Social Justice Report 2003: Chapter 2: Reconciliation and government accountability

Social Justice Report 2003

Chapter two: Reconciliation and government accountability

In the Social Justice Report 1999,
my first report as Social Justice Commissioner, I identified four key
themes and challenges that existed in the approach of the federal government
to Indigenous policy making at the time. These were moving beyond welfare
dependency, accountability, participation and reconciliation.^[1] Since the release of that report approximately four years ago, the key
themes and challenges facing the government have remained relatively constant.
The fundamentals of the government's approach to Indigenous affairs have
not changed substantially, with only subtle refinements and a locking
down of their approach across all program and policy areas and at the
inter-governmental level. These refinements have taken place through the
consistent use of coded language such as 'practical reconciliation', 'mutual
obligation', 'agreement making' and 'partnerships', and more recently
'shared responsibility'.^[2]

To the phrase 'moving beyond welfare dependency'
we could now add 'sustainable development', 'capacity building' and 'mutual
obligation'. For 'accountability' we could add 'governance reform', 'shared
responsibility', 'whole of government approach' and 'changing the way
we do business with Indigenous communities'. For 'participation' we could
add 'self-management', 'agreement making' and 'partnerships'. For 'reconciliation'
we can directly substitute 'practical reconciliation' and divide issues
into so-called real and symbolic ones.

The next two chapters examine current progress
in addressing a range of issues in relation to these four themes. They
consider the adequacy of the structures and processes that have been put
into place at the national level to progress programs and services to
Indigenous peoples; and ultimately, based on this analysis, identify an
agenda for change with recommendations to improve Indigenous policy and
program design. This chapter focuses on developments relating to reconciliation
and mechanisms for government accountability. Chapter 3 then focuses on
the participation (and accountability) of Indigenous organisations and
peoples in government activity and developments relating to the objective
of moving Indigenous peoples beyond welfare dependency. The subject matter
of the two chapters is inter-related and together they constitute my annual
progress report on reconciliation.

Reconciliation

In 2003, there have been three main sets
of developments in relation to the government's approach to reconciliation.
First, there has been continuity in the implementation of programmes and
in the policy direction of the federal government towards reconciliation.
The primary focus of activity during the year has been on advancing initiatives
that were announced or committed to in either 2002 or previous years (such
as through the Council of Australian Governments' Communiques on Reconciliation
in 2000 and 2002).

There has been a high level of commitment
by the federal government to continuing to implement programmes in accordance
with its 'practical reconciliation' agenda. There have been significant
developments in implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) to conduct a number of whole-of-government community
trials across Australia and to establishing an annual reporting framework
on Indigenous disadvantage. There has also been an increased focus on
debilitating problems affecting Indigenous communities such as family
violence, with the convening of a national summit by the Prime Minister
and the announcement of new funding for programs to address it (these
were described as a 'down-payment' and are expected to be backed up with
further funding in the 2004 Budget).

Second, and concurrent to this continuation
of the existing approach, has been public debate about the adequacy of
accountability mechanisms for government service delivery to Indigenous
peoples and for reconciliation. Specifically in relation to reconciliation,
this debate has taken place through the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee's inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation
and through the commencement of the second reading debate in the Senate
on the Reconciliation Bill 2001 (which seeks to introduce monitoring
and evaluation processes for reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations
of the final report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation). Through
both of these processes the government has revealed that it considers
it unnecessary to introduce formal legislative monitoring mechanisms for
progress towards reconciliation at the national level.

In more general terms, this debate has taken
place through the review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC). The review process saw a clear expression of dissatisfaction
with progress in addressing the disadvantage experienced by Indigenous
peoples and in government service delivery to Indigenous peoples, as well
as at the perceived failure of ATSIC to effectively represent Indigenous
peoples. The findings and recommendations of this review are discussed
in detail in the next chapter. Of note here, however, is that while the
review was intended to review mechanisms for service delivery to Indigenous
peoples (i.e., not to be solely focused on ATSIC) its ultimate focus from
an accountability perspective was on the role of ATSIC. It provided only
limited focus on accountability mechanisms and the responsibilities of
the rest of government.

The third main set of developments in relation
to the government's approach to reconciliation has been that the limits
of practical reconciliation were exposed through a number of processes
and events during the year. These included the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee's inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation,
the release of data from and analysis of the 2001 Census, the release
of the first national report on overcoming Indigenous disadvantage by
the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision,
and the public debates about service delivery to Indigenous peoples that
took place as part of the ATSIC Review.

The Social Justice Report 2002 had noted that the dominant feature of the government's approach to reconciliation
and Indigenous affairs the previous year was the refinement and bedding
down of its 'practical reconciliation' approach.^[3] The report expressed the concern that 'by continually reinforcing that
its commitment is to addressing key issues of Indigenous disadvantage
and nothing else' the government had 'developed a tunnel vision that renders
it incapable of seeing anything that falls outside the boundaries that
it has unilaterally, and artificially, established for relations with
Indigenous peoples'^[4] . It also expressed
the concern that as a consequence of this, the limited processes that
existed for accountability were not directed to those issues with which
the government did not agree or which fell outside of its limited approach.

In the remainder of this chapter, I examine
key developments relating to reconciliation at the national level during
2003. The focus of this progress report is on the adequacy of processes
for accountability of the government for reconciliation, particularly
as they relate to 'practical' reconciliation.

National progress towards reconciliation in 2003
- Key developments

This section considers developments over
the past year relating to reconciliation under the following headings:

• A 'highly controlled' commitment to 'practical' reconciliation;
• Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage; and
• Implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian
  Governments.

a) A 'highly controlled' commitment to 'practical'
reconciliation

On 27 November 2003, the Senate began the
second reading debate on the Reconciliation Bill 2001. The Bill
was identical to that included in the final report of the Council for
Aboriginal Reconciliation and which the Council had recommended should
be passed by the Parliament in order to provide a legislative framework
to deal with the unfinished business of reconciliation. The Bill was first
introduced by Senator Ridgeway on 5 April 2001, with debate on the Bill
adjourned that same day. It has taken more than two and a half years for
the Bill to be reconsidered and reach the second reading stage in the
Senate.^[5]

As Senator Ridgeway noted in his second
reading speech, the Bill provided 'an opportunity to debate essentially
what the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation recommended'.^[6] It was the first extensive debate to take place directly on
reconciliation in the Senate chamber since the Council released its report
in December 2000 (notwithstanding the debates that took place through
the parliamentary committee system with the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee's inquiry into reconciliation and estimates processes).

The debate on the Bill was acrimonious.
The opposition parties stated that 'there has been a clear lack of responsibility
on the part of the government which ...seems to be intent on destroying the
spirit of what reconciliation is about by putting forward a policy of
practical reconciliation';^[7] that reconciliation
'is clearly an issue that has fallen off the Howard government's agenda';^[8] and that the government has a 'record of not performing when it comes
to reconciliation in this country'. ^[9]

Government Senators responded angrily to
these comments. One government minister interjected that criticisms of
the government's performance were 'sanctimonious rubbish' and that 'you
could be a bit gracious and comment on some of the positive things'.^[10] Another member of the government accused a fellow Senator of being 'one
of the phoney people ... There is a lot of phoniness in this debate. People
come in here and make symbolic speeches and then go home and forget about
it. You want to live it'.^[11]

A striking feature of the debate is the
deeply impassioned nature of the speeches made by members of the government
and their outrage at the suggestion that the government is not committed
to reconciliation. Senator Ferris put the position of the government as
follows:

If one were to listen to the contribution of (the Opposition) ...
one would believe that reconciliation is dead in this country. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Reconciliation between Indigenous
Australians and the wider community is an objective that the federal
government is fully committed to, and all of us on this side of the
chamber are fully committed to. The Australian government strongly
reaffirms its support for reconciliation, as expressed in the historic
motion of reconciliation that was passed by both houses of the federal
parliament on 26 August 1999 ... [T]his motion confirmed a whole-hearted
commitment to reconciliation as an important national priority for
all Australians.'^[12]

There is a subtle but important factor illustrated
by comments such as these that must be acknowledged about the government's
approach to reconciliation. Members of the government are committed to
achieving reconciliation. Analyses of how the government is performing
on reconciliation, such as this report, do not seek to present the government's
position as if it were opposed to achieving reconciliation. Instead, the
crucial issue is the nature of the commitments made by the government
and whether they are sufficient (or in other words, do they progress reconciliation
or instead impede progress, either through commission or omission?).

Senator Ferris explained what the government
means by reconciliation in the debate on the Reconciliation Bill as follows:

Of course, the concept of reconciliation is one that
means different things to different people ... But there is one common
thread to people's view of reconciliation in this country and that is
that all Australians are entitled to equal life chances, to equality
of opportunity, and that true reconciliation will not exist until Indigenous
disadvantage has been eliminated. The very sad truth is that Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people in Australia still remain the most
disadvantaged group in our society ... despite the best efforts of hundreds,
perhaps thousands of individuals in this country over many years ...

The federal government believes that the best way
it can act to achieve reconciliation is through the provision of practical
and effective measures that address the legacy of profound economic
and social disadvantage that are experienced by many Indigenous Australians,
particularly in those crucial areas of health, education, housing and
employment. Practical measures in these key areas have a positive effect
on the everyday lives of Indigenous Australians.'^[13]

I have extensively criticised this approach
to reconciliation in the Social Justice Reports for 2000-2002.'^[14] At core, concerns about the government's approach to reconciliation focus
on the limited scope of the commitments that they make; the lack of a
process for dealing with issues that fall outside the parameters set by
the government; the derisive and somewhat arbitrary way that the government
discards issues which it does not agree with as 'symbolic' and then simply
ignores them; and the lack of a rigorous monitoring framework to hold
the government accountable for its commitments and for any lack of progress
in areas which it has chosen to ignore.

The government's approach to reconciliation
is also malleable. In 2003, for example, the design and wording for a
memorial on the stolen generations for inclusion at Reconciliation Place
in Canberra was agreed between the government and the National Sorry Day
Committee.'^[15] While there is a clear preference
for 'practical' measures of assistance rather than 'symbolic' measures,
the government's approach does involve and recognise the importance of
such symbolic measures. It is often not clear, however, why particular
issues are acceptable and fall within the parameters of practical reconciliation
while others do not.

These concerns about the government's approach
do not, however, suggest that there is an absence of a commitment to reconciliation.
Instead they identify that this commitment is to a particular type of reconciliation around which the boundaries are tightly proscribed by
the government.'^[16]

Jackie Huggins has effectively addressed
the issue of the nature of the government's commitment to reconciliation
as follows:

There is little doubt that the current Government in
Canberra would like to make an impact in Indigenous affairs, though
its vision of a reconciled Australia would be very different to that
of many of us ... Although, there are strong indications that Ministers
across a number of Commonwealth portfolios are becoming more open
to looking at creative solutions to persistent problems.

But the bottom line for this Prime Minister and his
governmental has always been the compartmentalising of reconciliation
and Indigenous affairs into so-called practical and symbolic measures,
the latter having been rejected as unacceptable to mainstream Australia ...

In this highly controlled context ... it is true to say
that many in the community have been left with the impression that
the reconciliation agenda in Australia has run into the sand. Others
have been basking in the mistaken belief that reconciliation has already
arrived. The truth is somewhere in between ...'^[17]

The continuity over several years of this
'highly controlled' approach of the government towards reconciliation
has inevitably seen policy debates shift towards the government's framework.
This was increasingly the case in 2003. Progressively each year has seen
less focus on issues that do not fall within the government's approach,
such as an apology, the plight of the stolen generations, the treaty debate
and native title. As Reconciliation Australia notes, these issues 'have
not gone away however those involved in reconciliation have chosen to
engage with the government where constructive progress can be made'.'^[18] This reflects political reality rather than an embracing or endorsement
of the government's position. As Jackie Huggins has noted:

Those of us involved in reconciliation and Indigenous
affairs have had to make a choice about whether to keep beating our
heads against a wall on ... issues (of unfinished business) ... or whether
we look to what can be achieved in the political context in which
we find ourselves, and try to move forward. And that is the choice
we have made. We have a responsibility to keep the rest of the agenda
alive but we also have a duty to engage and to continue to progress
things that can be progressed.'^[19]

Similarly, processes for sustaining and
monitoring progress towards reconciliation are increasingly focused on
'practical' reconciliation. In 2003, the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee concluded its inquiry into national progress towards
reconciliation and made several recommendations to implement a broader
approach to reconciliation which incorporates all aspects of reconciliation
that were identified by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation'^[20] A similarly based debate also commenced in the Senate on the Reconciliation
Bill 2001. The government has indicated that it does not consider
the mechanisms in either of these processes as necessary, on the basis
that it already has mechanisms in place for progressing practical reconciliation.
Consequently, it is unlikely that there will be mechanisms introduced
which will enable issues that do not fit exactly within the government's
framework to be advanced.

b) Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage

The government has emphasised time and again
that the key focus of reconciliation should be on practical and effective
measures that address the legacy of profound economic and social disadvantage
that is experienced by many Indigenous Australians. As quoted above, the
government's position is that 'true reconciliation will not exist until
Indigenous disadvantage has been eliminated'.

Newly released data in 2003 provided the
opportunity to establish whether we are progressing towards this ultimate
goal of the government's reconciliation agenda and to determine whether
the pace of such progress is adequate.

The Social Justice Reports for
2000 through to 2002 raised a number of challenges for the government
in order to determine whether they are meeting their commitment to address
the social and economic inequality experienced by Indigenous Australians.
These challenges include the establishment of benchmarks and targets which
commit to a rate of progress in improving the socio-economic conditions
of Indigenous peoples and improved data collection to enable such progress
to be more accurately measured. There have been some developments over
the past year relating to data collection and reporting, such as the establishment
of the national reporting framework on key indicators of Indigenous disadvantage
(which is discussed more fully in the next section of this chapter).

However, the long-standing commitment of
governments to develop benchmarks and action plans for key areas of Indigenous
disadvantage through the various inter-governmental ministerial councils
remains largely unfulfilled. Accordingly, it is not possible to determine
whether government efforts to address Indigenous disadvantage have progressed
at a rate that meets the expectations (and targets) of governments and
Indigenous peoples. There are no publicly reported goals setting out what
is an acceptable rate of improvement against which we can determine whether
current progress is adequate and fully matches the potential of available
resources and programs. This is a critical issue of lack of accountability
of government and I return to it later in this chapter.

Despite the lack of publicly reported benchmarks
and action plans, we can still evaluate progress in addressing Indigenous
disadvantage from the following three perspectives.

First, we can see whether there have been improvements in
the circumstances of Indigenous peoples on a number of key indicators
over the past five and ten years. Generally, due to difficulties in comparing
data over time periods the Australian Bureau of Statistics recommends
that such comparisons be made on the basis of changes in percentages over
time rather than raw figures.^[21]

Second, we can see whether there have been
improvements in the situation of Indigenous peoples compared to non-Indigenous
people over the past five and ten years. In other words, given the prime
goal of the government of eliminating the inequality in socio-economic
conditions experienced by Indigenous peoples, is there relative improvement
in the situation of Indigenous peoples compared to the rest of Australian
society? If the government's approach is working then we can reasonably
expect a continual closing of the gap between the two groups.

Third, we can make comparisons between the
situation of Indigenous peoples in Australia and Indigenous peoples in
other similar countries, as well as to people in less developed countries.
By doing so we can establish whether we are progressing at a rate comparable
to that in other countries or whether we are lagging behind in the improvements
being achieved.

The government's view is that it is making
progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage. In October 2003 the Minister
for Indigenous Affairs stated:

The wellbeing of Indigenous people is improving under
this Government. Record amounts of money and effort are now being spent
on trying to solve the problem of Indigenous disadvantage. Since coming
to Government, real steps forward have been made. Between the 1996 and
2001 censuses, many indicators of Indigenous disadvantage show real
improvement. For example:

• Indigenous unemployment rate fell from 22.7 per cent
  to 20.0 per cent, and there were an additional 18,000 Indigenous people
  in employment
• the proportion of Indigenous people employed in the
  private sector rose from 46.3 per cent to 48.5 per cent
• the proportion of Indigenous adults who had left school
  before their 15th birthday fell from 44.2 per cent to 33.4 per cent,
  and
• the proportion of Indigenous adults with post school
  qualifications rose from 23.6 per cent to 27.9 per cent
• the proportion of Indigenous children who stayed on
  at school through to Year 12 increased from 29.2 per cent in 1996
  to 38 per cent in 2002
• there were 5566 Indigenous students enrolled in a bachelor's
  level degree or higher degree course in 2002, 24.3 per cent more students
  than were enrolled in 1996
• there were 59 763 Indigenous people who undertook post-secondary
  vocational and educational training in 2002, nearly twice the number
  of Indigenous students registered for training in 1996.

While things are getting better, I am not saying
everything is good or that we can sit back and be complacent. This Government
will remain committed to building an Australia where Indigenous people
enjoy the same standards of living as other Australians while maintaining
their unique cultural identities.^[22]

In the debate on the Reconciliation
Bill 2001 in November 2003, Senator Ferris also stated the government's
position as follows:

Despite (the opposition's) claims of economic failure
and government policy failure, let us have a look at some of the improvements
that have taken place in Indigenous affairs since this government
came to office in 1996.

In terms of education, from 1996 to 2002 the proportion
of Indigenous children who stayed on at school increased from a very
poor 29.2 per cent to 38 per cent. I know that 38 per cent is still
very low, but an improvement of 10 per cent since this government
came to office is very significant. More importantly, the number of
Indigenous students registered for post-secondary vocational and educational
training has nearly doubled from 1996 to 2002 ... to a total of 59,763...
if that is failure of government policy, one can only imagine what
would be determined to be successful. The number of young Indigenous
Australians who are undertaking post-secondary training has almost
doubled. Over the same period of time, there was a 32 per cent increase
in the number of Indigenous men and women involved in bachelor-level
degree courses or higher degree courses in Australian universities.
I know that those figures are still low, but we are starting to build
a base of economic advantage through higher education and training
for young Indigenous men and women ...

In terms of unemployment, the unemployment rate for
Indigenous people actually fell from 22.7 per cent to 20 per cent
between the 1996 census and the 2001 census. Again, I am the first
to say that we have a long way to go before we can honestly in this
place say that there is equality of opportunity for jobs for young
Indigenous people. However, between 1996 and 2001 the number of Indigenous
people in employment increased from 82,346 to 100,348, an increase
of 22 per cent...

In terms of health, the Australian government has substantially
increased its spending on Indigenous-specific health programs. Such
spending is now at record levels. So much for failure ... Our total spending
on specific Indigenous health services this year will rise to more
than $258 million-more than has ever been spent before. Again I say
that we know this does not indicate we are going to solve this problem,
but it is a significant first step. This is a real increase of nearly
90 per cent since this government took office in 1996... how can you
say that this is a failure of government policy? We have increased
real spending on Indigenous-specific health by more than 90 per cent
since 1996. In the last five years, 46 remote communities have gained
access to primary health care for the very first time. Indigenous
infant and perinatal death rates have fallen by a third over the last
decade...

Commonwealth spending on Indigenous programs
has increased by one-third in real terms since 1996 and is now at record
levels. In 2003-04, the Commonwealth government will spend $2.7 billion
on Aboriginal affairs, on Aboriginal policies-more than has ever been
spent by any government in this nation's history. There is still much
that we can do and still much that state governments can do to help
with the practical measures that improve the day-to-day lives of Indigenous
Australians, but, as we all know, many of those problems will not be
solved with money. You cannot continue to just throw money at the issue
without looking at some of the other measures ...

This government is committed to seeing
that every policy initiative is carried out to reconcile Indigenous
Australians and the broader community. Improvements are being made,
and the statistics that I gave to this chamber earlier indicate that.
We are making steps forward. There is a long way to go.^[23]

These statements have been reproduced here
at length to ensure that I have authentically represented the government's
position on the rate of progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage.

There are a number of notable features about
these statements. First, the government's position on reconciliation clearly
states that the ultimate test of success is whether the inequality experienced
by Indigenous peoples compared to non-Indigenous people is eliminated.
Despite this, in its claims to success above there is not a single reference
to progress in reducing the gaps that exist between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Australians.

The only reference by the Minister to this
inequality gap can be found in a press release dated 12 November 2003,
which comments on the release of the first national report on national
indicators for overcoming Indigenous disadvantage.^[24] The Minister stated: 'While there has been improvements in many key indicators,
greater rates of improvement for non-Indigenous people, tend to mask the
gains that have been made.' ^[25]

In my progress report on reconciliation
in the Social Justice Report 2002, I noted a tendency of the
government to misrepresent progress towards reconciliation through the
way that it presents statistics.^[26] This
statement by the Minister is a further example of this. Greater rates
of improvement in key indicators for non-Indigenous Australians do not
'mask the gains that have been made' for Indigenous people. Instead, they
indicate that the gains made have not been sufficient to reduce the level
of inequality or that improvements for Indigenous peoples are not keeping
pace with the rest of society. There is a substantial difference between
presenting information in this way and the way that it has been presented
by the government.

Second, there are significant omissions
in the indicators that the government presents as demonstrating 'real
improvement'. This is most obvious in relation to indicators of health
status, where the only achievement listed above is that the government
has 'substantially increased its spending on Indigenous-specific health
programs to record levels'. There are also no indicators cited relating
to contact with criminal justice processes or care and protection systems,
for example.

At no stage does the government state that
there are areas where the situation is not improving. The Minister's statement
above, for example, is unequivocal that 'the wellbeing of Indigenous people
is improving under this Government'. The only qualification, that there
is still a way to go, also does not admit lack of progress in key areas:
'While things are getting better, I am not saying everything is good or
that we can sit back and be complacent'. It is hardly a frank assessment
of the actual situation.

Third, some of the measures of success are
presented purely as raw numbers and as percentages of increases in raw
numbers (for example, 5566 Indigenous students enrolled in a bachelor's
level degree or higher degree course in 2002, 24.3 per cent more students
than in 1996). As noted above, the ABS cautions against such presentation
of statistics as they do not account for changes in the accuracy of data
collection or increased rates of identification of people as Indigenous.
This can result in the presentation of the level of progress being misleading.
Indeed, as discussed shortly, there are significant concerns being expressed
about poor rates of achievement by the government in education over the
past five years, particularly in relation to higher education.

Taking these factors into account, and examining
the statistics on Indigenous well-being from the different perspectives
listed above (namely, on the basis of absolute change in the situation
of Indigenous peoples; relative change compared to the non-Indigenous
population; and where available, international comparisons), it can be
seen that the claim of the government that 'the wellbeing of Indigenous
people is improving under this Government' cannot be verified across many
core areas of practical reconciliation. There are undoubtedly some areas
where improvements are being realised. Overall, however, there is no consistent
forward trend in improving the well-being of Indigenous peoples, and particularly
no forward trend towards a reduction in the disparity between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous Australians.

Appendix one of this report provides a statistical
profile of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population. It includes
information on the current status of Indigenous peoples on key measures
of socio-economic well-being including health status, employment, income,
education, housing, and contact with criminal justice and care and protection
systems. The main findings in the Appendix in terms of progress in addressing
Indigenous disadvantage across these areas are summarised below.

Of particular concern is the lack of achievement in relation
to improving the health status of Indigenous Australians. Appendix One
illustrates the following.

These figures indicate that there are clear
disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, and limited
progress in reducing these disparities across many key areas of socio-economic
status.

These findings are confirmed by significant
research published by the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research
(CAEPR) in late 2003. CAEPR released analysis by Professor Jon Altman
and Dr Boyd Hunter of 2001 Census data which sought to monitor progress
towards reconciliation by measuring absolute and relative changes in Indigenous
peoples' labour force status, income, housing, education and health over
the period 1991-2001.

As the authors of the study noted, for the
first time ever there was a relatively close correlation between the conduct
of the five-yearly national census and political cycles:

The change in government shortly before the 1996 Census
means that the 1996 data reflect the Labor legacy rather than the
effect of early policy initiatives of the new government. While arguably
there are various types of policy lags ... the second inter-censal period
(1996-2001) can be readily interpreted as the policy domain (and legacy)
of the Howard government. ^[27]

The research aimed to answer the following question:

How do the outcomes in the period 1991-1996, represented
by the Federal government and many conservative commentators as a
period when symbolic reconciliation was too dominant, compare with
those in the period 1996-2001 when a change in government saw greater
policy focus on practical reconciliation? ^[28]

The research concluded that in the period
1996-2001, labour force status for Indigenous people worsened relative
to the rest of the population when measured by labour force participation
rates, unemployment rates, the employment to population ratio, and rate
of full time employment. There was, however, a slight improvement in employment
of Indigenous people in the private sector. The authors expressed concern
about this general worsening in Indigenous labour force status as it moved
'against the trend for the rest of the population'.^[29] They noted:

Unemployment rates fell by less for the Indigenous population
than for other Australians, despite rapid economic growth over the
five year period and growth in numbers participating in the CDEP scheme.
There is little evidence of trickle down improving Indigenous economic
participation and reducing the significance of non-employment (welfare)
income. Given that low skilled workers are often the first to lose
work in an economic downturn, the lack of improvement is worrying,
especially if there is any significant deterioration in the Australian
and international economies in the near future. ^[30]

In terms of income, the research noted a
continued relative decline in income for Indigenous individuals, but a
slight improvement in the relativity in median family income between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous families. ^[31] In terms
of housing, the research also noted marginal improvements in the relativity
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people for both home ownership rates
and household size.

The research expressed significant concern
about the lack of improvement in relation to both health and education.
The authors expressed concern at the 'substantial inertia in Indigenous
health'^[32] as indicated in the lack of improvement
in relativities relating to life expectancy and proportion of the population
aged over 55 years. In relation to education, the research notes a slight
reduction in the disparity in the proportion of adults who have never
gone to school, but a worsening in the comparative rate of early school
leavers. There was a slight improvement in the proportion of Indigenous
adults with post-school qualifications, but a significant decline in the
comparative rate of Indigenous youth currently attending a tertiary institution.
The authors commented that:

it is an indictment of current education policy that
there was a large decline in the Indigenous to non-Indigenous ratio
between 1996 and 2001 ... future prospects for improved socio-economic
outcomes for the Indigenous population are not good when attendance
of Indigenous youth at tertiary institutions fell by 2.2 percentage
points ... Even in its own terms the government is failing in the education
arena. ^[33]

When these results are compared to the results
achieved by the previous government in the period from 1991-1996, the
research revealed that:

in absolute terms, it is difficult to differentiate
the performance of governments pre-1996 and post-1996. However, in relative
terms - that is when comparing the relative wellbeing of Indigenous
people as a whole with all other Australians - there is some disparity
between the periods, with the early period 1991-1996 clearly outperforming
the more recent period ...^[34] Of particular
concern was relative decline over the period in educational and health
status. ^[35]

As a consequence, the authors offered the
following appraisal of the achievements of practical reconciliation in
addressing Indigenous disadvantage:

Despite the policy rhetoric of three Howard governments,
there is no statistical evidence that their policies and programs are
delivering better outcomes for Indigenous Australians, at the national
level, than those of their political predecessors ...^[36] It is of particular concern that some of the relative gains made between
1991 and 1996 appear to have been offset by the relative poor performance
of Indigenous outcomes between 1996 and 2001^[37] ...
This intractability is worrying in part because it is evident during
a time when (in) Australia the macro-economy is growing rapidly. This
suggests, in turn, that problems are deeply entrenched - it is not just
a matter of choosing between practical and symbolic reconciliation. ^[38]

There is one further issue of grave concern
relating to progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage. As CAEPR note:

A major problem for both Indigenous Australians and
the nation is that other research suggests that the situation described
using the latest 2001 Census statistics is likely to get worse, rather
than better, over the next decade. ^[39]

This is due to the demographic characteristics
of the Indigenous population. As I noted in the Social Justice Report
2002, there is 'a well-documented, emerging crisis facing Indigenous
policy design'. Not only is the Indigenous population growing at a faster
rate than the non-Indigenous population (2.3 per cent compared to 1.2
per cent annually), but the Indigenous population's median age is younger
(20 years compared to 35 years) and nearly twice as many Indigenous compared
to non-Indigenous people are under 15 years of age (almost 40 per cent
compared to just over 20 per cent). Similarly, only 2.8% of the Indigenous
population are aged over 65 compared to 12.5% of the non-Indigenous population. ^[40] The consequence of this age structure
and rate of population growth is that there will be a significant increase
in the number of Indigenous people entering the age group where they will
be seeking employment.

Based in this demographic profile, research
by CAEPR forecasts that there will be a further widening of the disparity
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous employment rates over the next decade:

Because the rate of employment growth is anticipated
to be slower than population growth, the overall employment rate is
expected to fall from 40 per cent to 36 per cent over the projection
period (2001-2011). Assuming no change in the labour force participation
rate, the reverse side of this equation will see unemployment numbers
rise from an estimated 32,808 in 2001 to 58,565 by 2011, with a consequent
increase in the unemployment rate from 22.5% to almost 31% of those
in the labour force.

These projections point clearly to a worsening in the
labour force status of Indigenous adults. Moreover it should be noted
that they are based on the inclusion of working CDEP scheme participants
in the estimates of persons employed. If these were excluded, and
instead counted as unemployed ... then predicted labour market outcomes
for Indigenous people would become far worse, with an unemployment
rate of 43 per cent rising to 50 per cent... ^[41]

It is worth recalling that the equivalent rates for
the rest of the Australian population are presently around 6.0 per
cent for unemployment ... these are likely to remain relatively unchanged ...
The medium term prognosis, then, all other things being equal, is
for a substantial worsening of the overall labour force status of
Indigenous people both relatively and absolutely. ^[42]

These figures from CAEPR update analysis
that they conducted in 1997 and 1998 into the likely growth in employment
disparity for Indigenous peoples. ^[43] Consequently,
the government has been aware of the likelihood of deterioration in employment
status for Indigenous peoples since at least 1997. The absence of benchmarks
and an action plan to address this potential situation is a serious omission
from the 'practical reconciliation' agenda.

These projected high rates of Indigenous
unemployment and low rates of Indigenous participation in the labour force
have impacts not only on the overall financial wellbeing of Indigenous
individuals and communities, but it also has major direct impacts on the
Australian economy at large. For example, CAEPR estimates the cost of
the current level of Indigenous employment (including unemployment, underemployment,
CDEP participation and discouraged workers) to be approximately $700 million
in total foregone tax revenue. ^[44] CAEPR
have made the following projections for the situation over the decade
to 2011:

If Indigenous unemployment was reduced to a level commensurate
with the rest of the population, and assuming that this latter rate
remained constant, then the savings to government in payments to the
unemployed, in real terms, would be $328 million in 2006 and $450
million in 2011. On the credit side, if all those formerly unemployed
were to gain mainstream employment (excluding CDEP scheme employees)
with an annual income equivalent ... [similar to reported income of non-CDEP
employees in 1994] ... then the estimated tax return to government would
approximate $211 million and $290 million in 2006 and 2011 respectively.

These estimates are conservative because they hold the
Indigenous participation rate at their 2001 levels. If all the Indigenous
people outside the labour force who wanted jobs found them, then the
government would save an additional $416 million in 2006 and $472
million in 2011 on government payments. That is, the additional welfare
cost of not finding work for discouraged workers is even greater than
that for the unemployed. The cost of lost tax revenue from discouraged
workers will be as much as $345 million by 2011. ^[45]

CAEPR have summarised this situation as
follows: 'the current fiscal cost of this failure to eradicate Indigenous
employment disparity is massive - in 2001, it was estimated to be around
0.5 per cent of Australian GDP. Findings from this new analysis indicate
that the cost will be even higher in the future.' ^[46]

Overall, the statistics across key areas
of Indigenous disadvantage for the past five years indicate that there
is no consistent forward trend in reducing the extent of disadvantage
experienced by Indigenous peoples, and limited progress in eradicating
the disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. There
is some evidence that in relation to key measures, this situation may
deteriorate further in the coming decade. The outcomes being achieved
by governments are not adequate on any measure of success and despite
the investment of significant resources by governments. This situation
needs to change.

c) Implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian
Governments

An area where there has been significant
progress in advancing the reconciliation process over the past year is
the efforts of governments, lead by the federal government, in implementing
the commitments made by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) towards
reconciliation.

In its communique of 3 November 2000, COAG
agreed to take a leading role in driving change to address Indigenous
disadvantage. COAG agreed to focus on three priority areas: community
leadership; reviewing and re-engineering programs and services to support
families, children and young people; and forging links between the business
sector and indigenous communities to promote economic independence. As
part of this process, Ministerial Councils were to develop 'action plans,
performance reporting strategies and benchmarks' with COAG to review progress
regularly.

In its communique of 5 April 2002, COAG
agreed to conduct a number of whole-of-government community trials across
Australia and to commission an annual reporting framework on key indicators
of Indigenous disadvantage. This reporting framework had its genesis in
the efforts of the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs in progressing COAG's communique of November 2000.

This section reviews developments in relation
to the disadvantage reporting framework, COAG trials and Ministerial action
plans over 2003.

i) Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage - Annual
report against key indicators

In his capacity as Chairman of COAG, the
Prime Minister wrote to the Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State
Service Provision^[47] on 3 May 2002 to request
the Committee to develop a framework for reporting to COAG against key
indicators of indigenous disadvantage. COAG had agreed to the production
of such a regular report at its April 2002 meeting.

The Steering Committee developed a draft
reporting framework in 2002 and consulted with Indigenous organisations
and governments about it in 2002 and 2003. This draft framework was the
subject of a workshop convened by the Social Justice Commissioner in November
2002, and was discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the Social Justice
Report 2002.

On 22 August 2003, the Prime Minister wrote
to the Steering Committee on behalf of COAG to formally endorse the Committee's
proposed framework for reporting progress in addressing indigenous disadvantage.
The finalised framework is reproduced in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 - COAG Framework for reporting on Indigenous
disadvantage

Click
here to view a larger version of this figure.

COAG and the Prime Minister nominated two
core objectives for the Report: namely, to identify indicators that 'are
of relevance to all governments and indigenous stakeholders' and 'demonstrate
the impact of programme and policy interventions'. ^[48]

As the Chair of the Steering Committee has stated about
the report:

The ... commissioning (of this report by COAG) demonstrates
a new resolve, at the highest political level, not only to tackle
the root causes of Indigenous disadvantage, but also to monitor the
outcomes in a systematic way that crosses jurisdictional and portfolio
boundaries. In doing so, the Report will henceforth also raise the
transparency of government's performance.

This report's purpose, therefore, is to be more than
just another collection of data. It seeks to document outcomes for
Indigenous people within a framework that has both an agreed vision of what life should be for Indigenous people and a strategic focus on key areas that need to be targeted if that longer term vision is
to be realised. ^[49]

The vision of the reporting framework
is that 'Indigenous people will one day enjoy the same overall standard
of living as other Australians. They will be as healthy, live as long,
and participate fully in the social and economic life of the nation.' ^[50] This vision is encapsulated in the three,
inter-related priority outcomes of the reporting framework, namely:

• Safe, healthy and supportive family environments with
  strong communities and cultural identity;
• Positive child development and prevention of violence,
  crime and self-harm;
• Improved wealth creation and economic sustainability
  for individuals, families and communities. ^[51]

The report also seeks to present the statistics
within a strategic framework. There are two key features to this
framework. First, it seeks to report on Indigenous disadvantage on a holistic
and whole-of-government basis. As the Committee has explained:

[T]he report is predicated on the view that achieving
improvements in the wellbeing of Indigenous Australians in a particular
area will generally require the involvement of more than one government
agency, and that improvements will need preventative policy actions
on a whole-of-government basis ...^[52]

Without detracting from the importance of individual
agencies being responsible and accountable for the services they deliver,
the structure of this Report seeks to facilitate interaction between
sectors and between governments on programs that are delivered to Indigenous
people. Furthermore, it can assist agencies to consider how they can
strategically develop programs which have the capacity to deliver outcomes
outside of their traditional sphere of action. ^[53]

A recurring theme of the framework is acknowledgement
that areas such as health, education, employment, housing, crime and so
on are inextricably linked. Disadvantage or involvement in any of these
areas can have serious impacts on other areas of well-being. Acknowledgement
of, and action based on, these interconnections is therefore critical
in assisting COAG to inform policy development with respect to Indigenous
peoples.

Second, the framework is premised on a realisation
that there are a range of causative factors for Indigenous disadvantage.
This necessitates reporting on progress in addressing both the larger,
cumulative indicators (such as life expectancy, unemployment and contact
with criminal justice processes) which reflect the consequences of a number
of contributing factors, as well as identifying progress in improving
these smaller, more individualised factors.

To reflect these strategic considerations,
the framework seeks to present progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage
at two levels. The first level is a series of twelve 'headline indicators'
that provide a snapshot of the overall state of Indigenous disadvantage.
The twelve indicators are:

• Life expectancy at birth;
• Rates of disability and/or core activity restriction;
• Years 10 and 12 retention and attainment;
• Labour force participation and unemployment;
• Household and individual income;
• Home ownership;
• Suicide and self-harm;
• Substantiated child protection notifications;
• Deaths from homicide and hospitalisations for assault;
• Victim rates for crime; and
• Imprisonment and juvenile detention rates.

These 'headline indicators' are measures
of the major social and economic factors that need to be improved if COAG's
vision of an improved standard of living for Indigenous peoples is to
become reality. But as the Chairman of the Steering Committee notes, these
headline indicators:

reflect desired longer term outcomes and therefore
are themselves only likely to change gradually. Because most of the
measures are at such a high level and have long lead times (eg life
expectancy) they do not provide a sufficient focus for policy action
and are only blunt indicators of policy performance.

Indeed, reporting at the 'headline' level alone can
make the policy challenges appear overwhelming. The problems observed
at this level are generally the end result of a chain of contributing
factors, some of which may be of long standing. These causal factors
almost never fall neatly within the purview of a single agency of government,
or indeed a single government. ^[54]

Hence, the Steering Committee has devised
a second level of reporting which breaks down these broader, longer term
measures. The Committee has identified seven 'strategic areas for action'
and a number of supporting 'strategic change indicators' to measure progress
in these. The particular areas and change indicators have been chosen
for their 'potential to respond to policy action within the shorter term ...
(and to indicate) intermediate measures of progress'^[55] while also having the potential in the longer term to contribute to improvements
in overall Indigenous disadvantage (as reflected through the 'headline
indicators'). ^[56] The seven strategic areas
and related indicators are set out in the following table.

Table 1: COAG Overcoming Disadvantage framework:
Strategic areas for action and strategic change indicators^[57]

The Steering Committee published its first
report against this framework, titled Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage
- Key Indicators 2003, in November 2003. The report confirms that
Indigenous disadvantage is broadly based, with major disparities between
Indigenous and other Australian in most areas. As the Chairman of the
Steering Committee has commented on the findings of the report:

[The report] confirms the pervasiveness of Indigenous
disadvantage. It is distressingly apparent that many years of policy
effort have not delivered desired outcomes; indeed in some important
respects the circumstances of Indigenous people appear to have deteriorated
or regressed. Worse than that, outcomes in the strategic areas identified
as critical to overcoming disadvantage in the long term remain well
short of what is needed. ^[58]

The presentation of information within the
strategic areas also highlights the inter-related nature of the challenges
faced in improving Indigenous well-being. As the Chairman of the Committee
notes, 'in the three strategic areas that focus on young Indigenous people,
the potential for cumulative disadvantage is plain to see.' ^[59] The presentation of what are generally well known statistics in this way
under the strategic areas of action 'are not rocket science'^[60] but the ability to highlight cumulative disadvantage factors is a significant
breakthrough which should assist policy making in relation to Indigenous
peoples.

There are, however, two main issues relating
to the framework which have a bearing on how influential it will be in
promoting change to policy and program approaches by governments and ultimately
in improving the well-being of Indigenous peoples.

First, a critical issue for the reporting
framework is the availability of adequate and regular data. The Social
Justice Report 2000 identified limitations in data collection as
a critical problem that must be addressed in order to ensure government
accountability for progress towards reconciliation. ^[61] This has been an issue that the Steering Committee has had to grapple
with in establishing the framework and in reporting against it.

The Committee has noted that the existence
of data sets or ease of developing them was a practical consideration
that influenced the choice of indicators in the framework:

In many cases, the selected indicators are a compromise,
due not only to the absence of data, but also to the unlikelihood of
any data becoming available in the foreseeable future ... In some cases,
however, an indicator has been included even when the data are not available
on a national basis, or are substantially qualified. These are indicators
where there is some likelihood that data quality and availability will
improve over time. In two cases where there were no reliable data available,
the indicators were nevertheless considered to be so important that
qualitative indicators have been included in the report. ^[62]

In reporting against each of the headline
indicators and strategic change indicators in the first report, the Steering
Committee has noted limitations in data availability and quality. Each
chapter of the report contains a section titled 'future directions in
data' which notes current developments which will contribute to addressing
the difficulties in data availability and quality in future years, and
how exactly specific initiatives will do this. It also identifies major
deficiencies and areas where there is an urgent and outstanding need for
improved statistical collection methods. ^[63]

I envisage that in future years the Committee
is also going to face additional issues relating to the regularity of
data availability and hence the ability to report progress over time.
In this regard, I have previously recommended that the Indigenous General
Social Survey (IGSS) should be conducted on a triennial basis, alongside
the General Social Survey, to ensure the regularity of comparable data
on the unique issues covered in that survey. Currently, the IGSS is intended
to occur every 6 years, with the results of the first IGSS conducted in
2002 due to be released in early 2004.

On the positive side, it was announced in
the federal budget for 2003 that a national longitudinal study on Indigenous
children will be conducted. This study will track the development of 4,000
Indigenous children over a nine year period and will be a rich source
of ongoing data for the Steering Committee. The study, however, is not
due to commence until at least 2005 in order for extensive consultations
to be conducted with Indigenous peoples and communities prior to its introduction.

There may also be issues in future years
relating to the ability to disaggregate available data from the national
and state or territory level, down to a regional level.

It is critical that the recommendations
and suggestions of the Steering Committee in relation to improved data
collection are addressed as a matter of urgency in order to ensure that
the reporting framework is able to fully realise its potential and to
be viable into the longer term. As the Chairman of the Steering Committee
notes:

[the] immediate contribution [of the report] is constrained
by serious gaps and deficiencies in data. For example, we know that
hearing impediments in young children can seriously undermine their
ability to succeed at school, yet we have little basis for knowing whether
this problem is getting better or worse. We know that attendance at
school is critical to lifelong achievement, but we have inadequate data
to monitor it. Substance abuse is blighting young lives, but we have
little systematic information on it. Data on the extent of disabilities
among Indigenous people is almost non-existent. The Review documents
these and a range of other data priorities that will need to be addressed
if the Report is to realise its potential and meet COAG's needs. ^[64]

In producing this report I am mandated to
make recommendations on actions which should be taken to secure the enjoyment
and exercise of the rights of Indigenous peoples. In light of the crucial
nature of this issue, I have chosen to make the following recommendation
about improving data collection in the context of the Steering Committee's
report.

The second main issue that impacts on the
potential of the Steering Committee's report is how it is incorporated
into policy design and programmes across governments and between government
departments. As the Chairman of the Steering Committee notes:

The Report's contribution to this important national
endeavour is essentially informational. It does not (and
cannot) in itself provide policy answers. But it can (and hopefully
will) help governments and Indigenous people to identify where programs
need to deliver results, and to assess whether they are succeeding.
For it to be effective in this, it will be important that governments
integrate elements of the reporting framework into their policy development
and evaluation processes. ^[65]

This is the most critical issue relating
to the report - ultimately it does not matter how refined the statistics
that are reported are if the report is not utilised by governments to
inform and change the way they go about delivering services to Indigenous
peoples.

In the Social Justice Report 2002, I expressed the concern that the Steering Committee's framework 'currently
exists in isolation from any other form of performance monitoring, particularly
on identifying progress on important goals such as capacity building and
governance reform, as well as identifying the unmet need and accordingly
whether policy approaches are moving forward or in fact regressing.' ^[66] If the reporting framework is not integrated into policy development then
the Steering Committee's report risks becoming, in the words of the Chairman
of the Steering Committee, 'an annual misery index'^[67] which simply reminds us on an annual basis of continuing Indigenous disadvantage
without action to change this situation.

At this stage, it is not clear how the report
will inform policy development and how governments will use the report
to review their approach to Indigenous issues. This is in part because
COAG has not yet formally considered and responded to the first report
of the Steering Committee. It is anticipated that further guidance will
be provided when COAG next meets.

It is clear, however, that the other two
main activities of COAG relating to reconciliation have a vital role to
play in drawing lessons from the reporting framework and connecting the
framework to day to day policy development processes. As the Chairman
of the Steering Committee has noted:

One important national vehicle for this is the Action
Plans that are being developed by Ministerial Councils in such areas
as health, education, employment, justice and small business. The
whole-of-government, outcomes orientation of the framework also complements
the coordinated service delivery trials in eight different regions
across Australia that was initiated by COAG. ^[68]

It is notable that when developing the framework
for reporting it was debated whether there should be a third level of
indicators added to the framework which could report on service delivery.
Ultimately, this was seen as a role for the Ministerial Council action
plans, which are intended to link service delivery with the reporting
framework. These action plans form the vital link in drawing lessons from
the reporting framework. Progress in developing these action plans is
discussed in the next section of this report.

Overall, as I noted in the Social Justice
Report 2002, the Steering Committee's framework is a 'significant
institutional development in measuring progress for Indigenous peoples'
and the 'only positive form of monitoring and evaluation that the Government
has provided for practical reconciliation'.^[69]

The endorsement of the framework by COAG
in August 2003 and the production of the first report by the Steering
Committee in November 2003 are both substantial achievements. And as the
Chairman of the Steering Committee has stated, one of the most significant
contributions of the reporting framework is that it 'challenges us to
do better. It also vindicates COAG's decision to give new impetus to the
development and coordination of Indigenous policies and programs.' ^[70]

ii) Developing Ministerial Council action plans
and benchmarks

The COAG Communique on reconciliation of
3 November 2000 commits to an integrated framework for addressing Indigenous
disadvantage. As the former Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
and Indigenous Affairs notes:

Under the aegis of the Framework to Advance Reconciliation
agreed by the Council of Australian Government s(COAG) in November
2000, all Australian governments are collectively establishing a comprehensive
regime of performance monitoring and reporting that supports (the
government's) overarching performance benchmark and objective of...
a society where Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples enjoy
comparable standards of social and economic wellbeing to those of
the wider community, especially in the areas of education, health,
employment, and law and justice, while maintaining their unique cultural
identities ...

This regime has two key elements:

• regular national report on Indigenous disadvantage;
  and
• a series of sectoral performance monitoring strategies
  and benchmarks oversighted by the responsible Commonwealth/State Ministerial
  Council.

The purpose of this regime is to enable
governments, community organisations, indigenous people and other Australians
to monitor progress of the nation in overcoming Indigenous disadvantage.
The regime is still in its development phase and the government anticipates
that it will be firmly in place by the third quarter in 2003. ^[71]

Each Ministerial Council is to develop action
plans, performance reporting strategies and benchmarks for addressing
Indigenous disadvantage. In its action plan, the Ministerial Council on
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (MCATSIA) resolved to review
all of the other Ministerial Council action plans, performance reporting
strategies and benchmarks in order to identify gaps to COAG and comment
on those gaps. ^[72] Progress under the action
plans would then be regularly reviewed by COAG.

The COAG communique of 5 April 2002 admits
that progress by the Ministerial Councils in developing action plans and
benchmarks in the year and a half after this commitment was made has been
'slower than expected'.^[73] The communique
indicates that COAG will continue to review progress and that a report
on the state of the action plans would be submitted by MCATSIA to COAG
for consideration no later than the end of 2003.

In his submission to the Senate Legal and
Constitutional References Committee inquiry into national progress towards
reconciliation, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs noted that MCATSIA had provided its initial report of comments
on the action plans to the Prime Minister (in his role as the Chair of
COAG) in June 2003. ^[74] At the time of writing,
MCATSIA's report had not been made public and a number of action plans
were still not finalised. It has now been three years since COAG agreed
to the production of these action plans and benchmarks.

The federal government noted in November
2002 that:

Already a number of Ministerial Councils have performance
monitoring strategies and benchmarks in place. A leading example is
the annual performance report against the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander health indicators. Other ministerial councils also have specific
data agreements that will support the development of performance monitoring
strategies and benchmarks. ^[75]

The government noted that the following
Ministerial Councils have, or had prior to COAG's decision in 2000, developed
action plans:

• Community Services Ministers Conference;
• Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources;
• Australian Transport Council;
• Sport and Recreation Ministerial Council;
• Standing Committee of Attorneys-General;
• The Online Council;
• Primary Industries Ministerial Council;
• Ministerial Council for Education, Employment, Training
  and Youth Affairs;
• Australian Health Ministers Conference;
• Cultural Ministers Conference;
• Housing Ministers Conference; and
• Small Business Ministerial Council. ^[76]

Examples of Ministerial Council action plans,
performance reporting strategies and benchmarks include the following:

Community services and juvenile
justice: The central aspect of the community services
action plan is the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Community
Services Information Plan. This implements the report Principles
and Standards for Community Services Indigenous Population Data and aims to improve data collection across this sector, with a key focus
on child protection and welfare, juvenile justice, the Supported Accommodation
Assistance Scheme and agencies funded under the Commonwealth / State
Disability Agreement.

Housing: In
2001, state and territory Housing Ministers and relevant federal Ministers
committed to new directions in housing through Building a better
future: Indigenous Housing to 2010.^[77] An agreement on national housing information was also signed by all
jurisdictions in 1999. All jurisdictions have agreed to a performance
monitoring system through improving the availability of reliable data;
developing reporting systems which will enable performance appraisal
at the national, state / territory and regional levels; and reporting
annually to relevant ministers at the federal and state/territory level
against outcomes identified in Building a better future. A
reporting framework has also been developed by ATSIC and the Department
of Family and Community Services to facilitate this performance reporting.

Employment: Indigenous specific employment data is collected at the federal level.
Quarterly reports of outcomes data are published by the Department of
Workplace Relations.

Justice related areas: The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General have agreed to performance
indicators in five areas, namely prevent crime and community safety;
improve access to justice related services; improved access to bail;
improved access to diversionary schemes; and enhanced participation
of Indigenous peoples in justice administration systems.

Health: Processes
have been in place since 1998 for reporting on national performance
indicators, although 'data required to report on some indicators are
either unavailable, of poor quality, or require substantial development'.^[78] Indigenous health care agreements with the states and the Commonwealth/State
Australian Health Care Agreements also have requirements relating to
data collection. The National Strategic Framework for Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Health was endorsed by health ministers
in July 2003. It includes reporting on three 'key result areas' which
relate largely to reforming the structure of the health system to increase
its accessibility to Indigenous people.

Education: The
Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs
(MCEETYA) has agreed on national performance indicators for all students
(not just Indigenous). The main measures are national literacy and numeracy
benchmarks for years 3 and 5 (with benchmarks for year 7 still under
development). The objective is that all students meet the standards.
Under the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Education Policy
(NATSIEP), all governments have made commitments 'to bring about equity
in education for Indigenous Australians'.^[79] The main goals of the policy are improved Indigenous participation in
educational decision-making; equality of access to education services;
equity of educational participation; and equitable and appropriate educational
outcomes. These goals are enshrined in the Indigenous Education
(Targeted Assistance) Act 2000 (Cth).

One of the main federal programs under the NATSEIP
is the Indigenous Education Strategic Initiatives Programme (IESIP).
IESIP funding is provided on a quadrennial basis and States/Territories
are required to acquit the spending of IESIP funds against negotiated
indicators which include numeracy and literacy, Indigenous workforce,
retention rates and attrition. Service providers are required to submit
annual reports against annual targets. This information is tabled,
along with progress in addressing other performance indicators, in
Parliament through the National Report to Parliament on Indigenous
Education and Training by the federal Department of Education
Science and Training. The first report was tabled in 2002. Programs
under the IESIP, such as the National Indigenous English Literacy
and Numeracy Strategy, also have targets for improving literacy and
numeracy rates of Indigenous people to levels comparable to other
Australians. ^[80]

The federal government admits that these
action plans 'vary in their sophistication'.^[81] In fact, many of these action plans are rudimentary in scope and deal
almost exclusively with data collection and performance monitoring issues.
Very few have any benchmarks or targets.

The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation
defined a 'benchmark' as 'an agreed standard or target that reflects the
community aspirations that either have been met or are desirable to be
met'.^[82]

Benchmarking is a critical aspect of ensuring
human rights compliance and accountability. This is in accordance with
the guiding principle of 'progressive realisation' under international
human rights law (and as reflected in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). The Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights and United Nations Development Programme has explained
this obligation as follows:

The idea of progressive realization has
two major strategic implications. First, it allows for a time dimension
in the strategy for human rights fulfilment by recognizing that full
realization of human rights may have to occur in a progressive manner
over a period of time. Second, it allows for setting priorities among
different rights at any point in time since the constraint of resources
may not permit a strategy to pursue all rights simultaneously with equal
vigour ...

The recognition of a time dimension is
accompanied by certain conditions aimed at ensuring that the State does
not take it as a licence either to defer or to relax the efforts needed
to realize human rights. In particular, the State is required to do
the following.

First, the State must acknowledge that
with a serious commitment to poverty reduction it may be possible to
make rapid progress towards the realization of many human rights even
within the existing resource constraint ... Second, to the extent that
the realization of human rights may be contingent on a gradual expansion
in the availability of resources, the State must begin immediately to
take steps to fulfil the rights as expeditiously as possible by developing
and implementing a time-bound plan of action. The plan must spell out
when and how the State hopes to arrive at the realization of rights.

Third, the plan must include a series
of intermediate - preferably annual - targets. As the realization of
human rights may take some considerable time, possibly extending well
beyond the immediate term of a Government in power, it is with regard
to these intermediate targets (or benchmarks) rather than the final
target of full realization that the State will have to be held accountable.

Fourth, as a prerequisite of setting targets,
the State will have to identify some indicators in terms of which targets
will be set... Realistic time-bound targets will have to be set in relation
to each indicator so as to serve as benchmarks.^[83]

The Social Justice Report 2000 described the key attributes of a benchmark as that it is:

• specific, time bound and verifiable;
• set with the participation of the people whose rights
  are affected, to agree on what is an adequate rate of progress and to
  prevent the target from being set too low; and
• re-assessed independently at their target date, with
  accountability for performance.^[84]

In relation to benchmarking, the Council
for Aboriginal Reconciliation's national strategy to overcome Indigenous
disadvantage also recommended that governments and ATSIC:

• set national, state, territory and regional outcomes
  and output benchmarks that are measurable, include time-lines and are
  agreed in partnership with Indigenous peoples and communities;
• ensure that they have appropriate methods to enable accurate
  and consistent output and outcome reporting for mainstream and Indigenous
  specific programs; and
• publicly and annually present an outputs and outcomes
  based report to their parliaments, on a whole-of-government basis, against
  these agreed benchmarks. ^[85]

Even the most sophisticated of these action
plans, in education, does not meet the attributes necessary for adequate
benchmarking. Like the Steering Committee's framework, a target of statistical
equality between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians can be implied
into some of these action plans. But the establishment of benchmarks requires
more than the identification of this ultimate goal. It requires an identification
of an agreed rate of progress towards this goal, within a short, medium
and longer term context, and an evaluation of issues relating to the prioritisation,
resourcing and re-engineering of programs and services that will be needed
in order to achieve this. The action plans and strategies adopted at the
inter-governmental level to date do not contain critical elements for
benchmarking.

The absence of appropriate benchmarks is
perhaps the most significant failure of governments in implementing practical
reconciliation since the year 2000. On this basis, I make the following
recommendations to improve government accountability for reconciliation.

iii) The COAG whole-of-government community trials

In its communique of 5 April 2002, COAG
agreed to trial a whole-of-government cooperative approach in up to ten
communities or regions of Australia. It was subsequently decided that
there will be eight trial sites, one in each state or territory of Australia.
The eight trial sites are:

• Murdi Paaki region (New South Wales);
• Wadeye (Northern Territory);
• Shepparton (Victoria);
• Cape York (Queensland);
• Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (South Australia);
• Northern Tasmania;
• East Kimberley region (Western Australia); and
• The Australian Capital Territory.

Appendix two of this report provides a detailed
overview of the trials, the mechanisms that have been put into place for
inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination, monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms for the trials, as well as progress in each of the trial sites.

The COAG Communique of April 2002 recognised
that outcomes and management processes in Indigenous policy and service
delivery need to be improved. The COAG initiative is intended to trial
a different approach as current and past approaches have not achieved
the desired outcomes. As the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce
notes:

Many people are saying that the relationship
between the community and the governments has got to change. It is clear
that some of the ways that governments and communities approach their
responsibilities needs to be done differently if we are going to move
forward together.

Recently, Commonwealth and State and Territory
governments have agreed to improve their approach. They have agreed
to work together .... And they have agreed to work in partnership with
Indigenous communities to support them find and manage sustainable solutions
to local problems. This means government have agreed to learn new ways
of doing business with Indigenous communities. ^[86]

It is intended that the trials will be flexible
in approach in order to reflect the specific needs of each community trial
site, to build on existing initiatives and to improve the compatibility
of the approaches currently undertaken by the federal and state or territory
governments in order to achieve better outcomes. COAG will be looking
for transferable outcomes from the trials, to be applied more broadly
in service delivery to Indigenous peoples.^[87]

The objectives of the COAG trials are to:

• tailor government action to identified community needs
  and aspirations;
• coordinate government programmes and services where this
  will improve service delivery outcomes;
• encourage innovative approaches traversing new territory;
• cut through blockages and red tape to resolve issues
  quickly;
• work with Indigenous communities to build the capacity
  of people in those communities to negotiate as genuine partners with
  government;
• negotiate agreed outcomes, benchmarks for measuring progress
  and management of responsibilities for achieving those outcomes with
  the relevant people in Indigenous communities; and
• build the capacity of government employees to be able
  to meet the challenges of working in this new way with Indigenous communities. ^[88]

It is anticipated that the trials will encourage
governments to modify the way they conduct their program and service delivery
responsibilities, including by encouraging the pooling of funding, breaking
down internal administrative barriers and improving the way government
manages and awards contracts. ^[89]

Overall, the broader policy context for
the COAG trials is the federal government's emphasis on mutual obligation
and the responsibility of all players (government, communities, families
and individuals) to address issues of social and economic participation.
It is a continuation of the approach adopted by the government in its
welfare reform package as well as through practical reconciliation.^[90]

The philosophy that underpins the trials
is 'shared responsibility - shared future'. The ICCT has stated that the
'Shared Responsibility approach will involve communities negotiating as
equal parties with government'^[91] and asserts
that the wellbeing of Indigenous communities is shared by individuals,
families, communities and government. All parties must work together and
build their capacity to support a different approach for the economic,
social and cultural development of Indigenous peoples. This partnership
approach is formalised in each trial site through the negotiation of a Shared Responsibility Agreement (SRA) between governments and
Indigenous peoples.

The Minister for Immigration, Multicultural
and Indigenous Affairs has overall federal responsibility for the trials.
A federal government department is also identified for each trial site
to lead the federal government's involvement in that particular trial.
It is then responsible for coordinating all federal government input into
the trial.

Federal government involvement in the trial
is also coordinated through three main processes. First, meetings are
held every three to four months by federal Ministers with program responsibilities
for Indigenous affairs. Second, monthly meetings are held of federal government
departmental secretaries (the Secretaries Group). Third, a coordinating
taskforce (known as the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce
or ICCT) has been established, located within the Department of Immigration,
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) to implement the directives
of these groups. The ICCT is comprised of senior officers seconded from
each of the government departments participating in the trials.

As demonstrated by the descriptions of current
progress in the eight trial sites in Appendix Two, there are significant
differences between the selected sites. These differences include the
location of the trials (across urban, regional and remote areas), the
representative structures for involvement of Indigenous peoples and communities
(varying from heavy involvement of ATSIC Regional Council structures through
to traditional governance models), and the priority areas for action identified
in each site.

While the trials remain in the preliminary
stages of development, rapid progress has been made during 2003. At this
initial stage, this progress has involved the selection of appropriate
trial sites and consultations with Indigenous communities in those sites
to determine their willingness to participate in the trials and the key
issues that the trials will focus on. For three of the sites, Shared Responsibility
Agreements have also been finalised.

In meetings and correspondence about the
trials, I have noticed an air of enthusiasm and optimism among government
departments about the potential of the trials. Government departments
are embracing the challenge to re-learn how to interact with and deliver
services to Indigenous peoples. There are no illusions among government
departments that the trials are as much about building the capacity of
governments as they are about building the capacity of Indigenous communities.

Through the active involvement of Ministers
and secretaries of federal departments in the trials, a clear message
is being sent through mainstream federal departments that these trials
matter and that government is serious about improving outcomes for Indigenous
peoples. Even at this preliminary stage, this is a significant achievement
for the trials. ATSIC have stated that to date 'there has been clear success
through improved relationships across governments at trial sites'.^[92]

Governments have not turned up in Indigenous
communities with pre-determined priorities and approaches. This has been
of great symbolic value. The ICCT has noted that much of the initial stages
have involved building up trust between governments and Indigenous peoples.
This has in turn had an impact on relationships within Indigenous communities
in some of the trial sites, with an increased focus from Indigenous communities
on organising themselves in ways that facilitate dialogue with governments.^[93]

It is too early to determine whether the
trials will have a positive impact in improving government service delivery
to communities in each trial region in the longer term or whether transferable
lessons will be learnt which are able to more broadly benefit other Indigenous
communities. At this stage, I have the following observations and concerns
about the conduct of the trials and their potential.

First, it appears that the Indigenous Communities
Coordination Taskforce is inadequately funded and supported to complete
its ever-expanding role in coordinating federal government involvement
in the trials.

As the trials have progressed, the ICCT
has become an integral, indeed the central, coordinating agency for the
trials. While the day to day operation of governmental activities in each
of the trial sites is the responsibility of the respective lead federal
government agencies, the ICCT has taken on a vital role in oversighting
developments in each trial. This has allowed lessons from individual trial
sites to be applied to other trial sites and ensured a level of consistency
in the approach of different federal agencies to the trials.

Examples of how the ICCT has fulfilled this
role is the development of a template Shared Responsibility Agreement
from which negotiations can commence in each trial site (and be customised
to local circumstances), the development of a information database on
the indicators for each trial, and a performance and monitoring framework
for the trials. The role of the ICCT continues to evolve, and expand,
as the trials develop.

At present, the federal government appears
to be equivocal as to the longer term future of the ICCT. It is not clear
that the ICCT will exist for the full five years of the trials and if
it does, in what form.

This uncertainty is compounded by the recommendations
of the report of the ATSIC Review team. While the review does not explicitly
consider the role of the ICCT, it recommends that the Office of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (currently located within DIMIA) be
replaced by a small office within the Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet to provide a whole of government approach to Indigenous issues.^[94] The proposed roles of this group would include progressing COAG initiatives,
achieving the cooperation of all spheres of government in addressing Indigenous
needs and achieving whole of government approaches to addressing Indigenous
needs. ^[95] These are roles that the ICCT
fulfils specifically in relation to the COAG trials. It is not clear whether
implementation of this recommendation would involve disbanding or substituting
the role of the ICCT.

Related to this uncertainty in the future
of the ICCT for the full five year period are uncertainties in staffing
of the ICCT. It is my clear impression that the ICCT is understaffed to
complete the large task that it has been set. In part this is because
the role of the ICCT has evolved and expanded as the trials have developed.
It is understandable that no one envisaged the full extent of the resources
required to implement the trials, nor the central role that the ICCT would
assume in the trials.

There is a clear need for the Commonwealth
to commit to the existence of the ICCT for the full five years of the
COAG trials and to increase staffing levels to ensure that the ICCT is
able to be fully responsive and continue to make high quality contributions
to the COAG trials. I note that, currently, officers are placed in the
ICCT's Secretariat from a variety of federal departments who are participating
in the trials. The costs of these officers are met by the participating
departments as a contribution to the trials. It is feasible that the cost
of expanding the number of staff on the ICCT, perhaps by doubling it,
could easily be absorbed within existing departmental budgets.

From discussions with the ICCT, it was noted
that despite the eight trial sites having already been announced, they
continue to receive requests from other departments as to whether there
will be an expansion of the trials beyond the eight sites or for assistance
and advice in new initiatives that these departments are considering.
An increased staffing capacity would contribute greatly to the ability
of the ICCT to provide advice and assistance more generally on approaches
to improving government coordination across government. The cost of this
increased capacity would be insubstantial, particularly in light of the
potential for transferring the lessons learnt from the trials more broadly
across government.

On the basis of these concerns, I make the
following recommendations.

Second, there are concerns relating to the
use of the Flexible Funding Pool that has been established to support
the trials. This Funding Pool consists of $3million for each of the 2003-04
and 2004-05 years. The ICCT have explained the purpose of this funding
pool as follows:

The idea of this flexible funding pool was that it
would only be a short term mechanism to kick-start some whole of government
activity on the basis that the whole of government or joined-up activity
had to come from mainstream and big Indigenous specific programs already
in operation. The government was not trying to create a superficial
mechanism to take the place of joining up existing programs and services ...
The trials were not about new money. The COAG decision was actually
more about more effective use of existing government expenditure. ^[96]

There is no commitment to any funding pool
for the final two years of the trials. The ICCT expects that funding will
ultimately be provided in 'a more informal way'^[97] through the joining up of existing programs and changes to program approaches.
This is an important goal for the trials and a way of ensuring that the
outcomes of the trials are sustainable and able to be more broadly applied
to other Indigenous communities. There will, however, need to be close
attention paid in the implementation of the trials to the reality of this
goal and a degree of flexibility from the government to allocate funding
to the ICCT for the final two years of the trials should such funding
ultimately prove necessary.

ATSIC has expressed concern about how funding
from this Funding Pool is allocated. ^[98] They state:

Generally, proposals to use the Flexible Funding Pool
[FFP] are developed by Lead Agencies and should be consistent with
the relevant Regional Council plan. However, concerns remain regarding
the manner in which the requirement for FFP proposals take account
of, and are informed by, Regional Council plans. Greater engagement
of Regional Councils in the submission and evaluation of FFP proposals
will provide valuable opportunities to progress ATSIC's involvement
in the FFP process at a regional and national level. ^[99]

Third, there is concern from ATSIC that
it is not being sufficiently engaged in the trials. The matching of the
use of the Flexible Funding Pool with ATSIC Regional Council plans is
a specific example of this concern. More broadly, the acting Chairman
has stated that:

While the Commission believe that the most important
level of Indigenous engagement in this initiative is the local community,
it should be recognised that the Commission and ATSIC Regional Councils
have significant responsibilities to these particular communities
and, for this reason, have sought to improve their involvement in
the initiative. As the initiative has enormous relevance and potential
implications for all Indigenous communities across the country, the
Commission does not want its roles and responsibilities in this regard
overlooked or ignored. In particular, Commissioners are concerned
that Indigenous representation is both welcomed and supported especially
in political interaction at the most senior levels. ^[100]

The acting Chairman has noted that ATSIC-ATSIS
are considering ways to strengthen their engagement in the trials to promote
national discussions, informed by an Indigenous perspective, regarding
the utility of the trials. The acting Chairman identifies the following
issues as needing to be addressed:

• the fragmented involvement of Regional Councils in both
  the signing of Shared Responsibility Agreements and selection of trial
  sites;^[101]
• the status of relationships between Commissioners, ATSIC
  Regional Councils, ATSIS staff, Lead Agencies and the ICCT; and
• a lack of engagement of and by Regional Councils with
  Lead Agencies and other government partners. ^[102]

Fourth, it is not clear at this stage that
the performance monitoring framework for the trials will be sufficiently
rigorous. It is anticipated that the first two years of the trial will
be reviewed in mid-2004 and a further review conducted at the end of the
5 year trial phase. It is not clear at this stage how these reviews will
be conducted, by whom or whether the results of the reviews will be made
public.

The lack of a clear evaluation strategy
is of great concern. It may be that the uncertainty in this regard is
largely the product of the evolving nature of the trials and that there
will be much greater clarity during 2004. I have previously, however,
expressed concern at reliance by COAG on internal monitoring and evaluation
strategies. In particular, I have expressed concerns about the lack of
information that is publicly reported about such evaluations (thus limiting
government accountability), the lack of appropriate consultation with
Indigenous peoples and lack of independence in the monitoring process. ^[103]

My concern about such processes is reinforced
by the failure in recent years of the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs to complete two significant evaluations
on COAG's behalf and in a timely manner. The first is the review of progress
by all levels of government in implementing the recommendations of the Bringing them home report. The second is an audit of family violence
programmes to guide the response of COAG to this crisis issue. Approximately
three years after these reviews were announced, neither has been presented
to COAG nor made public.

ATSIC has also expressed significant concern
about the monitoring framework for the trials. It states:

The Commission is particularly concerned that a comprehensive
national evaluation strategy is not in place. This is likely to lead
to unclear judgements later on, as the starting point for assessing
change has not been clearly established. In addition, the Commission
is concerned that there is no commitment to an independent evaluation
of the initiative. The reliance on a systems-based internal evaluation
strategy might not provide the most objective perspective on the successes
and failures of the initiative, and may produce an inadequate basis
upon which to make long term policy and program reforms. ^[104]

A related issue is the existence of adequate
data to contribute to the monitoring and evaluation process.

In the initial stages of the trials, there
has been a significant focus on developing local level priorities, outcomes
and benchmarks. The 'Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce Database'
has been developed to capture this information across the eight trial
sites. A number of government agencies have informed me that it is intended
that this local level information will be able to be aggregated into a
national level analysis. The intention is that this information will be
able to be aligned with the headline and strategic change indicators developed
by the Steering Committee for the Provision of Government Services, and
that data will able to be compared 'against existing portfolio budget
statements and other cross-government frameworks at the national level'.^[105]

It is not, however, clear how the local
level data will be able to be matched up to the national level in these
ways. There is very little ability to disaggregate, on a regional or local
basis, the statistics which form the basis of the headline indicators
and strategic change indicators in the national reporting framework. The
emphasis of the trials to date has also, quite rightly, not been on improving
data collection at this local level. Hence, existing systems of data collection
are very poor at identifying the status of Indigenous people in a particular
locality or region across a broad range of social and economic indicators.
Accordingly they are also ill equipped to measure change in such indicators.

It is quite likely that it will not be possible
to match up local level indicators with the national reporting framework,
other than through the provision of case studies which can illustrate
links between particular types of policy interventions and outcomes. This
will, of itself, be valuable information. The concern is that the trials
have set objectives for data analysis and performance monitoring that
will not be able to be achieved because of the existing limitations in
data quality and collection.

On the basis of these concerns, I make the following recommendations.

Fifth, it is not clear how the lessons learnt
from the trials will be transferable and contribute to broader reform
of program design and service delivery for Indigenous peoples. The adequacy
of the performance monitoring framework, as discussed above, will be one
of the key determinants of such lessons.

ATSIC have expressed some preliminary concerns
about the conduct of the trials and the transferability of lessons learned.
Their concerns relate to three broad factors. The first is limited experimentation
of new approaches by Lead Agencies in the trials. ATSIC argue that to
date:

there has been little progress in doing 'business' differently ...
Silos continue to characterise government relationships and the way
in which funds are provided and accounted for, leading to restrictions
in the experimentation of interventions. Lead Agencies are struggling
to balance different priorities with trial partners leading to difficulties
in progressing joined-up projects on the ground. As little obvious
progress has been made in re-engineering programs, Lead Agencies are
tending to use existing programs in the trial sites with little flexibility
or creativity.^[106]

They note, significantly, that 'programs
that are used more flexibly tend to be Indigenous-specific rather than
mainstream'.^[107]

The second concern identified by ATSIC is
that there has been a blurring in some instances of Commonwealth and state
responsibilities, 'attracting the possibility of cost shifting between
parties' compounded by the 'inexperience of Lead Agencies and their personnel
when engaging with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities'.^[108] ATSIC sees a need for 'clearer mechanisms ... to facilitate a more cohesive
joined-up approach accompanied by greater flexibility in the availability
of fund to improve outcomes' combined with 'effective and timely evaluation'.^[109]

The third concern identified by ATSIC relating
to transferability of outcomes is a perception that initiatives in one
trial are not being identified as having potential application in other
trials. They state:

One of the strengths of the initiative is the opportunity
to develop locally based solutions to meet locally identified needs.
It seems reasonable therefore, that where a Lead Agency has proceeded
to implement a program differently, such as increasing the provision
of housing to one of the communities in the trial site, then that
initiative should be considered for the other trial sites. This would
address basic needs that are common to most of the sites. ^[110]

It is clear that there are many common issues
across trial sites that could be advanced more quickly if each trial can
work from the experiences in other trial sites. This has been identified
as a critical issue by the ICCT. As noted earlier, a mechanism for coordinating
state and territory activity could also be of great value in addressing
this significant issue.

Ultimately, the transferability of outcomes
from the trials in the longer term will depend on whether the trials are
able to more broadly change the status quo of service delivery and program
guidelines. A significant challenge will be ensuring that the adoption
of more holistic, whole-of-government approaches is not a transient feature
and that departments do not simply slip back into their usual ways of
doing things once the trials have ended. Factors that will need to be
addressed to ensure that this is not the case include the following:

Continued engagement of mainstream
departments and programs: It is clear that a significant
factor in the early success of the trials has been the high level involvement
and commitment of ministers and departmental secretaries at the federal
level in taking responsibility for particular communities (as the lead
agency) and harnessing the services and programs of mainstream departments.
The lead agency approach is not sustainable beyond a limited number
of communities in its current format. Mechanisms such as the Minister's
group and the Secretaries group may be more sustainable, so long as
departments continue to have a significant investment in promoting improved
coordination of services.

Coordinating funding of proposals
in non-trial sites: Similarly, the identification
of a region or community as a trial site has naturally elevated the
priority with which the service delivery needs of that community or
region are dealt with. Governments and departments have been able to
look to how they can relax program guidelines or join up funding from
different programs and areas for more holistic solutions. A significant
challenge is identifying how proposals in non-trial sites can also benefit
from this approach where such proposals do not enjoy such priority attention.

Resource constraints: While the emphasis of the trials is not on new money but on better coordinating
and getting value from existing money, there is a broader context of
significant under-funding of key areas of Indigenous disadvantage. The
focus on a limited number of communities, and the
availability of a short term funding pool, shields the trials
from this broader issue. Funding restrictions will become a significant
issue when seeking to more broadly implement the lessons learnt from
the trials. This will be complicated further by an emphasis on addressing
relative need and reallocating funding towards those areas and issues
of greatest disadvantage.

Capacity development of Indigenous
communities: Each of the trials has built on local Indigenous
initiatives that were already under development to improve service delivery
to their communities. For example, processes such as the ATSIC Murdi
Paaki Regional Council initiatives of community working parties, the
incorporation of the Tharmarrurr Regional Council under local government
legislation in the Northern Territory, and the Cape York Partnerships
in Queensland were relatively developed when the decision was made to
make each of these areas a trial site. The trials have undoubtedly greatly
advanced processes that were previously underway in these and other
trial areas.

However, the broader concern is how transferable
lessons will be drawn from the trials for those communities which experience
a high degree of dysfunction and which are not, at least at this stage,
capable of organising themselves so that they can better interact with
governments.^[111] In other words, how
do we avoid the situation where governments focus their attention on
improved coordination of service delivery to those communities that
are relatively organised? Even in the trial sites, where there has been
a great deal of activity by communities to address these issues, it
has taken a long time to develop the capacity of the communities to
the point where they can determine what the priorities of the community
are and the approaches that should be adopted. It is critical that in
the longer term other communities do not get left behind because they
do not have such capacity.

There are also a number of processes available
to ATSIC and Indigenous peoples to build on the achievements of the trials
and more broadly inform policies and programs.

There are three significant processes which
ATSIC currently utilises which provide ATSIC with some leverage for advancing
inter-governmental coordination and improved service delivery.

ATSIC has also negotiated agreements and compacts with
federal government departments such as the Department of Workplace Relations
(DEWR), the Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) and the
Department of Health and Ageing. ^[112]

Second, is through the operation of ATSIC's Regional
Councils and the development of their regional plans. As ATSIC have stated
about their approach to the COAG trials:

ATSIC-ATSIS' approach has been to promote the Regional
Councils as the pre-eminent source of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
advice in all trial sites. This is easier in regions where Regional
Councils are the main source of leadership but it has proved difficult
where other organisations compete for this role or the trial boundary
differs from the Regional Council boundary.^[113]

The better utilisation of ATSIC Regional Councils and
the capacity of ATSIC's regional planning process is discussed in detail
in the next chapter. Regional plans offer a significant opportunity for
coordinating government activity within regions. Recent agreements between
ATSIC, DEWR and DEST, for example, commit these departments to using the
regional planning process to better coordinate their activities regionally.

Third, ATSIC leads the Community Participation Agreements
(CPA) initiative under the Australians Working Together package.
The CPA process provides ATSIC with a significant tool for advancing the
objectives of Indigenous communities or regions as they relate to aspects
of government service delivery.

The CPA initiative was announced in the 2001-02 Federal
Budget, with $30.5 million allocated to ATSIC over four years to develop
and implement agreements in remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
communities. The agreements involve the community identifying practical
ways people can contribute to their families and communities in return
for their income support payments. To date, ten CPA initiatives have commenced
in the Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia
and New South Wales. These ten processes cover a mix of individual communities
and regional negotiations, and involve the following 27 communities:

• Mutitijulu (NT);
• West Macdonnell Ranges (NT) - covering the communities of Papunya,
  Ikuntji, Kintore and Mt Leibig;
• Tennant Creek (NT) - involving the communities of Ali Curung, Elliot
  and Mungkarta;
• Canteen Creek (NT) - involving the communities of Kunlinjara, Canteen
  Creek, Epenarra and 10 Mile communities;
• Barrow Creek (NT) - involving the communities of Tara, Barrow Creek
  and Wilora;Coen (Qld);
• Aurukun (Qld);
• Tjurabalan (WA) - involving the communities of Yagga Yagga, Billiluna,
  Mulan, Ringers Soak and Balgo;
• New South Wales - involving the communities of Bourke, Brewarrina,
  Walgett and Wilcannia; and
• Oodnadatta (SA).

CPA initiatives are underway in a number of COAG whole
of government trial sites. This includes Tjurabalan (WA) which corresponds
to the west Kimberley trial, and a number of specific communities in the
Murdi Paaki region and Cape York respectively. CPA negotiations are occurring
on a community-by-community basis and in remote COAG regions their potential
is being explored as a subsidiary measure to support the COAG shared responsibility
approach. In addition to the aforementioned COAG sites, preliminary discussions
are occurring in Wadeye (NT) and the Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) Lands
in South Australia about their interest in implementing a CPA agreement.

A further tool which is available to Indigenous communities
to build on the advances of the COAG trials are the Indigenous Land Use
Agreement provisions of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). In discussions
with government officers concerning the trials it was noted that there
are similarities between the issues raised in some native title agreement
negotiations and the negotiation of Shared Responsibility Agreements in
the COAG trials. It was noted that while native title issues have not
emerged as central issues in the initial stages of the trials, it is anticipated
that these issues will become more prominent in some trial sites as the
trials progress.

My Native Title Report 2003 provides a detailed
analysis of how federal, state and territory government policies and approaches
to native title negotiations promote the utilisation of native title as
a tool for economic and social development within a cultural context.
It suggests that the full potential of native title as contributing to
these processes is not being utilised and in many instances is being actively
prevented by the approaches of governments. The report states:

In many cases the role of native title is glaringly
absent from States' policy responses to the reconciliation process.
Native title negotiations and agreements are not seen as part of the
State's policy toolbox directed towards transforming the conditions
of Indigenous people's lives ...

The two important policy responses to emerge from the
reconciliation process as necessary to facilitate the economic and social
development of Indigenous people are, firstly, a whole-of-government
approach to Indigenous policy and secondly, partnerships between government
and Indigenous communities ... [A] whole-of-government approach, which
requires government to integrate the responsibilities and policies of
all the agencies concerned with providing services to Indigenous communities,
is a very important element of achieving the sustainable development
of these communities. However the application of this approach is very
limited and fails to ensure that Indigenous policies in all their manifestations
are underpinned by consistent objectives. In particular it fails to
ensure that native title programs are brought within or are consistent
with strategies for achieving economic social and cultural development.

The second policy response to reconciliation, the establishment
of partnerships between Indigenous communities and governments, is also
an important element of sustainable development ... government plays
an important role in the group achieving its development objectives:
it facilitates the group in identifying its development goals; it assists
the group to build upon its assets, skills and knowledge so as to achieve
its development goals; it assists the group to identify which aspects
of its asset skills and knowledge base may need to be supplemented,
and it facilitates the group to monitor and evaluate the strategies
it adopts to achieve its goals. This policy framework can be summed
up as a partnership approach. It is a partnership, however, with special
characteristics.

First, for the approach to achieve sustainable development
of the community, the dominant partner is the Indigenous side. It is
the community that must determine its policy objectives and strategies
and control the way they are achieved. Decisions to this effect must
be conducted through processes and institutions which the community
respects and which reflect the group's cultural values ... native title
provides a framework to ensure decisions are made in this way.

Second, the government's role in this partnership directed
to the sustainable development of the group is to facilitate and assist
the group to achieve its goals. The government should not take over
the control of the process. Indigenous leader Gerhardt Pearson has put
the situation thus:

It is easy for government bureaucracies to accept so-called
"whole-of-government" approaches, coordinated service delivery and so
on. It is much harder for them to let go of the responsibility. On one
hand we have the almost complete failure on their part to lead and facilitate
social and economic development in Indigenous Australia. On the other
hand, our experience is that the government bureaucracies are resistant
to the transfer of responsibility to our people.^[114]

Despite the limitations in the way the whole-of-government
and partnership approaches have been applied these two responses to
reconciliation have provided an important foundation for economic and
social development to occur in Indigenous communities. Yet in many cases
States have not included native title in their response to reconciliation.^[115]

Overall, the COAG whole-of-government community trials
have advanced significantly during 2003 and offer much potential for reforming
inter-government and whole-of-government approaches to service delivery
to Indigenous peoples. There have already been a number of achievements
from the process. There remain a number of challenges and some structural
issues (particularly relating to monitoring and evaluation) that remain
to be addressed. The long term success of the process will, however, depend
on how the trials promote structural change in the way that governments
go about delivering services to Indigenous peoples. A number of challenges
and options for this have been identified in this section of the report.

Conclusion - Government accountability for reconciliation

During 2003, the government's approach to reconciliation
has continued to be restricted to measures that fall within its 'practical'
reconciliation approach. The government has rejected the introduction
of measures (such as those recommended by the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee and contained in the Reconciliation Bill 2001)
to progress issues that fall outside the parameters it has set. This has
the consequence of there being a partial framework for progressing reconciliation
with significant issues of unfinished business left in abeyance.

The focus of this chapter has largely been on processes
for government accountability for 'practical' reconciliation. It has sought
to evaluate progress of the government on their own terms. It establishes
that progress in advancing 'practical' reconciliation over the course
of the year has been variable.

The statistical data indicates that there has been limited
progress over the past five years in achieving the central purpose of
practical reconciliation, namely improved Indigenous well-being. Of particular
concern is the fact that the disparities that exist between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous Australians have remained substantially the same, or
have widened over the past five and ten years. Indigenous Australians
also presently endure health standards worse than those in some so-called
'third world' countries. The lack of progress in achieving substantial
improvement in Indigenous well-being is also in marked contrast to outcomes
in similar settler countries such as the United States of America, Canada
and New Zealand.

The Social Justice Report 2000 set out a human
rights approach for progressing reconciliation. It identified five integrated
requirements to ensure sufficient government accountability for addressing
Indigenous disadvantage from a human rights perspective. These five requirements
are:

1) Making an unqualified national commitment to redressing
Indigenous disadvantage;

2) Facilitating the collection of sufficient data to
support decision-making and reporting, and developing appropriate mechanisms
for the independent monitoring and evaluation of progress towards redressing
Indigenous disadvantage;

3) Adopting appropriate benchmarks to redress Indigenous
disadvantage, negotiated with Indigenous peoples, state and territory
governments and other service delivery agencies, with clear timeframes
for achievement of both longer term and short-term goals;

4) Providing national leadership to facilitate increased
coordination between governments, reduced duplication and overlap between
services; and

5) Ensuring the full participation of Indigenous organisations
and communities in the design and delivery of services.^[116]

The year 2003 saw the development of significant measures
for advancing reconciliation within the framework of the Council of Australian
Governments. The national reporting framework on Indigenous disadvantage
and whole-of-government trials under COAG have contributed to meeting
aspects of the second, fourth and fifth of these requirements. These initiatives
are in fledgling stages and there are a number of issues that remain to
be addressed before success is assured.

These initiatives have not, however, been backed up by
a range of other commitments and processes that are necessary to ensure
the long term sustainability of improvements in the well-being of Indigenous
peoples. There remains an absence of an appropriate national commitment
to redressing Indigenous disadvantage, sufficiently rigorous monitoring
and evaluation mechanisms, and benchmarks with both short term and longer
term targets agreed with Indigenous peoples. There are also critical issues
relating to the depth of inequality experienced by Indigenous people,
the size and growth of the Indigenous population and under-resourcing
of services and programs to Indigenous peoples that cannot continue to
be ignored if there is to be any genuine improvement in Indigenous peoples'
circumstances.

Ultimately, the process of practical reconciliation is
hampered by its lack of a substantive action plan for overcoming Indigenous
disadvantage in the longer term, with short term objectives to indicate
whether the rate of progress towards this goal is sufficient.

The failure of the government to address these factors
as part of its practical reconciliation approach reflects a fundamental
flaw in the process. By committing to provide full access to citizenship
entitlements and nothing more, practical reconciliation is a 'blank cheque'
and amounts to a commitment into the foreseeable future to pay the increased
economic and social costs associated with Indigenous disadvantage. In
relation to employment alone, this cost is estimated by the Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research to rise to the vicinity of 0.5 to
1% of gross domestic product within the decade.

At this stage, it is not possible to foresee a time when
'record levels of expenditure' of the Commonwealth on Indigenous services
will not be necessary. It is also not possible to foresee a time when
a continuation of the current approach will result in significant improvements
in the lives of Indigenous peoples. Practical reconciliation does not
have a plan for overcoming rather than simply managing Indigenous
disadvantage.

Ultimately, deficiencies in monitoring and evaluating
processes for reconciliation indicate that there are problems of accountability
of governments for their contribution to reconciliation. This lack of
accountability allows governments to unilaterally establish the boundaries
of issues that they will address in the first place and then to avoid
public scrutiny when material improvements in Indigenous well-being are
not achieved and sustained. A number of recommendations have been made
throughout the course of this chapter to address this situation.

The focus of this chapter has been on government accountability.
This is, however, only half of the story. The next chapter examines initiatives
over the past year relating to the role of Indigenous communities and
organisations. It also builds on the analysis in this chapter by considering
how Indigenous people can play a more meaningful role in setting the priorities
of governments in achieving sustainable improvements in Indigenous well-being
and in monitoring and evaluating their performance.

1. See: Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice
Report 1999, HREOC Sydney 2000, pp 2-24.

2. For an analysis
of these themes see: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2001, HREOC Sydney 2001,
Chapters 2,3,6 and Appendix 2 (Herein Social Justice Report 2001);
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social
Justice Report 2002, HREOC Sydney 2002, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (Herein Social Justice Report 2002).

4. ibid, p87.

5. The debate on the
Bill was interrupted after 2 ½ hours and it is unclear when it will recommence.

6. Senator Ridgeway, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p17988.

7. ibid.

8. Senator Evans, Hansard
- Senate, 27 November 2003, p17988.

9. Senator Brown, Hansard
- Senate, 27 November 2003, p17993.

10. Senator Patterson, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p18003.

11. Senator Heffernan, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p18008.

12. Senator Ferris, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p17990.

13. ibid, pp 17990-91. See also: Department of Immigration, Multiculturalism and
Indigenous Affairs, Fact Sheet No.3 - Reconciliation, online
at

www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/facts/index.htm,
accessed 10 November 2003.

14. See in
particular: Social Justice Report 2001, Chapter 6; Social
Justice Report 2002, Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

15. Ruddock, P and
National Sorry Day Committee, Recognition of removal practices at
Reconciliation Place, Joint Media Statement, 29 June 2003.

16. In the Social
Justice Report 2001 I described the consequences of this approach
as follows: 'Recent years have seen the emphasis of the reconciliation
process shift dramatically. Currently, it is not about mutual accommodation
on the basis of equality - it is about whether one group, Indigenous people,
are prepared to conform to the rest of society. If not, then the offer
is closed.': Social Justice Report 2001, p221.

17. Huggins, J, 'The
figures seem to confirm that practical reconciliation is not enough',
On Line Opinion, 19 November 2003, p2,

,(5
December 2003).

18. Reconciliation
Australia, 2003 Reconciliation report, Reconciliation Australia,
Canberra 2003, p10.

19. Huggins, J, op.cit, p3.

20. Senate Legal and
Constitutional References Committee, Reconciliation: Off track, Parliament of Australia, Canberra 2003.

21. See Appendix one
of this report for discussion of data collection issues.

22. Senator Vanstone,
'Indigenous wellbeing is a top priority', Media Release, 15
October 2003, www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/media/media03/v03002.htm

23. Senator Ferris, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, pp17991-2.

24. This report is
discussed in the next section of this chapter.

25. Senator Vanstone,
'Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage', Media Release, 12 November 2003, www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/media/media03/v03003.htm,
accessed 12 November 2003.

26. See Social
Justice Report 2002, pp85-87.

27. Altman, J and
Hunter, B, 'Monitoring 'practical' reconciliation: Evidence from the reconciliation
decade, 1991-2001', Discussion Paper 254 / 2003, Centre for Aboriginal
Economic Policy Research, Canberra 2003, p1. Available online at: www.anu.edu.au/caepr/discussion2.php.

28. ibid, p2.

29. ibid, p9.

30. ibid.

31. Although note
that the Australian Bureau of Statistics produced alternative adjusted
figures for household income (as presented in Appendix One of this report)
which showed a slight increase in the disparity between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous people.

32. Altman, J and
Hunter, B, op.cit, p11.

33. ibid., pp10-11.

34. ibid, p v.

35. ibid, p12.

36. ibid., p16.

37. ibid, p v..

38. ibid., p16.

39. ibid.

40. Social Justice
Report 2002, pp59-60.

41. Hunter, H, Kinfu,
Y and Taylor, J, 'The future of Indigenous work: Forecasts of labour force
status to 2011', Discussion paper 251/2003, Centre for Aboriginal Economic
Policy Research, Canberra 2003, p3. Available online at: www.anu.edu.au/caepr/discussion2.php,
p9.

42. ibid, p10.

43. Taylor, J, and
Altman, J, The job ahead - Escalating economic costs of Indigenous
employment disparity, ATSIC, Canberra 1997; Taylor, J, and Hunter,
B, The job still ahead: Economic costs of continuing Indigenous employment
disparity, ATSIC, Canberra, 1998.

44. Hunter, H, Kinfu,
Y and Taylor, J, 'The future of Indigenous work: Forecasts of labour force
status to 2011', op.cit, Table 12, p17.

45. Ibid, p19.

46. Ibid, p20.

47. The Committee
has since been renamed the Steering Committee for the Review of Government
Service Provision.

48. Steering Committee
for the Review of Government Service Provision, Overcoming Indigenous
Disadvantage - Key indicators 2003, Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne
2003, p xvii (Herein, Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage).

49. Banks, G, 'Indigenous
disadvantage: assessing policy impacts', Speech, Pursuing Opportunity
and Prosperity conference, Melbourne, 13 November 2003, pp1-2, available
online from: www.pc.gov.au. Emphasis
added.

50. Overcoming
Indigenous disadvantage, pp 1.1, 1.2.

51. ibid, p2.4. The Steering Committee notes that these outcomes were widely supported
by Indigenous peoples during their consultations on the draft framework.

52. ibid, p2.2.

53. ibid, p2.1.

54. Banks, G, op.cit., p3.

55. ibid.

56. For a more detailed
overview of the rationale for choosing each strategic area and the change
indicators underneath these, see: Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage, pp2.6-2.10

57. ibid, p2.5.

58. Banks, G, op.cit, p9.

59. ibid, p5.

60. ibid, p3.

61. Social Justice
Report 2000, pp 96-100 and recommendations 6-10, pp131-32.

62. Overcoming
Indigenous disadvantage, p2.9.

63. For a summary
of these see the overview of the report: ibid, p LII.

64. Banks, G, op.cit, pp9-10.

65. ibid, p9.

66. Social Justice
Report 2002, p133.

67. ibid, p130.

68. Banks, G, op.cit, p9.

69. Social Justice
Report 2002, pp132-33.

70. Banks, G, op.cit., p9.

71. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission - Senate Legal
and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards
reconciliation, 26 November 2002, p10.

72. Council of Australian
Governments, Communique, COAG, Canberra, 5 April 2002, p18 (contained
in Attachment 1: COAG Reconciliation Framework - Report on progress in
2001).

73. ibid, p4.

74. Senate Legal and
Constitutional References Committee, Reconciliation: Off track, Parliament of Australia, Canberra 2003, p75.

75. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission - Senate Legal
and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards
reconciliation, op.cit, p12.

76. ibid, p13.

77. Available online
at: www.facs.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/aboutfacs/programs/

community_indig_housing_2010.htm.

78. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission - Senate Legal
and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards
reconciliation, op.cit, p15.

79. Department of
Education, Science and Training, National Report to Parliament on
Indigenous Education and Training 2001, DEST, Canberra 2002, p2.

80. See: www.dest.gov.au/schools/indigenous/nielns.htm.

81. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission - Senate Legal
and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards
reconciliation, op.cit, p12. For details of a number of these action
plans see: ibid, pp 13-17.

82. Council for Aboriginal
Reconciliation, Towards a benchmarking framework for service delivery
to Indigenous Australians, CAR and Centre for Aboriginal Economic
Policy Research, Canberra 1998, p16.

83. United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Development Programme, Draft Guidelines: A Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies,
OHCHR, Geneva 2002, Guideline 4, pp14-15. See also: Social Justice
Report 2002, Chapter 4; Social Justice Report 2000, Chapter
4.

84. Social Justice
Report 2000, p97; quoting the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report 2000.

85. Council for Aboriginal
Reconciliation, Overcoming disadvantage, as quoted in Social
Justice Report 2000, p99.

86. Indigenous Communities
Coordination Taskforce, Towards better outcomes for Indigenous Australians, DIMIA Canberra 2003,

www.icc.gov.au/publications?MySourceSession=6c119361b7d1a3a6cffc8b581a0eba82,

accessed 15 November 2003.

87. Council of Australian
Governments, Communique, 5 April 2002,

www.pmc.gov.au/docs/coag050402.cfm,
accessed 12 December 2003.

88. Indigenous Communities
Coordination Taskforce, Trial Objectives, online at:

www.icc.gov.au/communities/objectives/,
(29 October 2003).

89. Indigenous Communities
Coordination Taskforce, Imagine What Could Happen if we Worked Together:
Shared Responsibility and a Whole of Governments Approach, Conference
Paper - The Native Title Conference, Alice Springs, 3 June 2003,

www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/ntru/conf2003/papers/hawgood.pdf, 24 December
2003.

90. For a detailed
evaluation of mutual obligation in an Indigenous context see: Social
Justice Report 2001, Chapter 2 and 3.

91. Hawgood, D, Hansard
-House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Affairs, 13 October 2003, p1294.

92. Quartermaine,
L, Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social
Justice Commissioner on COAG trials, 15 January 2004, p4.

93. Discussions with
ICCT, November 2003.

94. Hannaford, J,
Huggins, J and Collins, B, In the hands of the regions - A new ATSIC.
Report of the Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 2003, Recommendation 32, p55.

95. ibid, p51.

96. Hawgood, D, Hansard
- Senate Legal and Constitution Legislation Committee, (Estimates),
4 November 2003, p8.

97. ibid.

98. As noted in Appendix
2, ATSIC has contributed $1million (of the $3million total) per annum
to this Flexible Funding Pool.

99. Quartermaine,
L, op.cit p6.

100. ibid, p5.

101. ATSIC note that
'the involvement of the Commission and Regional Councils in the selection
of the trial sites has varied from none to limited, with the exception
of the Murdi Paaki Regional Council, which nominated its region as a trial
site and since its announcement has been integrally involved in the development
of the trial': ibid, p6.

102. ibid.

103. Social Justice
Report 2001, p201; and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social
Justice Commissioner, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee inquiry into the stolen generation, HREOC Sydney
2000, online at:

www.humanrights.gov.au/social_justice/senate_submission/index.html.

104. ibid.

105. Indigenous Community
Coordination Taskforce, Shared responsibility shared future - Indigenous
whole of government initiative: The Australian government performance
monitoring and evaluation framework, DIMIA Canberra 2003, p3. See
Appendix 2 of this report for further information.

106. Quartermaine,
L, op.cit, p4.

107. ibid.

108. ibid.

109. ibid, p5.

110. ibid ¸p5.

111. It is the interaction
of these factors that is critical - many of the communities in the trial
sites would describe themselves as experiencing high levels of dysfunction.
It is the determination, and in most cases simply the ability, to address
this that is missing in some other communities.

112. See comments
on this approach by the CEO of ATSIC in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission, Annual Report 2002-03, ATSIC Canberra 2003, pp15-16.

113. Quartermaine,
L, op.cit, p4.

114. Pearson, G, Man Cannot Live By Service Delivery Alone, Conference Paper,
Opportunity and Prosperity Conference, Melbourne November 2003, online
at www.capeyorkpartnerships.com, (14/11/2003).

115. Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report
2003, HREOC Sydney 2004. Note: this quote is from the draft report.

116. Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice
Report 2000, HREOC Sydney 2000, p100.