are producing better
results.^[256]

A further difficulty is that the Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage reports provide a reading of outcomes from a ‘whole of
government’ perspective. This means that the information is inevitably
provided at a broad level.^[257] The strategic change indicators in the reports are more closely linked to
program areas, but are not comprehensive and also suffer from a range of data
issues. It is simply not possible to establish causal linkage between policy
objectives and/ or program specifics with the results of the key indicators. One
can only draw conclusions by implication. As the Productivity Commission has
correctly pointed out:

It (the report) is not a substitute for detailed evaluation of specific
programs and policy
initiatives.^[258]

Overall, the risk is that without targeted evaluations, set against well
considered benchmarks and reporting on relevant indicators, policy failure may
take some while to show up in the key, or ‘headline’, indicators.
The time lag in this reporting framework means that remedies and adjustments to
policy settings may, by the time the necessity to make them has become clear, be
all that more difficult to implement. The disadvantage of Indigenous peoples
will be further entrenched.

The Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs has also noted the
following evaluation problems. Firstly, the problems of delay:

... it will take some years to be able to report comprehensively on the
impact of the new arrangements for Indigenous
Australians.^[259]

Secondly, the need for Key Indicators reports to be supported by other
evaluation data. Thus, these reports:

... need to be complemented by a robust, whole-of-government accountability
and performance reporting framework for the Australian Government’s
programs and services. We need stronger performance indicators and a more
systemised way of capturing and, more importantly, regularly reporting this
information.^[260]

And thirdly, the need to link programs and actual on-the-ground outcomes:

We also need to focus more on how funding or service interventions are making
a difference in the life circumstances of Indigenous
Australians.^[261]

According to the Secretaries’ Group, the new administrative
arrangements for Indigenous affairs are, in fact, ‘supported by a
comprehensive accountability framework, with multiple
layers’.^[262] The
Secretaries’ Group also notes that the new arrangements are to operate in
‘a learning framework’, ‘sharing information and experience,
learning from mistakes and progressively adopting approaches that work
best.’^[263] Such a learning
environment can only work, of course, with a good evaluative data base.

OIPC, in conjunction with other federal agencies, has prepared a plan for
evaluation activities in respect of the government’s whole of government
approach in Indigenous
affairs.^[264] While the plan
covers the period 2006-09, it focuses on activities for the 2006-07 financial
year.

Mainstream government departments and agencies remain responsible for the
evaluation of the programs they
administer.^[265] To avoid
duplication of effort, agency evaluations are expected to be shared across
agencies. OIPC has undertaken to compile and maintain a running directory of all
evaluations of Indigenous specific programs over the past 5 years. The focus of
the Evaluation Plan itself is on activities of a whole of government
nature.^[266]

Thus both Indigenous specific and mainstream programs as accessed by
Indigenous peoples, are excluded from OIPC’s evaluation activities. OIPC
makes clear that:

This plan is therefore only one element of the assessment of the new
arrangements in Indigenous affairs. The new arrangements are being assessed
through several layers of evaluation and performance management. This
whole-of-government evaluation activity complements and will be informed by:

• Evaluations and audits by independent authorities, including the Office of
  Evaluation and Audit (Indigenous Programs) in the Department of Finance and
  Administration;
• Australian National Audit Office;
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner;
• Departmental sponsored audits and evaluations of the mainstream and
  Indigenous specific programs, including lapsing programs and services each is
  responsible for;
• Public-sector, academic and independent research activities, including those
  funded by government departments and those conducted independently by academic
  institutions;
• Performance monitoring and reporting mechanisms, such as the Council of
  Australian Governments (COAG) Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage Report and the annual Reports on Government Services; and
• The Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs Annual
  Report.^[267]
  

It is proposed that the OIPC plan will be a rolling plan. It will
be reviewed annually to ensure that planned evaluation activities target the
areas of most need. Thus:

The plan is not a constraining document, and other evaluative activities may
be commissioned during the 2006-07 and beyond if the need
arises.^[268]

The plan is an interesting document and I am pleased to see a continuing
commitment to the need for ongoing evaluations. The plan builds on whole of
government evaluative work over the past 12 months, including the Red Tape
Evaluation (Morgan Disney
report),^[269] the formative
evaluation of the 8 COAG trial sites, and the review of individual SRAs. There
is a commendable flexibility built into the plan.

The most recent system evaluation, the Morgan Disney report identified
significant problems in program implementation. One significant problem
identified, in terms of evaluation, is a mismatch between indicators established
in funding approvals (for example for SRAs) and the intended
outcomes.^[270] The report found
instead a compliance driven emphasis on outputs, unrelated to the objectives of
the program or project. Indicators were not related to nation-wide objectives
and tended to be idiosyncratic. The data resulting from poorly articulated
indicators cannot be seen as evaluative or as providing guidance for policy
development.

In respect of the evaluations of the COAG trials, although not complete at
the time of preparation of this report, these showed indications of serious
failures of the trials. There appears to be a hasty transition from the
evaluation findings to new or different policy settings underway without
sufficient time to reflect on the lessons of the evaluations (as discussed in
earlier sections of this chapter). The SRA reviews are ‘very low
cost’ because they are very brief (and potentially superficial).

While evaluations have to be as technically rigorous as possible, they also
need to be conducted in an inclusive manner to ensure that accurate
interpretations and conclusions are drawn from the data, and the correct policy
implications drawn.

There remains a particular challenge in respect of the objective of the new
arrangements of ‘harnessing the mainstream.’ That is, how to achieve
measurable outcomes for Indigenous peoples. Again, this problem has been
highlighted by the Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, which
commented that ‘[i]n most areas, information is not yet available to
assess the use of mainstream programs by Indigenous
people.’^[271]

Further, they note:

Improving the range and currency of this kind of information is an area where
we need to do further
work.^[272]

In this I concur. The range of information on accessing mainstream government
services is patchy at best. There appears to be no overarching framework of
benchmarks and indicators specific to issues of improving access to mainstream
services. This amounts to a major evaluation gap in the new arrangements for the
administration of Indigenous affairs given the centrality of this objective in
reducing Indigenous disadvantage.

It is possible that, given the lack of data and tools for measuring outcomes,
there may in fact be no overall improvement in accessing mainstream services as
a result of the new arrangements. Some Indigenous peoples, particularly those in
urban areas, may actually be in a worse position as a result of the new
arrangements, given the withdrawal of Indigenous-specific programs. This is a
significant concern in the social justice context.

The accountability problem is potentially acute in respect of mainstream, as
distinct from Indigenous-specific, programs. The methodological difficulties
entailed in monitoring and evaluating progress in improving accessibility to
mainstream programs can be significant. This is an area that needs to be
addressed specifically in planning for evaluation of the new arrangements.

Over the coming year, my Office will continue to follow the implementation of
the OIPC Evaluation Plan, as well as evaluations undertaken by other
agencies wherever possible. In particular, I will closely watch developments in
relation to the audit currently being conducted by the Australian National Audit
Office into key aspects of the new arrangements at the federal level.

The results of these evaluations will be of critical importance in guiding
and modifying policy settings in Indigenous affairs. At the very least, the
‘lessons learned’ from these evaluations need to be shared widely
and seriously considered by the Secretaries Group on Indigenous Affairs. They
also need to be discussed with Indigenous peoples and other stakeholders
including state and territory governments, the community sector and relevant
industry bodies.

Part
3: Conclusions and recommendations

An increasing degree of disquiet can be discerned in relation to the efficacy
of the new arrangements. The concern is whether they are capable of delivering
the promised improvements, given the extent and pervasiveness of Indigenous
disadvantage, and whether any progress is being
made.^[273]

As Dr Shergold, in his capacity as Chair of the Secretaries’ Group on
Indigenous Affairs has observed, the reform of the administration of Indigenous
affairs instituted in 2004 ‘set a huge challenge for the Australian Public
Service (APS)’.^[274] While
Dr Shergold expressed confidence that the APS could meet this challenge, he did
not underestimate the level of difficulty in radically re-structuring the
administrative arrangements for Indigenous affairs.

Streamlining service delivery, enhancing coordination, eliminating
duplication, and engaging with local communities rather than having a ‘one
size fits all’ approach, laudable as these objectives are, may instead
create their own red tape entanglements, establish their own new bureaucratic
silos and bump along in a series of half-developed initiatives that do not
substantially reduce Indigenous disadvantage.

It is indeed possible that the level of coordination and integration of
services required under the new arrangements will prove to be too complex in
implementation, and that the delivery of services to Indigenous communities will
collapse under the weight of inordinately complicated and unrealistic
arrangements. The impacts of continual change and insufficient attention to the
management of the changes on staff in the ICCs also cannot be overlooked or
disregarded. The Morgan Disney report, discussing the costs, benefits and
consequences of coordination noted:

The new arrangements at Australian Government level have built into their
structure the need for a high degree of coordination between all the agencies
represented in the ICCs. The necessary level of coordination is resource
intensive and constantly needs attention. For every Minute (or administrative
instruction) or policy statement that is issued in one department, there is a
set of communications that must then occur between departments at national
office, state/territory office and, ICC levels, in order to ensure that there is
‘joined up government’, with all parties made aware.

This is resource intensive for the Australian Government agencies, and
reduces the time available to spend with Indigenous organisations dealing with
their needs and problems, and assisting them in developing their own
organisational capacity.^[275]

The difficult but important challenge of improving the access of Indigenous
peoples to mainstream services seems to be slipping from view. Experience with
the implementation of the new arrangements has shown that assertions of intent,
no matter how well-meaning, unless backed by specific programs, activities and
undertakings, often have come to nought.

There is a need to move away from a mindset that is concentrated on process,
towards one that is more focussed on outcomes. One of the shortcomings of the
new arrangements in Indigenous affairs has been the tendency to characterise all
problems besetting Indigenous communities as the result of failed processes -
whether it be during the ATSIC era, or more recently, a lack of coordination on
the part of governments in respect of service delivery. It can be misleading to
confuse process with outcomes, and it appears that this may be what the new
arrangements have, unwittingly, tended to do.

This confusion can also be seen as a by-product of the failure of the new
arrangements to adopt a human rights based approach to addressing Indigenous
disadvantage. The necessary components of this rights-based approach include:
the development of agreed targets and benchmarks, an evaluative framework to
assess whether the ‘progressive realisation’ principle is being met,
and a people-centred approach which values the full participation of Indigenous
peoples in the process.

The ‘new broom’ that has been introduced through the new
arrangements to date has been a process broom. This has both exaggerated the
role of process as a cause of Indigenous disadvantage, and resulted in other key
issues not receiving the priority attention they deserved. In this regard I am
thinking in particular of:

• The urgent need to improve access to mainstream services;
• The need to give Indigenous peoples a real and substantive voice at the
  negotiating table. Without full Indigenous participation we are not moving from
  a passive welfare model, regardless of initiatives such as SRAs;
• The significant under investment in infrastructure for Indigenous
  communities, a problem which is being exacerbated by the young and highly mobile
  demographic profile of the Indigenous population; and
• The need to support Indigenous communities in capacity building to assist
  them in developing autonomy and self-reliance.
  

The vacuum at the national and regional levels of Indigenous
representative input is now serious. Without that Indigenous input, I am
concerned that the mistakes of the past will be repeated, or the wrong lessons
learned.

Unless there is a re-engagement with Indigenous Australians on the basis of
mutual respect and equality, with clear processes and certainty of structures
for Indigenous representation and advocacy, it remains uncertain whether the new
arrangements can produce tangible, significant and lasting benefits rather than
amounting to little more than an administratively complex repackaging of
existing programs.

The following recommendations are made to address the critical absences of
regular monitoring, engagement with Indigenous peoples and benchmarking of
accessibility of mainstream service delivery. The first Inquiry identifies the
need for regular parliamentary scrutiny that can then also be supplemented
through the estimates process and in the examination of proposed
legislation.

The second recommendation seeks to address one of the fundamental policy
problems of the new arrangements.

For example, the new arrangements should be able to provide mechanisms to
support viable aspirations of smaller communities located on traditional country
(outstations), and to develop appropriate enterprises in order to provide such
communities with a degree of autonomy, purpose and stability.

A human rights based approach to development also requires a people-centred
approach that aims above all else to produce beneficial outcomes for Indigenous
Australians. In order to move the bureaucratic culture away from its current
emphasis on compliance, both governments and senior officials within the
bureaucracy need to exercise their leadership to ensure the new arrangements
prioritise beneficial outcomes on the ground. This will necessarily require a
degree of flexibility being incorporated into the design and implementation of
policies and programs for Indigenous peoples to ensure that where appropriate,
processes can be modified to ensure beneficial outcomes can be achieved.
Policies and programs should therefore be monitored and evaluated in terms of
the effectiveness of their processes as well as the outcomes they achieve.

The third recommendation relates specifically to the situation of urban based
communities and peoples and ensuring adequate monitoring and an evidence base
for decisions relating to mainstream accessibility.

---

Endnotes

^[1] ATSIC was created in 1989 and commenced operating in 1990 until 2004. It was a
fully elected Commission with 35 Regional Councils and a national Board of
Commissioners. In 2003, the service delivery responsibilities of ATSIC were
administered by a newly created body, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Services
(ATSIS).

^[2] Vanstone, A., (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs), Australian Government Changes to Indigenous Affairs Services
Commence Tomorrow, Media Release, 30 June
2004.

^[3] Vanstone, A., (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs), Australian Government Changes to Indigenous Affairs Services
Commence Tomorrow, Media Release, 30 June
2004.

^[4] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, New arrangements in Indigenous
affairs: Attachment F: National Framework of Principles for Delivering Services
to Indigenous Australians, OIPC, Canberra, 2004,
p51.

^[5] Shergold, P., Hansard, Senate Select Committee on the Administration of
Indigenous Affairs, Inquiry into the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Bill 2005, 8 February 2005, p2, available online at www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S8106.pdf accessed 14 February
2007.

^[6] Vanstone, A., (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs), Address to National Press Club, Speech, 23 February 2005:
“Happily, I can say a quiet revolution in Indigenous affairs is already
underway.”

^[7] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2004, HREOC, Sydney, 2004, Chapter 3 and Appendix 1,
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005, Chapter 3 and Appendix
1.

^[8] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2003, HREOC, Sydney 2003,
p13.

^[9] Gray, W. and Sanders, W.G., Views for the Top of the ‘Quiet
Revolution’: Secretarial Perspectives on the New Arrangements in
Indigenous Affairs, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR),
Discussion Paper no 282/2006, pp19- 22.

^[10] See, for example, the Whitlam Government’s
reforms to the delivery of government services to Aboriginal communities in the
Northern Territory in the early 1970s which dismantled the all-encompassing
service provision umbrella of the Social Welfare Branch of the Northern
Territory Administration in favour of line government
agencies.

^[11] Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (SCRGSP), Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage – Key Indicators 2003, Productivity Commission, Canberra, 2003, p
v.

^[12] Henry, K., (Secretary of Treasury), Managing Prosperity, Address to the
2006 Social and Economic Outlook Conference, Melbourne, 2 November 2006.

^[13] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations:
Australia 01/09/2000, 1 September 2000, UN Doc E/C.12/1/add.50, paragraph
15.

^[14] Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (SCRGSP), Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage – Key Indicators 2005, Productivity Commission, Canberra,
2005.

^[15] Banks, G., (Chairman of the Productivity Commission), Indigenous
disadvantage: are we making progress? Address to the Committee for Economic
Development in Australia (CEDA), 21 September 2005, pp
8-9.

^[16] Diabetes Australia, Rapid Increase in Diabetes Rates May Threaten Survival of
Some Indigenous Groups, Media Release, 13 November 2006.

^[17] Taylor, J., Social Indicators for Aboriginal Governance: Insights from the
Thamarrur Region, Northern Territory, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research (CAEPR), Research Monograph No. 24, 2004,
p12.

^[18] Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
(ICESCR).

^[19] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3: The
nature of States parties obligations (art.2(1) of International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 14 December 1990, UN Doc E/1991/23,
para
2.

^[20] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000
– Human rights and human development, UNDP, New York, 2000, available
online at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2000/en/ accessed 14 February
2007.

^[21] For an overview of these principles in the Australian context see further:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner,
‘Achieving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health equality within a
generation’, Social Justice Report 2005, Chapter 2, HREOC, Sydney,
2005 and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, ‘Measuring Indigenous disadvantage’, Social Justice
Report 2002, Chapter 4, HREOC, Sydney,
2002.

^[22] See for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Article 27; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
comment 4 (1991): The Right to adequate housing (art.11(1) of the
International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc
E/1992/23, 13/12/91, 13 December 1991, para 8; Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General comment 14 (2000): The Right to the highest
attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000,
para
27.

^[23] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 1:
Reporting by States parties, 24 February 1989, UN Doc E/1989/22, paras 3, 4,
5, 6 and
8.

^[24] See in particular: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000; Social Justice Report 2002; Social
Justice Report 2005; and Native Title Report 2003, HREOC,
Sydney.

^[25] United Nations, The Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation:
Towards a Common Understanding Among the UN Agencies, United Nations, New
York 2003, available online at www.unescobkk.org/fileadmin/user_upload/appeal/human_rights/UN_Common_understanding_RBA.pdf accessed 14 February
2007.

^[26] Such as education, governance, nutrition, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS,
employment and labour relations, and social and economic
security.

^[27] United Nations, The Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation:
Towards a Common Understanding Among the UN Agencies, United Nations, New
York 2003, available online at www.unescobkk.org/fileadmin/user_upload/appeal/human_rights/UN_Common_understanding_RBA.pdf accessed 14 February
2007.

^[28] United Nations, The Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation:
Towards a Common Understanding Among the UN Agencies, United Nations, New
York 2003, available online at www.unescobkk.org/fileadmin/user_upload/appeal/human_rights/UN_Common_understanding_RBA.pdf accessed 14 February
2007.

^[29] Commonwealth Grants Commission, Report on Indigenous Funding 2001,
Canberra 2001, p
43.

^[30] Commonwealth Grants Commission, Report on Indigenous Funding 2001,
Canberra 2001, p
62.

^[31] Commonwealth Grants Commission, Report on Indigenous Funding 2001,
Canberra 2001,
p101.

^[32] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commissioner, Social Justice Report
2002, HREOC, Sydney,
2003.

^[33] United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment
14 (2000): The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc
E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para 11. The full document, including references,
is available online at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/40d009901358b0e2c1256915005090be?Opendocument accessed 14 February
2007.

^[34] United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
comment 14 (2000): The right to the highest attainable standard of health
(article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights), UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para 27. The full document,
including references, is available online at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/40d009901358b0e2c1256915005090be?Opendocument accessed 14 February
2007.

^[35] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2002, HREOC, Sydney, 2002,
p98.

^[36] Shergold, P., (Secretary, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet), Connecting
Government: Whole-of-Government Responses to Australia's Priority
Challenges, Speech at launch of the publication of the
same name, 20 April 2004, available online at http://www.dpmc.gov.au/speeches/shergold/connecting_government_2004-04-20.cfm accessed 18 January
2007.

^[37] Council of Australian Governments (COAG), Communiqué: Council
of Australian Governments’ Meeting 25 June 2004, available online at http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/250604/#formats accessed 18 January
2007.

^[38] Council of Australian Governments, National Framework of Principles for
Delivering Services to Indigenous Australians, 25 June 2004, available at http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/250604/attachments_b.rtf accessed 18 January
2007.

^[39] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2004, HREOC, Sydney, 2004,
p127.

^[40] Gray, W. and Sanders, W.G., Views for the Top of the ‘Quiet
Revolution’: Secretarial Perspectives on the New Arrangements in
Indigenous Affairs, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR),
Discussion Paper No 282/2006,
p23.

^[41] Structural arrangements designed to keep priority on reducing Indigenous
disadvantage include the Ministerial Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs and the
Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous
Affairs.

^[42] Gray, W. and Sanders, W.G., Views for the Top of the ‘Quiet
Revolution’: Secretarial Perspectives on the New Arrangements in
Indigenous Affairs, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR),
Discussion Paper no 282/2006, p24.

^[43] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Secretaries’ Group
Annual Report on Indigenous Affairs 2004-05, Canberra, 2005, p13, available
online at http://www.oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ accessed 18 January
2007.

^[44] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p178.

^[45] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p178.

^[46] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Standing Committee
on Community Affairs Estimates, Canberra, 2 November 2006, pCA21, available
online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[47] Commonwealth Grants Commission, Report on Indigenous Funding 2001,
Canberra 2001,
p61.

^[48] Commonwealth Grants Commission, Report on Indigenous Funding 2001,
Canberra 2001, p61-62.

^[49] Jonas, W., (previous Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner), The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law, Speech to the
HREOC and International Lawyers Association (Australian Division) Workshop on
‘Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander customary law –
international and domestic law implications’, Sydney, 20 November 2003,
available online at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/speeches/social_justice/recognition_customary_law.html accessed 18 January 2007.

^[50] See, for example, report on work of the Winnunga Nimmityjah Heath Service in
Canberra and its CEO Julie Tongs, ‘Tongs draws on sobering past to guide
others down the right path’, Canberra Times, 18 November 2006,
Forum
B3.

^[51] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2004, HREOC, Sydney, 2004,
p117.

^[52] House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA), “We Can Do It!” The Report of the
Inquiry into the Needs of Urban Dwelling Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Peoples, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 2001 at
3.3.

^[53] Reys, S. (Managing Director, Arrilla - Indigenous Consultants and Services and Director, Reconciliation Australia), quoted in The Weekend
Australian, November 4-5, 2004 – ‘The Nation’ section.

^[54] House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA), “We Can Do It!” The Report of the
Inquiry into the Needs of Urban Dwelling Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Peoples, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 2001, paragraphs 1.36 and
1.37.1.

^[55] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p179.

^[56] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Correspondence with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner – Request for
Information in preparation of Social Justice Report 2006, 22 December 2005,
pp7-8.

^[57] The IEDS builds upon the government’s Indigenous Employment Policy (IEP).
The IEP had been implemented progressively since 1999 to address continuing high
unemployment rates among Indigenous Australians and a demographic profile which
indicated that the labour market disadvantages of Indigenous Australians would,
in all likelihood, increase further unless special efforts were made. The IEP
focused on creating opportunities for Indigenous peoples in the private sector
and aimed to: improve outcomes for Indigenous job seekers through Job Network;
help Community Development Employment Project (CDEP) sponsors to place their
work-ready participants in open (non-CDEP) employment; and support the
development and expansion of Indigenous small business. See Australian
Government, Indigenous Employment Policy, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Category/SchemesInitiatives/IndigenousProgs/IndigenousEmploymentPolicyIEP.htm accessed 12 February
2007.

^[58] Australian Government, Indigenous Economic Development Strategy: Achieving
Indigenous Economic Independence, November 2005, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/B7206570-9BFD-4403-B4A3-6649065FAE5A/0/IEDStrategyBooklet_revised_FINAL.pdf accessed 8 February
2007.

^[59] Australian Government, Indigenous Economic Development Strategy: Achieving
Indigenous Economic Independence, November 2005, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/B7206570-9BFD-4403-B4A3-6649065FAE5A/0/IEDStrategyBooklet_revised_FINAL.pdf accessed 8 February 2007.

^[60] These reforms included an introduction of time limits for participation in CDEP
contracts and an explicit focus on participants finding long-term jobs in the
mainstream market. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p180-192.

^[61] CDEP participants are paid a wage rather than receiving unemployment payments
such as Newstart and Youth Allowance. Participants in remote areas receive a
slightly higher wage than those in non-remote
areas. CDEP organisations are paid
‘on-costs’ to cover the costs of running CDEP activities. Places in
CDEP are capped and demand has always outstripped the available
places.

^[62] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p180-181.

^[63] Unpublished Job Futures response to government discussion paper: Indigenous
Potential Meets Economic Opportunity, November 2006, p2. Response provided
by Job Futures to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner.

^[64] Australian Government, Indigenous Employment Centres, Employment and
workplace services for Australians website, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Category/SchemesInitiatives/IndigenousProgs/IndigenousEmploymentCentres.htm accessed 9 February
2007.

^[65] Andrews, K., (Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations), Indigenous
Employment Discussion Paper Released, Media Release, 6 November 2006,
KA303/06.

^[66] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p5, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January 2007.

^[67] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p7, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January 2007.

^[68] Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, CDEP Guidelines 2005-06:
Building on Success, p.7, available at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/DA6EA99F-EB21-4C90-810F-405D3AC49A51/0/CDEP_Guidelines2005_06.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[69] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p6, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January 2007. The timeframe was Aug 2005 –
August 2006, and represented a 68 percent increase over two
years.

^[70] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p7, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[71] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p7, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[72] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p2, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[73] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p8, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[74] Australian Government, Indigenous Employment Policy, Employment and
workplace services for Australians website, available online at

http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Pages/ContentPage.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRORIGINALURL=/workplace/Category/SchemesInitiatives/IndigenousProgs/IndigenousEmploymentPolicyIEP.htm&NRNODEGUID={1BB4D436-B862-4E41-9ABA-CFBDA2C2A713}&NRCACHEHINT=Guest#1 accessed 9 February
2007.

^[75] Australian Government, Structured Training and Employment Projects (STEP) for
employers, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Individual/IndigenousAustralians/StructuredTrainingandEmploymentProjectsSTEPforemployers.htm accessed 13 February
2007.

^[76] Australian Government, Indigenous Programs, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Category/SchemesInitiatives/IndigenousProgs/ accessed 9 February
2007.

^[77] Unpublished Job Futures response to government discussion paper: Indigenous
Potential Meets Economic Opportunity, November 2006, p5. Response provided
by Job Futures to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner.

^[78] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p13, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[79] An overview of the reform process over the past two years is provided in the
chronology of events in Appendix 1 of this report and Appendix 1 of the Social Justice Report
2005.

^[80] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p9, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[81] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p9, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[82] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p9, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[83] See, for example, the Reverend Gregor Henderson, President of the Uniting
Church, Govt urged to defer axing of CDEP program, ABC News online, 27
November 2006 available online at http://www.abc.net.au/message/news/ accessed 2 December
2006.

^[84] Unpublished Job Futures response to government discussion paper: Indigenous
Potential Meets Economic Opportunity, November 2006, p3-4. Response provided
by Job Futures to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner.

^[85] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p9, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[86] Unpublished Job Futures response to government discussion paper: Indigenous
Potential Meets Economic Opportunity, November 2006, p5. Response provided
by Job Futures to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner.

^[87] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p180-192.

^[88] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p14, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007.

^[89] Australian Government, Have your say, Employment and workplace services
for Australians website, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Category/SchemesInitiatives/IndigenousProgs/Haveyoursay.htm accessed 13 February
2007.

^[90] Unpublished Job Futures response to government discussion paper: Indigenous
Potential Meets Economic Opportunity, November 2006, p11. Response provided
by Job Futures to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner.

^[91] Australian Government, Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity: A
discussion paper, p12, available online at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D61B8DCB-A036-423F-9511-299E83F22752/0/CDEPPaperdiscussionwebfinal.pdf
accessed 18 January
2007

^[92] Unpublished Job Futures response to government discussion paper: Indigenous
Potential Meets Economic Opportunity, November 2006, p7. Response provided
by Job Futures to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner.

^[93] Council of Australian Governments, Council of Australian Governments
Communiqué: Reconciliation, 5 April 2002, available online at http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/050402/index.htm#reconciliation accessed 18 January
2007.

^[94] Council of Australian Governments, COAG Indigenous Trials: Trial Objectives, available online at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/coag/trial_sites/default.html accessed 18 January
2007.

^[95] Indigenous Communities Coordination Task Force, Trial Objectives, see
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2003, HREOC, Sydney, 2003,
p40.

^[96] Council of Australian Governments, COAG Indigenous Trials: Evaluation, available online at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/coag/evaluation/default.html accessed 9 November
2006.

^[97] Management Advisory Committee, Connecting Government – Whole of
government responses to Australia’s priority challenges, Australian
Public Service Commission, Canberra, 2004,
p158.

^[98] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2004, HREOC, Sydney, 2004,
p71.

^[99] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Australian Government Submission to
the Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs, 11
August 2004, p2, available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/indigenousaffairs_ctte/submissions/sub128.pdf

^[100] Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs, After
ATSIC – Life in the mainstream? Australian Senate, Canberra, March
2005.

^[101] Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs, After
ATSIC – Life in the mainstream? Australian Senate, Canberra, March
2005, paragraph 5.61,
p91.

^[102] Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs, After
ATSIC – Life in the mainstream? Australian Senate, Canberra, March
2005,
p92.

^[103] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2003, HREOC, Sydney, 2003, p46.

^[104] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2003, HREOC, Sydney, 2003,
p46.

^[105] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2003, HREOC, Sydney, 2003,
p48.

^[106] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p193.

^[107] House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA), Many Ways Forward: Report of the inquiry into
capacity building and service delivery in Indigenous communities, June 2004,
paragraph 2.94 at
p.47.

^[108] House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA), Many Ways Forward: Report of the inquiry into
capacity building and service delivery in Indigenous communities, June 2004,
paragraph 2.94 at
p.47.

^[109] House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA), Many Ways Forward: Report of the inquiry into
capacity building and service delivery in Indigenous communities, June 2004,
Recommendation 3,
p61.

^[110] Australian Government response to Many Ways Forward – Capacity building
and service delivery in Indigenous communities, August 2006,
p15.

^[111] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2003, HREOC, Sydney, 2003, pp227-251; Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2004, HREOC, Sydney, 2004, pp71-74; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social
Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
pp193-202.

^[112] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Evaluation Plan for
Whole-of-Government Activities in Indigenous Affairs 2006-09, Attachment A,
available online at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/OIPC_EvaluationPlan_23May.pdf accessed 18 January
2007.

^[113] Ms Bryant, Hansard, Standing Committee on Community Affairs Estimates,
Canberra, 2 November 2006, p29, available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[114] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
pp193-202.

^[115] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
pp200-01.

^[116] The Eureka Project, Take It Or Leave It – How COAG is failing
Shepparton’s Aboriginal People, The Eureka Project Pty Ltd Melbourne,
October 2005,
p9.

^[117] Bill Gray AM, Council of Australian Governments (COAG) – Wadeye
Northern Territory – An independent evaluation, May
2006.

^[118] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Secretaries’ Group
Annual Report on Indigenous Affairs 2004-05, Canberra, 2005, p7, available
online at http://www.oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ accessed 18 January
2007.

^[119] Vanstone, A., (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs), Address to National Press Club, Speech, 23 February
2005.

^[120] Taylor, J., Social Indicators for Aboriginal Governance: Insights from the
Thamarrur Region, Northern Territory, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research (CAEPR), Research Monograph No24, 2004,
p35.

^[121] Govt Rejects 20-Yr Lease Proposal, 1 December 2006, News item available
online at http://www.abc.net.au/message/news/stories/ms_news_1802425.htm accessed 15 February
2007.

^[122] Taylor, J., Social Indicators for Aboriginal Governance: Insights from the
Thamarrur Region, Northern Territory, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research (CAEPR), Research Monograph No. 24, 2004,
pp35-36.

^[123] FaCSIA, Community Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP) E-Sub Program
Guidelines 2006-07, pp5-6, available online at http://www.facs.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/via/chip_guidelines/$file/e-sub_guide_2006_07.pdf accessed 5 December
2006.



^[124] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, Canberra, 12
February 2007, pCA99. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9937.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[125] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, 2 November 2006,
pCA39, available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[126] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, 2 November 2006,
pCA39, available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[127] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, 2 November 2006,
pCA16, available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[128] Brough, M., (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs),
quoted in ‘No more waiting on black projects’, article in
Equity Email Networks Newsletter, Issue 26, 14 September 2006, available
online at http://www.equity.qut.edu.au/publications/publications/newsletter/E_News_Issue_26.doc accessed 18 January
2007.

^[129] Brough, M., (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs),
quoted in ‘No more waiting on black projects’, article in
Equity Email Networks Newsletter, Issue 26, 14 September 2006, available
online at http://www.equity.qut.edu.au/publications/publications/newsletter/E_News_Issue_26.doc accessed 18 January
2007.

^[130] Harmer, J., (Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing Committee on
Community Affairs Estimates, Canberra, 2 November 2006, pCA41, available
online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[131] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, 2 November 2006,
pCA42, available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[132] Harmer, J., (Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing Committee on
Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, Canberra, 2 November 2006, pCA41, available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007

^[133] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Correspondence with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner – Request for
Information in preparation of Social Justice Report 2006, 22 December 2005,
pp8-9.

^[134] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Correspondence with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner – Request for
Information in preparation of Social Justice Report 2006, 22 December 2005,
p8.

^[135] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Correspondence with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner – Request for
Information in preparation of Social Justice Report 2006, 22 December 2005,
p8.

^[136] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Correspondence with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner – Request for
Information in preparation of Social Justice Report 2006, 22 December 2005,
p9.

^[137] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, 2 November 2006,
pCA22, available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[138] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, 2 November 2006,
pCA22, available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February 2007.

^[139] These are outlined in detail in the Chronology in Appendix One as well as in
Chapter 3 of this report.

^[140] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
pp107-109.

^[141] Brough, M., (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs),
quoted in ‘No more waiting on black projects’, article in
Equity Email Networks Newsletter, Issue 26, 14 September 2006, available
online at http://www.equity.qut.edu.au/publications/publications/newsletter/E_News_Issue_26.doc accessed 18 January
2007.

^[142] Brough, M., (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs),
quoted in ‘No more waiting on black projects’, article in
Equity Email Networks Newsletter, Issue 26, 14 September 2006, available
online at http://www.equity.qut.edu.au/publications/publications/newsletter/E_News_Issue_26.doc accessed 18 January
2007.

^[143] OIPC, Evaluation Plan for Whole-of-Government Activities in Indigenous
Affairs 2006-09, Attachment C, available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/OIPC_EvaluationPlan_23May.pdf accessed 18 January 2007.

^[144] OIPC, Evaluation Plan for Whole-of-Government Activities in Indigenous
Affairs 2006-09, Attachment C, available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/OIPC_EvaluationPlan_23May.pdf accessed 18 January
2007.

^[145] See, for example, the Northern Territory Government’s BushTel site which
provides a basic data set on all Indigenous communities in the Territory, at http://www.bushtel.nt.gov.au/portal/page?_pageid=53,1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&p_nav_type=BushTelHome&p_text_only accessed 19 January
2007.

^[146] See Taylor, J., Social Indicators for Aboriginal Governance: Insights from
the Thamarrurr Region, Northern Territory, Centre for Aboriginal Economic
Policy Research (CAEPR) Research Monograph No.24, 2004, available at http://www.anu.edu.au/caepr/mono.php ; and Taylor, J. and Stanley, O., The Opportunity Costs of the Status Quo in
the Thamarrurr Region, CAEPR Working Paper No28, 2005, available at http://www.anu.edu.au/caepr/working.php accessed 15 February
2007.

^[147] See, for example, Taylor, J., Bern, J. and Senior, K.A., Ngukurr at the
Millennium: A Baseline Profile for Social Impact Planning in South-East Arnhem
Land, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) Research
Monograph No 18, 2000, Chapter
1.

^[148] Taylor, J., Bern, J. and Senior, K.A., Ngukurr at the Millennium: A Baseline
Profile for Social Impact Planning in South-East Arnhem Land, Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) Research Monograph No 18, 2000,
p5.

^[149] Taylor, J., Bern, J. and Senior, K.A., Ngukurr at the Millennium: A Baseline
Profile for Social Impact Planning in South-East Arnhem Land, Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) Research Monograph No18, 2000,
p6.

^[150] See for example comments by Senator Adams, member of the Senate Committee on
Community Affairs, Hansard, Senate Standing Committee on Community
Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, 2 November 2006, pCA44. “I find
it very, very strange that you have to now go and employ consultants to get the
data about dealing with these communities. It just is incredible. There have
been trials, trials and trials, and I think you will find that the Aboriginal
communities are saying, ‘Gosh, not another survey! We are not being
researched again!’ This is just a disgrace.” Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007:

^[151] Martin, C., (Northern Territory Chief Minister and Minister for Indigenous
Affairs), Hansard, Question Time, 13 June 2006, available online at http://notes.nt.gov.au/lant/hansard/hansard10.nsf/0/19638dd5f6e96927692571b60000908d?OpenDocument&Click accessed 19 January
2007.

^[152] Brough, M., (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs), Alice Springs Town Camps and Itinerant Populations – NT and Local
Politicians Can’t Walk Away from Solutions, Media Release, 25 August
2006. See also ABC news item: Federal Government can negotiate with
Indigenous leaders without NT: Brough, 9 November
2006.

^[153] Brough, M., (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs), New Aboriginal Land Deal for Galiwin’ku, Media Release, 19 June
2006.

^[154] The Australian, ‘Island “held to ransom” over
land’, The Australian, 9 November
2006.

^[155] To rely on the relevant Land Council may not be sufficient for this
purpose.

^[156] This issue is discussed at length in the Native Title Report 2006,
particularly chapter
2.

^[157] Brough, M., (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs), Indigenous Affairs Arrangements, Foreword, Department of Families,
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, 2004,
p.v.

^[158] OIPC, Indigenous Coordination Centres – Questions and Answers, at http://www.Indigenous.gov.au/icc/qa.html accessed 19 January
2007.

^[159] Gray, W. and Sanders, W.G., Views for the Top of the ‘Quiet
Revolution’: Secretarial Perspectives on the New Arrangements in
Indigenous Affairs, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR),
Discussion Paper no 282/2006,
p13.

^[160] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005, p42-46;
p86-94.

^[161] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p46.

^[162] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p46.

^[163] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p46.

^[164] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005, p46.

^[165] Gray, W. and Sanders, W.G., Views for the Top of the ‘Quiet
Revolution’: Secretarial Perspectives on the New Arrangements in
Indigenous Affairs, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR),
Discussion Paper no 282/2006,
p13.

^[166] For example, Gray found evidence that the partners in the COAG trial began to
initiate funding applications and responses that were not part of the agreed
processes under the SRA. See Gray, W. and Sanders, W.G., Views for the Top of
the ‘Quiet Revolution’: Secretarial Perspectives on the New
Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research (CAEPR), Discussion Paper no 282/2006,
p8.

^[167] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Correspondence with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner – Request for
Information in preparation of Social Justice Report 2006, 22 December 2005,
p5.

^[168] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Correspondence with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner – Request for
Information in preparation of Social Justice Report 2006, 22 December 2005,
p5.

^[169] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Correspondence with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner (Email), 15 June
2005.

^[170] Calma, T., Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Evaluating the external forces which exert an influence on government policy
direction, Speech delivered at Collaborative Indigenous Policy Development
Conference, Brisbane 27-28 June
2006.

^[171] This is according to the Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy
Coordination, Canberra, 2005p 6. However, it appears that not all ICCs may, in
fact, have solution
brokers.

^[172] Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, CDEP Guidelines 2005-06:
Building on Success, p25. Available at http://www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/DA6EA99F-EB21-4C90-810F-405D3AC49A51/0/CDEP_Guidelines2005_06.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[173] See Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee, 2006-07 Budget Estimates,
Question No.071, p
79.

^[174] Senate Estimates, Hansard, Senate Standing Committee on Community
Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, Canberra, 2 November 2006, pCA11-12. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[175] See for example Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p166-169.

^[176] Henry, K., (Secretary of the Treasury), Managing Prosperity, Address to
the 2006 Economic and Social Outlook Conference, Melbourne, 2 November 2006, p6,
available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1183/PDF/Managing_Prosperity.pdf accessed 19 January 2007. See also the evaluation of the Wadeye COAG trial, as
discussed in section one of this chapter. It noted an increase in red tape as a
result of the whole of government efforts as part of the
trial.

^[177] Australian Government, e-Sub online introduction, available at https://www.indigenous.gov.au/eSub/PublicPages/IntroInformation.aspx accessed 14
February
2007.

^[178] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May
2006.

^[179] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006,
p6-7.

^[180] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006,
p7.

^[181] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006,
p8-9.

^[182] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006,
p10.

^[183] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006,
p82.

^[184] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006,
p10.

^[185] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006,
p83.

^[186] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006,
p10.

^[187] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Shared responsibility
agreements, Bulletin 1, April
2006.

^[188] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous
Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005,
p9. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[189] Australian Government, Indigenous Portal, SRA and RPAs Website available
at http://www.Indigenous.gov.au/sra.html accessed 19 January 2007.

^[190] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005, p178-79. The report notes (p179),
however, that while ‘there are some SRAs in urban contexts’ they
‘are, however, very few in number. The SRA process has not, to date, been
a significant tool in harnessing the
mainstream.’

^[191] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p178-9.

^[192] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p179.

^[193] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p179.

^[194] OIPC, Areyonga Bus and Oval SRA, June 2005, available at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/sra.html#sra accessed 19 January
2007.

^[195] OIPC, Areyonga Bus and Oval SRA, June 2005, available at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/sra.html#sra accessed 19 January
2007.

^[196] For the full survey results see further Chapter 3 of this
report.

^[197] OIPC, New Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs, p40. Available http://www.oipc.gov.au/About_OIPC/new_arrangements.asp accessed 15 February
2007.

^[198] OIPC, New Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs, p32. Available http://www.oipc.gov.au/About_OIPC/new_arrangements.asp accessed 15 February
2007.

^[199] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, A Comprehensive Approach to
Indigenous Reforms, Bulletin 3/2005. Available at http://www.apsc.gov.au/indigenousemployment/bulletin0305.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[200] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, A Comprehensive Approach to
Indigenous Reforms, Bulletin 3/2005. Available at http://www.apsc.gov.au/indigenousemployment/bulletin0305.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[201] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, A Comprehensive Approach to
Indigenous Reforms, Bulletin 3/2005. Available at http://www.apsc.gov.au/indigenousemployment/bulletin0305.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[202] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, A Comprehensive Approach to
Indigenous Reforms, Bulletin 3/2005. Available at http://www.apsc.gov.au/indigenousemployment/bulletin0305.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[203] Gray, W. and Sanders, W.G., Views for the Top of the ‘Quiet
Revolution’: Secretarial Perspectives on the New Arrangements in
Indigenous Affairs, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR),
Discussion Paper no 282/2006,
p13.

^[204] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Standing Committee
on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, Canberra, 2 November
2006, pCA17. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[205] Regional Partnership Agreement between the Ngaanyatjarra Council (Aboriginal
Corporation), the Australian Government, the State Government of Western
Australia and the Shire of Ngaanyatjarraku, 12 August
2005.

^[206] Social Justice Report 2005, op cit, p
118-119.

^[207] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, Canberra, 2
November 2006, pCA39. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[208] Gibbons, W., Hansard, (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, Canberra, 2
November 2006, pCA39. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007.

^[209] Compare to the Ngaanyatjarra RPA which is a 4-way agreement between the
Australian Government, the Western Australian Government, the Ngaanyatjarra
Council, and the Shire of
Ngaanyatjarraku.

^[210] Brough, M., (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs), Port Headland tackles Indigenous Unemployment, Media Release, 7 November
2006.

^[211] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p110.

^[212] Vanstone, A., (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs), Minister announces new Indigenous representation arrangements,
Media Release, 29 June 2005,
p1.

^[213] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p110-111.

^[214] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p110-111.

^[215] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005, p117 and text box on
p-112-114.

^[216] OIPC, Regional Indigenous Engagement Agreements, available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/RegionalIndigenousEngagementArrangements_Parameters.pdf accessed 4 December
2006.

^[217] OIPC, Regional Indigenous Engagement Agreements, available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/RegionalIndigenousEngagementArrangements_Parameters.pdf accessed 4 December
2006.

^[218] Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, A Red Tape Evaluation in Selected
Indigenous Communities: Final Report for OIPC, May 2006, available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/publications/PDF/RedTapeReport.pdf accessed 19 January
2007.

^[219] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2006, HREOC Sydney 2007, Chapter
3.

^[220] Vanstone, Address to National Press Club 23 February 2005 at http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/news/vanstone1.html accessed 15 February
2007.

^[221] Brough, M., (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs), Indigenous Affairs Arrangements, Foreword, OIPC, Commonwealth of
Australia, Canberra, 2006, pv. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/About_OIPC/Indigenous_Affairs_Arrangements/OIPC_Book.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[222] ‘European’ in terms of the system of laws that entered Australia
with settlement, which were predominantly
British.

^[223] Pearson, N., ‘The Right Side of the Law’, The Australian, 11
November
2006.

^[224] Corbett, K., ‘Stop criticising indigenous people – leader’,
The Australian, 23 November
2006.

^[225] See Rowley, C.D., The Remote Aborigines, Pelican, Sydney,
1972.

^[226] see Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations at http://www.orac.gov.au/training_information_sessions/calendar/default.aspx

^[227] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 2005,
p160.

^[228] House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA), Many Ways Forward: Report of the inquiry into
capacity building and service delivery in Indigenous communities, June
2004.

^[229] House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA), Many Ways Forward: Report of the inquiry into
capacity building and service delivery in Indigenous communities, June 2004,
paragraph 2.94 at
p..xxix.

^[230] Australian Government response to Many Ways Forward – Capacity building
and service delivery in Indigenous communities, August 2006,
p7.

^[231] Australian Government response to Many Ways Forward – Capacity building
and service delivery in Indigenous communities, August 2006, p
20.

^[232] Previous reorganisations and downsizing of ATSIC had already had a considerable
detrimental impact, particularly the reorganisation of
2000.

^[233] Gray, W. and Sanders, W.G., Views for the Top of the ‘Quiet
Revolution’: Secretarial Perspectives on the New Arrangements in
Indigenous Affairs, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR),
Discussion Paper no 282/2006,
p10-12.

^[234] Gray, W. and Sanders, W.G., Views for the Top of the ‘Quiet
Revolution’: Secretarial Perspectives on the New Arrangements in
Indigenous Affairs, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR),
Discussion Paper no 282/2006,
p11.

^[235] Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, About OIPC, available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/About_OIPC/default.asp accessed 19 January
2007.

^[236] See FaCSIA Organisation Structure January 2007, available at http://www.facs.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/aboutfacs/orgchart.htm accessed 15 February
2007.

^[237] Harmer, J., (Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing Committee on
Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, Canberra, 2 November 2006, pCA13. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[238] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, The ICC model: Five point
plan, Bulletin (4/2005), October 2005, p1, available at: www.apsc.gov.au/indigenousemployment/bulletin0405.pdf,
accessed 9 November
2006.

^[239] Australian Government response to Many Ways Forward – Capacity building
and service delivery in Indigenous communities, August 2006,
p5.

^[240] Gibbons, W., (Associate Secretary, FaCSIA), Hansard, Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs, Supplementary Budget Estimates, Canberra, 2
November 2006, pCA14. “... all of the programs that are
Indigenous-specific are in one area of the department, together with the
whole-of-government coordination functions in the Office of Indigenous Policy
Coordination. Activities that are mainstream in their focus—that is, they
service Indigenous and non-Indigenous people alike - are in the mainstream
element of the department.” Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9783.pdf accessed 13 February
2007

^[241] See FaCSIA Organisation Structure January 2007, available at http://www.facs.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/aboutfacs/orgchart.htm
accessed 15 February
2007.

^[242] The Hon. Mal Brough MP was appointed Minister for Families, Community Services
and Indigenous Affairs, and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Indigenous
Affairs on 27 January 2006. Prior to this, The Hon Senator Amanda Vanstone MP
was the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, and
Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Indigenous Affairs. See Parliamentary
Library, Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, Current
Parliamentary Information on the 41^st Parliament, Commonwealth
Government, Canberra, 2007. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/parl/41/ministry/ministry.htm accessed 15 February
2007.

^[243] See Rowley, C.D., The Remote Aborigines, Pelican, Sydney, 1972, p343.

^[244] COAG, Communiqué, 5 April 2002, Attachment 1, COAG Reconciliation
Framework: Report on Progress in 2001, p6-7, available at http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/050402/reconciliation_report.pdf accessed 19 January
2007.

^[245] COAG, Communiqué, 25 June 2004, Attachment B – National
Framework of Principles for Delivering Services to Indigenous Australians,
p2, available at http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/250604/index.htm#attachments accessed 19 January
2007.

^[246] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2004, HREOC, Sydney, 2004,
p95.

^[247] Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs, After
ATSIC – Life in the mainstream?, Commonwealth of Australia, March
2005, chapter 5 Mainstreaming of Service Delivery, para 5.54. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/indigenousaffairs_ctte/report/final/report.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[248] Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs, After
ATSIC – Life in the mainstream?, Commonwealth of Australia, March
2005, chapter 5 Mainstreaming of Service Delivery, para 5.76. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/indigenousaffairs_ctte/report/final/report.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[249] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous
Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005,
p2. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[250] Howard, J., (Prime Minister) letter to Mr Gary Banks, Chairman Steering
Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision, 3 May 2002,
reproduced in SCRGSP, Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage – Key
Indicators 2003, Productivity Commission, Canberra, 2003. Available at http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/reports/indigenous/keyindicators2003/ accessed 15 February
2007.

^[251] SCRGSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision), Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage – Key Indicators 2003, Productivity Commission, Canberra, 2003. Available at http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/reports/indigenous/keyindicators2003/ accessed 15 February
2007.

^[252] Banks, G., (Chairman of the Productivity Commission), Indigenous
disadvantage: are we making progress?, Speech, Committee for Economic
Development in Australia (CEDA), 21 September 2005,
p3.

^[253] Banks, G., (Chairman of the Productivity Commission), Indigenous
disadvantage: are we making progress?, Speech, Committee for Economic
Development in Australia (CEDA), 21 September 2005,
p9.

^[254] SCRGSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision), Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage – Key Indicators 2003, Productivity Commission, Canberra, 2003, Section 2.5 ‘Data issues’,
p2.15. Available at http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/reports/indigenous/keyindicators2003/ accessed 15 February 2007.

^[255] Banks, G., (Chairman of the Productivity Commission), Indigenous
disadvantage: are we making progress?, Speech, Committee for Economic
Development in Australia (CEDA), 21 September 2005,
p12.

^[256] Banks, G., (Chairman of the Productivity Commission), Indigenous
disadvantage: are we making progress?, Speech, Committee for Economic
Development in Australia (CEDA), 21 September 2005,
p3.

^[257] Banks, G., (Chairman of the Productivity Commission), Indigenous
disadvantage: are we making progress?, Speech, Committee for Economic
Development in Australia (CEDA), 21 September 2005,
p16.

^[258] Banks, G., (Chairman of the Productivity Commission), Indigenous
disadvantage: are we making progress?, Speech, Committee for Economic
Development in Australia (CEDA), 21 September 2005,
p16.

^[259] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous
Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005,
p24. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[260] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous
Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005,
p24. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[261] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous
Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005,
p24. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[262] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous
Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005,
p26. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[263] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous
Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005,
p27. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[264] OIPC, Evaluation Plan for Whole-of-Government Activities in Indigenous
Affairs 2006-09, p1, available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/OIPC_EvaluationPlan_23May.pdf accessed 18 January
2007.

^[265] Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee, Answers to questions on
notice, Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs Portfolio, 2006-07 Budget Estimates, May-June 2006: Office of Indigenous Policy
Coordination Evaluation Plan for whole-of-government activities in Indigenous
Affairs 2006-09, p1. Available at available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/OIPC_EvaluationPlan_23May.pdf accessed 18 January
2007.

^[266] OIPC, Evaluation Plan for Whole of Government Activities in Indigenous
Affairs 2006-09, p1. Available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/OIPC_EvaluationPlan_23May.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[267] OIPC, Evaluation Plan for Whole of Government Activities in Indigenous
Affairs 2006-09, p1-2. Available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/OIPC_EvaluationPlan_23May.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[268] OIPC, Evaluation Plan for Whole of Government Activities in Indigenous
Affairs 2006-09, p3. Available at http://www.oipc.gov.au/documents/OIPC_EvaluationPlan_23May.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[269] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May
2006.

^[270] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006,
p73.

^[271] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous
Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005,
p16. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[272] Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous
Affairs 2004-05, Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005,
p16. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
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^[273] See, for example, ‘Post-ATSIC Agenda Needs Explaining’, The
Australian, editorial, 2 October 2006. Also comments from members of the
government-appointed National Indigenous Council, as reported in: ‘Show
Aborigines the money, Howard’s advisers demand’, Weekend
Australian,16/17 September 2006, p3. Also Bartos, S., (Director of the
National Governance Institute, University of Canberra), ‘The light at the
end of the tunnel could be –The year in review’, Canberra
Times, The Public Sector Informant, December 2006,
p4.

^[274] Shergold, P., Foreword, in Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous
Affairs, Annual Report on Indigenous Affairs 2004-05, Office of
Indigenous Policy Coordination, Canberra, 2005, p.v. Available at http://oipc.gov.au/performance_reporting/sec_group/ar2005/OIPC_Sec_Report05.pdf accessed 15 February
2007.

^[275] Morgan Disney & Associates, A Red Tape Evaluation of Selected Indigenous
Communities: Final Report for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, Morgan Disney & Associates Pty Ltd, May 2006, p72.